Kevin E. Davis

Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance

The use of indicators is a prominent feature of contemporary global governance. Indicators are produced by organizations ranging from public actors such as the World Bank or the US State Department, to NGOs such as Freedom House, to hybrid entities such as the Global Fund, to private sector political risk rating agencies. They are used to compare and rank states for purposes as varied as deciding how to allocate foreign aid or investment and whether states have complied with their treaty obligations. This article defines the concept of an “indicator,” describes how indicators have recently been used in global governance, and identifies various ways in which the use of indicators has the potential to alter the nature of global governance. Particular attention is paid to how reliance on indicators affects the authority and contestability of decisions. The United Nations Human Development Index and the World Bank Doing Business indicators are analyzed as case studies.

The relationship between law and development: Optimists versus skeptics

Over the past two decades there has been a resurgence of interest, on the part of both academics and practitioners, in using law to promote development in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, and Asia. The level of academic interest in the topic is reflected in the publication of three recent books on law and development by prominent American scholars: Thomas Carothers (ed.), PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, Kenneth Dam, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, and David Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds.), THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL. In this Essay we suggest that these books (or at least some contributions to them) reflect insensitivity to the ambiguities surrounding the relationship between legal reform and development. We show that there is ongoing debate about fundamental questions such as whether law is an important factor in determining social or economic outcomes in developing societies given the existence of informal methods of social control; whether there are insurmountable economic, political or culture obstacles to effective legal reform; as well as, assuming effective legal reform is feasible, what types of reforms are conducive to development and what types of actors ought to implement them. We argue that although there are some reasons for optimism about the potential impact of legal reforms upon development, the relevant empirical literature is inconclusive on many important issues and counsels caution about the wisdom of continuing to invest substantial resources in promoting legal reform in developing countries without further research that clarifies these issues.

The quiet power of indicators : measuring governance, corruption, and rule of law

Introduction: the local-global life of indicators: law, power and resistance Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry Part I. Global Indicators of Governance, Corruption, and Rule of Law: 1. International organizations and the production of indicators: the case of freedom house Christopher G. Bradley 2. Indicators and the law: a case study of the rule of law index Rene Uruena 3. Measuring corporate accountability through global indicators Galit A. Sarfaty 4. The quest for measuring development: the role of the indicator bank Maria Angelica Prada Uribe 5. Qualitative and quantitative conditionality: accountability in the EU accession and MCC processes Nikhil Dutta Part II. Indicators in Local Contexts: 6. Rule of law indicators as a political technology of power in Romania Mihaela Serban 7. Indicators, global expertise, and a local political drama: producing and deploying corruption perception data in postsocialist Albania Smoki Musaraj 8. Evaluating the impact of corruption (perception) indicators on governance discourses in Kenya Migai Akech 9. Measuring labour market efficiency: indicators that fuel an ideological war and undermine social concern and trust in the South African regulatory process Debbie Collier and Paul Benjamin Conclusion: contesting global indicators David Nelken.

Does the Globalization of Anti-Corruption Law Help Developing Countries?

What role do foreign institutions play in combating political corruption in developing countries? This chapter begins by describing the recently developed transnational anti-corruption regime, which encompasses legal instruments ranging from the dedicated multilateral agreements sponsored by the OECD and the United Nations, to the anti-corruption policies of international financial institutions, to components of the international antimoney laundering regime, international norms governing government procurement, and private law norms concerning enforcement of corruptly procured contracts. It also surveys the evidence concerning a variety of claims about the potential advantages and disadvantages of having foreign institutions play a role in preventing, sanctioning, or providing redress for corruption on the part of local public officials. One of the main conclusions is that more attention ought to be paid to whether foreign institutions displace and undermine, or alternatively complement and enhance, local anti-corruption institutions. The analysis not only sheds light on the transnational anti-corruption regime, but also has implications for other efforts to rely on foreign legal institutions to address the problems of developing countries.

The Quiet Power of Indicators: Introduction: The Local-Global Life of Indicators: Law, Power, and Resistance

This book is about the quiet exercise of power through indicators. With the turn to evidence-based governance, reliance on statistical data along with its synthesis into the kinds of scales, ranks, and composite indexes we refer to as indicators has become essential for policy formation and political decision making. The use of indicators in governance has expanded from economic and sector-specific quantitative data to measurement of almost every phenomenon. This book focuses on indicators of governance itself, specifically governance through law: indicators purporting to measure practices or perceptions of good governance, rule of law, corruption, regulatory quality, and related matters. This volume presents nine original case studies that investigate how leading indicators of legal governance produced with global or transnational scope or aims are created, disseminated, and used, and with what effects. The indicators studied include Freedom Houses Freedom in the World indicator, the Global Reporting Initiatives structure for measuring and reporting on corporate social responsibility, the World Justice Projects measurement of the rule of law, the Doing Business index of the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank, the World Bank–supported Worldwide Governance Indicators, the World Banks Country Performance Institutional Assessment (CPIA), the Transparency International Corruption (Perceptions) index, and several indicators (including some of these) used by the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation in determining which countries are eligible to receive certain US aid funds. The underlying theoretical framework of this volume is the linkage between knowledge and power. Indicators are both a form of knowledge and a technology for governance. Like other forms of knowledge, indicators influence governance when they form the basis for political decision making, public awareness, and the terms in which problems are conceptualized and solutions imagined. Conversely, the kinds of information embodied in indicators, the forms in which they are produced and disseminated, and how they function as knowledge are all influenced by governance practices.

The Prospects for Anti-corruption Law: Optimists versus Skeptics

The recent emphasis placed on anti-corruption laws as means of combatting corruption in low and middle-income countries reflects a great deal of optimism about the ability of law to effect social change. The more general literature on law and development suggests several reasons for skepticism on this front: the risk that legal institutions will be captured by powerful interests; the possibility that law plays only a limited role as a means of social control; and, in the case of transnational law, the limited power, will, knowledge, and legitimacy of foreign actors. This essay examines the extent to which these concerns provide grounds for skepticism about the potential efficacy of anti-corruption law.