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Dive into the research topics where Kenneth Koford is active.

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Featured researches published by Kenneth Koford.


The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance | 1993

Stock market views of corporate multinationalism: some evidence from announcements of international joint ventures

Il Yung Chung; Kenneth Koford; Insup Lee

Abstract This study examines trends in U.S. international joint ventures and describes the U.S.-foreign partnerships. To analyze the profitability of U.S. international joint ventures, it develops a data set of all such ventures from 1969–1989 and indicates their general nature and trends. It then investigates the effects of announcements of international joint ventures on common stock returns. It also determines whether the gains or losses affected by the announcements of cross-border alliances are related to the economic status of the host countries and foreign partners, the specific industries, ana the number of participatingfirms in these joint ventures.


Public Choice | 1982

Centralized vote-trading

Kenneth Koford

This paper presents a model of centralized vote-trading in a legislature. In this model, legislators trade only with party leaders, who set prices at which they will buy needed vote-changes and sell promises to pass or defeat particular bills. Each legislator trades away votes on bills of little concern to him and of high concern to leaders, and purchases promises from the leaders to pass (or defeat) particular bills of high concern to the legislator, relative to the price the leguslator must pay.This model is intended as a formal representation of an ‘efficient’ and possibly desirable legislature; modifications are needed to make it useful in describing actual legislatures. However, some evidence is cited to show that this model better accords with reality than previous vote-trading models.


Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | 1998

The Market Value of Rarity

Kenneth Koford; Adrian E. Tschoegl

Abstract Most theories of demand assume that consumers value the characteristics of products but are unconcerned with how many other consumers also consume the product. However, several theories of demand argue that consumers can value the exclusivity of possessing a rare object. We test this implication on a particular collectible, rare coins. Our paper examines the case of coins of a given type and identical quality that have mintages in different quantities. This allows us to exclude the common case in which rarity (or price itself) is an indicator of quality. For our sample, rarer coins command higher prices; rarity in the form of original mintage more strongly influences the market price than does collectibility as represented by the rarest coins of each mint mark or year. We also point out that here may be other goods such as automobiles, for which rarity may influence market demand.


European Journal of Political Economy | 2000

Citizen Restraints on 'Leviathan' Government: Transition Politics in Bulgaria

Kenneth Koford

Standard theories of government in transition countries (Olson, M., Jr., 1995. Why the Transition from Communism Is So Difficult. Eastern Economic Journal 21, 437-462.) regard politicians and bureaucracies as “bandits” who extract the maximum resources from the public. Extraction is limited when the bandit expects to maintain power for a longer period of time and when the public can resist. When “bandits” try to gain wealth quickly and then leave, it is hard for them to work together – they become “disorganized roving bandits”. In the transition, the public begins to act together to restrain the ability of the government to extract rents, changing the constraint faced by “bandits”. The paper uses these principles to analyze the politics of transition in Bulgaria. While some political actors extracted rents for their personal use, others followed traditional authoritarian principles, producing the leader’s idea of the public good – a concept of government as Leviathan. Four episodes of transition policy are considered. In each, the government followed policies that led to its collapse under citizen resistance. Either governments were too “disorganized” to carry out utility-maximizing policies, or they underestimated the willingness of the public to resist their policies.


Policy Sciences | 1986

Inflation, recession and the federal budget deficit (or, blaming economic problems on a statistical mirage)

George M. Guess; Kenneth Koford

Policy proposals to balance the budget and to limit government spending assume that budget deficits cause substantial harm, either increasing inflation or crowding out private borrowing from credit markets. These assertions have the support of policymakers across the breadth of the political spectrum, and dominate current political debate on macroeconomic policy. However, macroeconomic theory fails to provide a clearcut causal connection between budget deficits and larger economic problems such as inflation and recession. Thus, policies could be enacted that attack the symptoms instead of the causes of the deficit.We use the Granger causality test to find the causal relationships between budget deficits and inflation, GNP, and private investment respectively, for seventeen OECD countries for the period 1949–1981. Deficits do not cause changes in these variables; rather there is weak evidence that inflation and recession cause deficits. This implies that deficits are a symptom rather than a cause of inflation and reduced national output. So, if our goal is to reduce inflation and increase output, we should look to more direct policies than reducing deficits.


Economics of Planning | 2000

The Effect of Incomes Policies on Inflation in Bulgaria and Poland

Tihomir Enev; Kenneth Koford

Transition countries, and many other countries with incomplete markets, have faced long periods with both high inflation and unemployment. Policies to reduce inflation without high unemployment include incomes policies, which were widely employed in transition countries. This paper studies the effects of incomes policies on inflation in Bulgaria and Poland in 1990-1993. The actual policies, which were complex and changing, are examined. The policies do not appear well-designed in a technical sense to reduce inflation.A time-series analysis is made which includes standard determinants of inflation including past inflation, wage increases, exchange rate changes, and monetary changes, plus a dummy for incomes policies. The regressions are fairly successful in fitting standard factors that should influence inflation, particularly the exchange rate and unemployment in Bulgaria and wages and unemployment in Poland. They find a fairly substantial inflation-reducing effect from the Bulgarian policy but no significant results from the Polish policy.


Public Choice | 1993

The Median and the Competitive Equilibrium in One Dimension

Kenneth Koford

Two alternative models of legislative outcomes are the minimum winning coalition and the competitive equilibrium (Koford, 1982). In a unidimensional setting, the outcome under the former is the median, while the outcome under the latter is the highest net demand location.This paper describes the competitive equilibrium in a unidimensional model, and shows that under some common conditions it coincides with the median, in particular for pure redistributive issues. However, for distributive issues, the two equilibria will differ. Finally, the comparative statics of the two models are examined; while the winning coalition is sensitive only to changes in the location of the median, for “distributive” issues the competitive equilibrium has the standard “economic” comparative statics that the outcome adjusts in the direction of the change in preferences.


Public Choice | 1982

Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking

Kenneth Koford

Recent formal models of legislatures have proved that equilibrium outcomes are extremely unlikely without either (1) extreme restrictions upon preferences or (2) constraints upon the agenda. The implication is that constant instability or dictatorial manipulation is the norm in politics.This paper argues to the contrary, that legislatures (and other political processes) are characterized by some regularities, and that equilibrium models are the appropriate technique to use in describing these regularities. Examples from economic theory are used to illustrate this principle. The assumption of equilibrium is methodological, committing the researcher to develop models that have specific empirical implications.Using analogies from the economic theories of general equilibrium, oligopoly, and demand revealing processes, some potentially fruitful means of developing equilibrium political models are described. Assuming that legislators may freely make binding contracts has both empirical and normative advantages. Finally, institutional restrictions on legislative agendas may assure equilibrium. These include ‘constitutional’ rules, agreements to share ‘pork barrel’ projects evenly, limitation of committees to specific policy arenas, and the election of leaders who then determine the voting agenda.


The American Economic Review | 1992

Macroeconomic Market Incentive Plans: History and Theoretical Rationale

Kenneth Koford; Jeffrey B. Miller

This paper explores the contemporary debate among economists on the means to move the economy toward high employment without inflation-beyond the traditional instruments of monetary and fiscal policy. The authors pay particular attention to the Market Anti-Inflation Plan (MAP), submitted by Lerner and Colander in 1980. The reasons economists have searched for alternative measures relate to the problems associated with wage and price controls. MAP is an anti-inflation plan that allows relative prices to adjust: The scheme increases costs to firms that raise prices, and contains an added incentive to lower prices. Since MAP is designed to fight macroeconomic inflation by changing the incentives of individual price setters, the relationship between microeconomic behavior and macroeconomic outcomes must be addressed. The theoretical justification for MAP is that there is a macroeconomic externality, and MAP can mitigate the ramifications of the externality. However, efforts to more clearly define the nature of this externality require a better understanding of transaction costs. Consequently, there will be the need for a mechanism to integrate such costs into microeconomic and macroeconomic models.


Public Choice | 1982

Optimal voting rules under uncertainty

Kenneth Koford

The theory of ‘constitutional’ choice of voting rules developed by Buchanan and Tullock is an extended to an explicit decision-theoretic form. Voters in the ‘constitutional’ position choose what they believe will be their optimal share or majority rule for making social decisions, by maximizing their individual expected utility from the anticipated social decisions, under conditions of uncertainty.The rule that maximizes expected social benefits depends upon (1) the expected distribution and intensity of preferences on future issues, and (2) the decisionmaking procedures and costs. ‘Decisionmaking’ and ‘external’ costs are shown to be interrelated. Following this analysis, failure to pass laws imposes ‘external’ costs in the same way that passing them does, so that the optimal majority may be lower when desirable laws are viewed as changing over time. Decisionmaking costs depend upon the way in which voters are persuaded to support or oppose bills, upon the distribution of preferences on bills, and on vote-trading possibilities. If vote-trading is almost costless, a wide range of decision rules has nearly equal social benefits. Finally, the model is used to discuss optimal voting rules for several decisionmaking bodies.

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Eric Grelak

University of Delaware

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Insup Lee

University of Delaware

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Linda Heckert

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

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