Kerry Brown

The Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia 1967–1969: The Purge of the “Heirs of Genghis Khan”

Kerry Brown lived in the Inner Mongolia region from 1994 to 1996. He completed a PhD at Leeds University in modern Chinese politics from 1998 to 2004, while working in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, first in London, and then Beijing. He is the author of The Purge of the Inner Mongolian People’s Party in the Cultural Revolution in China 1967–1969 (Global Oriental, London, 2006) and Struggling Giant – China in the 21st Century (Anthem Press, London, 2007). This is a substantially modified version of the talk on the same subject which he gave to the Society on 8 November 2006. 2006 saw the fortieth anniversary of the start of the Great Cultural Revolution, launched by Chairman Mao Zedong in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in mid-1966. The anniversary was marked in the Hong Kong and international press, though, as for the last three ten-year anniversaries, there was little commemoration in the PRC itself, the country which was to be driven to the brink of civil war during the course of the “ten years of turbulence”. The Cultural Revolution (CR) was to have a devastating and profound effect on the development of the PRC, an impact that has lasted to this day. It involved as many as 10 million casualties and injuries, country-wide mayhem, the closing down of China’s schools and universities, and the devastation of China’s cultural and historical heritage. It also shaped the outlook of the generation of Chinese who hold key positions today – including the current President, Hu Jintao, and Premier Wen Jiabao, both of whom lived through the CR, and participated in it to some extent. The CR began with an obscure literary argument in Beijing between the then Vice Mayor Wu Han and a Shanghai-based writer Yao Wenyuan. Wu Han had written a play, Hai Rui, Dismissed From Office, ostensibly about a Ming dynasty official from 500 years before who had been hounded from power because of a corrupt emperor. Yao, who was to gain fame as one of the members of the group later to become notorious as the Gang of Four, accused this work of being a veiled attack on Mao Zedong and his dismissal of the popular Defence Minister and war hero Peng Dehuai after the disaster of the Great Leap Forward seven years before. This literary spat was to escalate to the point that, by 1967, most of China’s schools, its leadership structure, and many of its institutions had simply broken down. The President of China, Liu Shaoqi, was hounded from office for being a ISSN 0306-8374 print/ISSN 1477-1500 online/07/020173-15 # 2007 The Royal Society for Asian Affairs

A response to Francis Fukuyama’s ‘reflections on Chinese governance’

Abstract Governance in contemporary China presents external analysts with a number of challenges, the most significant of which is how to use general political science models to adequately conceptualize the Communist Party of China—a hybrid force that aims to cover all possible political territory in the People’s Republic and perform a function which is more extensive and yet more abstract than political parties in liberal democratic systems. Using the three areas of government modernization referred to by Francis Fukuyama—the state, rule of law and accountability—this essay looks at the ways in which the Communist Party has engaged in a progress of partial reform, tactically conceding space for other actors in some areas, while maintaining control of the core issue for control—political organization and the articulation of broad overarching goals for Chinese society, and how it has attempted to do something unique—create a modern, developed, market economy while still being governed by a Communist Party exercising a monopoly on power.

Australian relations with China and the USA: the challenge of grand strategies

Australia seems to have condemned itself to a template of its relations with the USA and China where security assurances reside with the former and economic with the latter. But this veneer of stability is misleading. Over the last decade, successive Australian prime ministers have ranged from describing China as a ‘true friend’ (Rudd in 2008) to one towards whom it feels ‘fear and greed’ (Abbott in 2014). This range betrays a policy void where the dominant Australian psyche is plagued by a perceived lack of power and fatalism. Policy towards China has become the victim of shifting ephemeral political trends driven by volatile emotions rather than a stronger, more level-headed long-term strategic vision. We will argue in this commentary that this approach is against Australia’s national interests. It is an approach that emerges out of a number of underlying drivers of Australian strategic behaviour. One is an aversion to larger strategic thinking in the foreign policy arena. Another is a lack of consensus over what China and the USA might really want from Australia and how much Australia can leverage this. Finally, there is a national psychology that sees a threat in the rise of a nation with political values as different as China’s. There is a perception that, as China is Australia’s largest trading partner, Australia has no choice but to comply reluctantly—it is trapped in a self-made dichotomy between trade and security. In order to make better foreign policy, Australia needs to interpret what is happening more accurately, understand its own position more clearly and, most importantly, view its value in these relationships more positively. Politicians must regard China as a long-term issue rather than something immediate that results in partisan policy. Australia should focus less on internal domestic political conflicts and be more reflective of the situation in the outside world. In essence, relations with China in this ‘clash of discourses’ need to be undemonised and depoliticised.

Tai Ming Cheung (ed). Forging China's Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation

Overall, this book is a valuable addition to the study of contemporary China, providing as it does a cogent analysis of the changing mindset of Chinese leaders alongside an account of the astounding transformation that the country has gone through over the past few decades. Filled with fascinating and invaluable anecdotes, covering a range of critical matters through both ‘a wide-angle view’ and ‘an up-close view’, Lampton’s work will satisfy the intellectual appetite and curiosity of seasoned China watchers and novices alike.

Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China

down’ youth, ostensibly there to aid the rural areas in their revolutionary development and create a sense of understanding for the countryside, from the early 1960s onwards being a particular example. Youths were regarded largely as unfit for farm work, many of them were appalled at the primitive conditions they found, and the vast majority got out as soon as they were able to. As Brown admits, perhaps the one benefit of this vast experiment in social engineering was that it gave urban dwellers some lasting idea of how tough it was to be a farmer in socialist China.

China's Overseas Investment in the European Union

Chinese overseas investment is a new, and growing phenomenon. In the last decade, there have been exponential increases in how much direct investment is flowing from China, particularly into the resource sector. As the eurozone crisis has deepened since 2008, there has been continuing talk by political and business leaders of investment in Europe being a key target for Chinese companies. And yet, the amounts invested so far come to less than 5 percent of Chinas global overseas foreign direct investment (FDI) total. In the crucial determinants of Chinese FDI, the EU ranks low. There is therefore a good structural reason why, despite the ambitious talk of the Chinese coming to invest more in vital sectors in the EU, this is not happening at the moment and is not likely to happen until China develops into a middle income, more developed economy.

The PRC’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative, Southeast Asia, and the United States

This chapter considers the interaction among China, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the United States and how the issue of regional trust affects Beijing’s core strategic interests. The New Silk Road maritime version opened up fresh areas of economic and strategic space around China. It spelled out clearly to the country’s maritime neighbours the opportunities and benefits of engaging more with Chinese investment, Chinese trade, and Chinese growth just as the land Silk Road had done for the Central Asian partners. In this complex political and diplomatic context, the regional response to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been a mixture of applause and excitement alongside caution.

THE ANTI-CORRUPTION STRUGGLE IN XI JINPING’S CHINA: AN ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL NARRATIVE

The fact that the extensive anti-corruption struggle that has consumed China since 2013 is highly political is widely accepted and understood. But the question is precisely what political strategy it is directed at – that of bolstering the position of the current supreme leader, Xi Jinping. Or for the preservation of the Party itself. There is a huge difference between these. The first simply means in effect the replacement of one corruptible elite by another. The second means a titanic struggle to change the Chinese communist party culture of power, and to make it enduring and sustainable.

China’s Foreign Policy Since 2012: A Question of Communication and Clarity

China’s success in developing its economy since 1978 has been accompanied by an increasing geopolitical role. In recent years, this has been accentuated by the increasing confusion about the resilience of its own systems and global visions by the United States and its allies. China has never had a larger stage to exercise its influence and present its values and vision. It has created a set of narratives for its foreign policy that conveys this vision in ways which attempt to avoid normativeness, but assert China’s legitimate interests. Nevertheless, a number of challenges have emerged for China in the past five years and these will continue shaping China’s self-image and global role in the future.

The powers of XI Jinping

Since becoming head of the Communist Party in China in late 2012, Xi Jinping has accrued an impressive raft of titles. He has been compared to the founder of the regime, Mao Zedong, and is seen by some as sitting at the centre of a network of different power sources. But is power as personalised as this model makes out in contemporary China, with all its complexity and diversity? And can one person really rule the continental sized country in this paternalistic way? This article argues that Xis powers are intrinsically linked with the organisation that he leads and which his power is sourced in – the Party itself. Far from him being the emperor of modern China, it is the Communist Party which acts as the all-seeing, all-powerful ruler. In this model, Xi is its servant, not its master.