Kevin K. Tsui

More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries

This article exploits variations in the timing and size of oil discoveries to identify the impact of oil wealth on democracy. I find that discovering 100 billion barrels of oil (approximately the initial endowment of Iraq) pushes a countrys democracy level almost 20 percentage points below trend after three decades. The estimated effect is larger for oilfields with higher-quality oil and lower exploration and extraction costs. However, the estimates become less precise when oil abundance is measured by oil discovery per capita, suggesting politicians may care about the level instead of the per capita value of oil wealth.

Oil and Conflict: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?

This paper examines the effect of oil abundance on political violence. First, we revisit one of the main empirical findings of the civil conflict literature that oil abundance causes civil war. Using a unique panel dataset describing worldwide oil discoveries and extractions, we show that simply controlling for country fixed effects removes the statistical association between oil reserves and civil war in a sample of more than 100 countries over the period 1930-2003. Other macro-political violence measures, such as coup attempts and irregular leader transitions, are not affected by oil reserves either. Rather, we find that oil-rich nondemocratic countries have a larger defense burden. To further address the problems of endogeneity and measurement error, we exploit randomness in the success or failure of oil explorations. We find that oil discoveries do not increase the likelihood of violent challenges to the state in the sample of country-years in which at least one exploratory well is drilled, and oil discoveries increase military spending in the subsample of nondemocratic countries. Similar results are obtained on a larger sample which includes country-years without oil exploration while controlling for selection based on the likelihood of exploration using propensity score matching. We suggest a possible explanation for our findings based on the idea that oil-rich nondemocratic regimes effectively expend resources to deter potential challengers.

Oil, Growth, and Health: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?

We show that previous results from the resource curse literature are primarily driven by collapsing in oil prices since the mid-1980s. Exploiting cross-country variations in the size of initial oil endowments and the timing of oil discoveries, we find that there is a stable positive relationship between oil abundance and long-run economic growth. Using dynamic panel data methods, we also find no evidence that higher oil rents hinder growth. Focusing on material gain, however, understates the welfare gain from oil, because oil-rich countries benefit more in infant-mortality reduction and longevity gain. Interestingly, such oil-led health improvements are more pronounced in nondemocratic countries, where initial heath conditions were poor and oil wealth is concentrated among the ruling elites.

Resource Curse, Political Entry, and Deadweight Costs

A simple model of political entry in a two-sector economy is developed to analyze the effects of natural resource wealth on economic policy, political development, and civil insurrection. The model emphasizes the role of political entry and deadweight costs of taxation on the joint determination of these economic and political outcomes. Contrary to popular belief, my model shows that natural resource abundance is an economic blessing even in a rent-seeking society, although resource dependence can be negatively associated with economic performance. In a contested political market, dictators care about popular support and hence resource wealth can help reduce the deadweight cost of taxation (and hence the cost of public good provision). On the other hand, natural resource wealth can be a political curse, because it encourages political entry and hence it induces incumbent dictators to run more repressive regimes. With constant returns counterinsurgent technology, however, the equilibrium number of insurgents is independent of the size of resource wealth. The onset of civil war, therefore, depends on the counterinsurgent technology and whether the costs of entry deterrence are affected by resource wealth. This helps clarify the two seemingly contradictory hypotheses that “resource wealth enhances regime durability” and “resource wealth fuels conflict.”

Resource Curse or Malthusian Trap? Evidence from Oil Discoveries and Extractions

This paper studies the effects of oil rent on development using a unique panel dataset describing worldwide oil discoveries and extractions. First, we revisit the so-called curse of oil, which contends that oil rent hinders economic development. Exploiting cross-country variations in the timing of oil discoveries and the size of initial oil in place, we find that, contrary to the oil-curse hypothesis, there is little robust evidence of a negative relationship between oil endowment and economic performance, even after controlling for initial income. Second, based on both cross-country and panel evidence, we find a robust association between oil abundance and population growth, which might suggest a Malthusian effect which reduces the economic growth measured in per capita GDP. We find some evidence that oil abundance increases fertility. On an accounting basis, however, migration plays an even more prominent role in explaining the oil-induced population growth. Furthermore, we show that focusing on material gain may understate the welfare gain from oil abundance, because relative to non-oil countries, oil-rich countries gain more in health improvements. These results suggest that despite the positive oil effect on population growth, oil-rich countries do not suffer from the Malthusian trap, and overall oil abundance is an economic blessing rather than a curse.

International Politics and Import Diversification

This paper examines how international politics affects trade in the absence of empires or wars. We first show that deterioration of relations between the United States and another country, measured by divergence in their United Nations General Assembly voting patterns, reduced U.S. imports from that country during 1962–2000. Though statistically significant, the magnitude of the effect of political distance on trade is small. Indeed, we show that except for petroleum and some chemical products, U.S. imports are not affected by international politics. American firms, however, diversify their oil imports significantly away from political opponents of the United States. Oil trade is often associated with backward vertical foreign direct investment that is subject to the expropriation risk. In contrast to the usual claim that oil is a strategic commodity, we provide suggestive evidence that trade in products when rents are appropriable is more likely to be affected by international politics.

International Politics and Import Diversification in the Second Wave of Globalization

We provide evidence that deterioration of relations between the United States and another country, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns, reduces US imports from that country during the second wave of globalization. Though statistically significant, such an effect of “political distance” on trade is small compared with the frictions imposed by other trade barriers. Indeed, using sector-level trade data, we show that except for petroleum and some chemical products, US imports are not affected by international politics. American firms, however, diversify their import of crude oil significantly away from the political opponents of the US, even after controlling for wars, sanctions, and tariffs. To explain the distinctive political impact on oil import diversification, we test the strategy commodity hypothesis over the hold-up risk hypothesis, because while oil is widely thought to be a strategic commodity, oil trade is also often associated with backward vertical FDI that is subject to the risks of hold-up and expropriation. Our results suggest both political and economic forces are at work. First, although the political limits on oil import are only significant when American firms import oil from dictators, the effect is even more pronounced when the exporting countries have high expropriation risk. Second, a similar import pattern is observed only for other major powers or countries with oil companies operating overseas. Finally, we show that while the US imports of a few strategic commodities, such as tin, are also discouraged by political distance, a similar political effect is also observed in the import of R&D intensive goods, in which case quasi-rents derived from backward FDI in R&D may be expropriated by a hostile government.

China’s Outward Direct Investment: Evidence from a New Micro Dataset

More than seventy percent of China’s outward direct investment (ODI), according to the Ministry of Commerce statistics, is invested in Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands. Using a unique micro-level dataset collected by the Heritage Foundation that documents individual ODI transactions, we first show that the official statistics and the Heritage Foundation measure of China’s ODI are correlated only in the sample of non-haven economies, because the official statistics treat tax havens as final destinations rather than transit points. On average, a dollar increase in the Heritage Foundation measure of ODI is associated with less than a fifteen cent increase in the official ODI among the non-haven economies, and the downward bias is even larger for investment in energy. We also document that the sharp increase in the official ODI to Hong Kong coincides with the rise in the Heritage Foundation measure of ODI to OECD countries since 2007. Finally, we show that some of the well-documented stylized facts about the pattern of China’s ODI are artifacts of the mismeasurement of the official data. For instance, contrary to previous findings, we find no evidence that China’s ODI is attracted to host countries with poor governance, and that neither cultural proximity nor geographical distance is a major determinant of China’s ODI. Furthermore, the Heritage Foundation data suggest that the resource seeking motive of China’s ODI is at least as strong as the market seeking motive.

The Economics of the Long Tail

Abstract Anderson (2006) argues that e-commerce and other new technologies improve efficiency by encouraging the entry of new producers and innovations, creating a “long tail” of niche products while reducing the market share of previously popular products. We study the strategic interaction between hits and niches in their pricing, entry, and innovation decisions using a model of competition under product differentiation and generalized cost structure. In contrast to the popular view, we show that improvements in information and communication technology can lead to either the long tail effect or an opposite “superstar” effect (Rosen, 1981), depending on (a) how the structure (not simply the level) of producer costs changes, and (b) how disparate are consumer preferences. These two factors also determine whether there is excessive or insufficient product diversity. Post-entry product and technology innovation incentives may be inefficient in the long tail market structure because producers can soften price competition by engaging in excessive product differentiation and adopting technologies with high variable costs. These results have implications for various competition-related policies.

The Upside-down Economics of Regulated and Otherwise Rigid Prices

A hedonic model featuring quality-quantity tradeoffs reveals a number of surprising market behaviors that can result from price regulations that are imposed on competitive markets for products that have adjustable non-price attributes. Quality need not clear a competitive market in the same way that prices do, because quality can reduce the willingness to pay for quantity. Producers can benefit from price ceilings, at the expense of consumers. Price ceilings can result in quality-degradation “death spirals” that would not occur under quality regulation or excise taxation. The features of tastes and technology that lead to such outcomes are summarized with pairwise comparisons of (not necessarily constant) elasticities.