Kevin C. Elliott

Is a little pollution good for you? : incorporating societal values in environmental research

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction: Societal Values and Environmental Research OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUMMARIES CONCLUSION 2. The Hormesis Case SETTING THE STAGE BRIEF HISTORY OF HORMESIS RESEARCH CHOOSING AND DESIGNING STUDIES DEVELOPING SCIENTIFIC LANGUAGE EVALUATING AND INTERPRETING STUDIES APPLYING RESEARCH CONCLUSION 3. An Argument for Societal Values in Policy-Relevant Research BACKGROUND ON VALUES IN SCIENCE THE EASY CASES VALUES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC LANGUAGE VALUES IN THE EVALUATION AND INTERPRETATION OF STUDIES CONCLUSION 4. Lesson #1: Safeguarding Science SPECIAL-INTEREST SCIENCE UNIVERSITY CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST POLICIES ADDITIONAL RESPONSES CONCLUSION REVIEW ONGOING QUESTIONS CONCLUSION

It's Good to Share: Why Environmental Scientists’ Ethics Are Out of Date

Although there have been many recent calls for increased data sharing, the majority of environmental scientists do not make their individual data sets publicly available in online repositories. Current data-sharing conversations are focused on overcoming the technological challenges associated with data sharing and the lack of rewards and incentives for individuals to share data. We argue that the most important conversation has yet to take place: There has not been a strong ethical impetus for sharing data within the current culture, behaviors, and practices of environmental scientists. In this article, we describe a critical shift that is happening in both society and the environmental science community that makes data sharing not just good but ethically obligatory. This is a shift toward the ethical value of promoting inclusivity within and beyond science. An essential element of a truly inclusionary and democratic approach to science is to share data through publicly accessible data sets.

Scientific Judgment and the Limits of Conflict-of-Interest Policies

This article argues that the three major elements of typical university conflict-of-interest (COI) policies (i.e., disclosure, management, and elimination of conflicts via divestiture or recusal) are likely to be insufficient for screening out many worrisome influences of financial COIs. Current psychological research challenges the effectiveness of disclosure, management plans are unlikely to address the wide range of ways that financial COIs can influence scientific judgment, and it is often impractical to eliminate conflicts. Identifying the limits of these policies highlights the importance of considering alternative strategies, such as encouraging more independently funded research, in order to maintain the integrity of science.

Nonepistemic Values and the Multiple Goals of Science

Recent efforts to argue that nonepistemic values have a legitimate role to play in assessing scientific models, theories, and hypotheses typically either reject the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values or incorporate nonepistemic values only as a secondary consideration for resolving epistemic uncertainty. Given that scientific representations can legitimately be evaluated not only based on their fit with the world but also with respect to their fit with the needs of their users, we show in two case studies that nonepistemic values can play a legitimate role as factors that override epistemic considerations in assessing scientific representations for practical purposes.

Science, Policy, and the Transparency of Values

Background: Opposing groups of scientists have recently engaged in a heated dispute over a preliminary European Commission (EC) report on its regulatory policy for endocrine-disrupting chemicals. In addition to the scientific issues at stake, a central question has been how scientists can maintain their objectivity when informing policy makers. Objectives: Drawing from current ethical, conceptual, and empirical studies of objectivity and conflicts of interest in scientific research, we propose guiding principles for communicating scientific findings in a manner that promotes objectivity, public trust, and policy relevance. Discussion: Both conceptual and empirical studies of scientific reasoning have shown that it is unrealistic to prevent policy-relevant scientific research from being influenced by value judgments. Conceptually, the current dispute over the EC report illustrates how scientists are forced to make value judgments about appropriate standards of evidence when informing public policy. Empirical studies provide further evidence that scientists are unavoidably influenced by a variety of potentially subconscious financial, social, political, and personal interests and values. Conclusions: When scientific evidence is inconclusive and major regulatory decisions are at stake, it is unrealistic to think that values can be excluded from scientific reasoning. Thus, efforts to suppress or hide interests or values may actually damage scientific objectivity and public trust, whereas a willingness to bring implicit interests and values into the open may be the best path to promoting good science and policy. Citation: Elliott KC, Resnik DB. 2014. Science, policy, and the transparency of values. Environ Health Perspect 122:647–650; http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1408107

Philosophies of funding.

Successful scientific practice encompasses broader and more varied modes of investigation than can be captured by focusing on hypothesis-driven research. We examine the emphases that major US and UK funding agencies place on particular modes of research practice and suggest that funding agency guidelines should be informed by a more dynamic and multidimensional account of scientific practice.

Direct and Indirect Roles for Values in Science

Although many philosophers have employed the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” roles for values in science, I argue that it merits further clarification. The distinction can be formulated in several ways: as a logical point, as a distinction between epistemic attitudes, or as a clarification of different consequences associated with accepting scientific claims. Moreover, it can serve either as part of a normative ideal or as a tool for policing how values influence science. While various formulations of the distinction may (with further clarification) contribute to a normative ideal, they have limited effectiveness for regulating how values influence science.

How Values in Scientific Discovery and Pursuit Alter Theory Appraisal

Philosophers of science readily acknowledge that nonepistemic values influence the discovery and pursuit of scientific theories, but many tend to regard these influences as epistemically uninteresting. The present paper challenges this position by identifying three avenues through which nonepistemic values associated with discovery and pursuit in contemporary pollution research influence theory appraisal: (1) by guiding the choice of questions and research projects, (2) by altering experimental design, and (3) by affecting the creation and further investigation of theories or hypotheses. This analysis indicates that the effects of these values are sufficiently complex and epistemically significant to merit further attention.

The Ethics of Infection Control: Philosophical Frameworks

Recent developments that are relevant to the ethics of infection control include the patient safety movement, the appearance of new diseases (notably, severe acute respiratory syndrome) that pose threats to healthcare workers, data confirming the suspicion that infection control measures such as isolation may compromise patient care, and, in philosophy, renewed interest in virtue ethics and communitarianism. We review general ethical frameworks and relevant vocabulary for infection control practitioners and hospital epidemiologists. Frameworks for the ethics of infection control resemble those of public health more than those of clinical medicine but embrace elements of both. The optimum framework, we suggest, takes into account a virtue-based communitarianism. The virtue ethics movement stresses the need to consider not only rules and outcomes but also the character of the individual(s) involved. Communitarianism emphasizes the well-being and values of local communities, best determined by shared, democratic decision making among stakeholders. Brief discussions of 15 consecutive cases illustrate the extent to which the daily practice of infection control poses problems heavily freighted with ethical overtones.

Selective Ignorance and Agricultural Research

Scholars working in science and technology studies have recently argued that we could learn much about the nature of scientific knowledge by paying closer attention to scientific ignorance. Building on the work of Robert Proctor, this article shows how ignorance can stem from a wide range of selective research choices that incline researchers toward partial, limited understandings of complex phenomena. A recent report produced by the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology for Development serves as the article’s central case study. After arguing that the forms of selective ignorance illustrated in cases like this one are both socially important and difficult to address, I suggest several strategies for responding to them in a socially responsible manner.