Kenneth Winston

The principles of social order : selected essays of Lon L. Fuller

Part 1 Eunomics - the theory of good order and workable social arrangements: means and ends. Part 2 The principles and forms of social order: two principles of human association the forms and limits of adjudication mediation - its forms and functions the implicit laws of lawmaking the role of contract in the ordering processes of society generally irrigation and tyranny human interaction and the law. Part 3 Legal philosophy, legal education and the practice of law: the needs of American legal philosophy the lawyer as an architect of social structures on legal education philosophy for the practising lawyer the case against freedom appendix.

The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism

It is widely held that there are no indigenous roots in China for the rule of law; it is an import from the West. The Chinese legal tradition, rather, is rule by law, as elaborated in ancient Legalist texts such as the Han Feizi. According to the conventional reading of these texts, law is amoral and an instrument in the hands of a central ruler who uses it to consolidate and maintain power. The ruler is the source of all law and stands above the law, so that law, in the final analysis, is whatever pleases the ruler. This essay argues, to the contrary, that the instrumentalism of the Han Feizi is more sophisticated and more principled than the conventional reading recognizes. It suggests that, by examining the text of the Han Feizi through the lens provided by American legal theorist Lon Fuller, we can observe an explicit articulation of what Fuller called the internal morality of law. The principles of this morality are elaborated and their importance explained. In this way, the Han Feizi is retrieved as a significant reference point for thinking about legal reform in China today.

What Makes Ethics Practical

The place of ethics in the curriculum of schools of public management and policy is not a settled matter. One common approach, called applied ethics, relies primarily on the work of academic philosophers and follows a two-stage process: first, work out the guiding principles (in the academy, where one is protected from worldly pressures), then apply them to the real world (where they are inevitably compromised). This essay defends an alternative approach, practical ethics, which follows John Dewey’s admonition to be guided by problems of life and practice, rather than academic disputes or disciplinary methods. The essay identifies the basic features of practical ethics, and proposes an agenda for future research. It emphasizes, above all, that practical ethics is strategic and depends crucially on the ability to exercise contingent judgment. Practical ethics takes into account the powers, opportunities, and constraints, as well as the interests (including moral interests), of human agents in particular circumstances. The picture of practical reasoning is thus at odds with the prevailing approach. The essay also addresses the peculiar position of the classroom teacher of ethics, who is not confronted by ineluctable features of real decision making, including the necessity to act and the contingencies involved in acting both effectively and well. Suggestions are offered on how the teaching of practical ethics can be improved.