Kevin McCain

The virtues of epistemic conservatism

Although several important methodologies implicitly assume the truth of epistemic conservatism, the view that holding a belief confers some measure of justification on the belief, recent criticisms have led some to conclude that epistemic conservatism is an implausible view. That conclusion is mistaken. In this article, I propose a new formulation of epistemic conservatism that is not susceptible to the criticisms leveled at earlier formulations of epistemic conservatism. In addition to withstanding these criticisms, this formulation of epistemic conservatism has several benefits. First, this formulation has the benefits of earlier formulations of epistemic conservatism, that is to say it makes sense of our intuitions about justification in regard to both memory beliefs and beliefs for which we have forgotten our evidence. Second, it provides a good way of responding to the skeptic’s challenge concerning the possibility of possessing knowledge of the external world posed by the Alternative Hypotheses argument. Third, it provides responses to both forms of a new skeptical problem plaguing basic knowledge structure theories, the Problem of Easy Knowledge formulated by Stewart Cohen. I argue that given the many benefits of this formulation of epistemic conservatism and the fact that it is not vulnerable to the criticisms that undermine earlier formulations of epistemic conservatism, this formulation of epistemic conservatism is a plausible view to maintain.

Evolutionary Theory and the Epistemology of Science

The sciences offer us a detailed picture of the world in which we live. But why is it rational to accept this picture? Evolutionary theory provides a beautiful case study of the way in which scientific theories are supported by their evidence. In this chapter we provide a guide for teachers who wish to use evolutionary theory to explain the way in which scientific theories are supported, and to explain what is required for a theory to be rationally accepted. Our method is to consider evolutionary theory in the light of a range of criticisms that have been made by its critics: that it is a theory rather than a fact, that it cannot be proven, that it is not falsifiable, that it has been falsified, and that it does not make predictions. Using a series of examples, we explain why these criticisms are either false or involve a misunderstanding of the nature of evidential support and scientific knowledge. In the process, we exhibit some of the epistemic principles that are at the heart of scientific inference, and show how they are employed to establish the rational acceptability of evolution.

Which question do polls about evolution and belief really ask, and why does it matter?

Data from studies conducted to determine acceptance rates for evolution are often misleading. The questions that are asked and compared to one another do not always give an authentic picture of respondents’ views. Quite often, polls, such as those by IPSOS, Gallup, and PEW, also run together questions asking respondents’ beliefs in concepts like God with questions asking respondents’ beliefs about concepts like evolution. The two are distinct and should not be confused. One might believe in evolution while having wrong beliefs about it, whereas someone else might decide not to believe in evolution while having accurate beliefs about it. Distinguishing between “belief in” and “belief about” might help remove an unrecognized confounding element from these studies.

Explanationist aid for phenomenal conservatism

Phenomenal conservatism is a popular theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity and the fact that some think that phenomenal conservatism can provide a complete account of justification, it faces several challenges. Among these challenges are the need to provide accounts of defeaters and inferential justification. Fortunately, there is hope for phenomenal conservatism. Explanationism, the view on which justification is a matter of explanatory considerations, can help phenomenal conservatism with both of these challenges. The resulting view is one that respects the internalist character of phenomenal conservatism and its motivating intuitions while providing an intuitive and elegant account of both inferential justification and the justificatory impact of defeaters.

Pick Your Poison: Beg the Question or Embrace Circularity

According to Roderick Chisholm, there are three ways of responding to the Problem of the Criterion and they all leave something to be desired. Michael DePaul, Paul Moser, and Earl Conee have each proposed variations of a fourth way of responding to this problem that rely on reflective equilibrium. We argue that these four options for responding to the Problem of the Criterion leave one with a tough choice: accept one of the three that Chisholm describes or DePaul’s reflective equilibrium approach and beg the question or accept a reflective equilibrium response of the sort Conee and Moser propose and embrace epistemic circularity.

In Defense of the Explanationist Response to Skepticism

A promising response to the threat of external world skepticism involves arguing that our commonsense view of the world best explains the sensory experiences that we have. Since our commonsense view of the world best explains our evidence, we are justified in accepting this commonsense view of the world. Despite the plausibility of this Explanationist Response, it has recently come under attack. James Beebe has argued that only a version of the Explanationist Response that provides an a priori justification of inference to the best explanation can hope to respond to two serious objections. Additionally, he has argued that providing such an a priori justification requires an acceptable account of a priori probability and that it is unclear whether such an account can be developed. In this paper I argue that Beebe fails to provide adequate support for either of these claims.

Empirical Evidence of Irrationality

Whereas the previous two chapters responded to philosophical challenges to our scientific knowledge this chapter explores a more practical threat to scientific knowledge. This challenge comes from research which suggests we are subject to a number of biases and irrational processes when forming our beliefs. Numerous studies have seemingly shown that people are prone to make systematic errors of reasoning in particular kinds of cases. Some take this evidence of human irrationality to undercut our knowledge in general, and hence, our scientific knowledge as well. This chapter argues that this challenge does not pose a significant threat to our scientific knowledge. Although there is evidence for human irrationality, we have ways of keeping this sort of irrationality contained so that it does not “infect” all of our beliefs. So, while we are prone to make systematic errors in certain cases, we are aware of our proclivities, and we can take steps to counteract our natural shortcomings.

Looking Back and Looking Forward

This concluding chapter recaps some of the major insights of the earlier chapters of this book. It also points out how these insights can be used to supplement the science education literature on the nature of science discussed in the first chapter. The result is a more philosophically grounded science education literature. Such integration holds promise for strengthening both science education and philosophical approaches to the nature of science as well as providing a more in-depth understanding of scientific knowledge. Additionally, the chapter discusses some of the major areas where further research would be helpful. Although it is often a bit risky to do so, this chapter also makes some suggestions as to how some of the needed research might be fruitfully conducted and it speculates on what some of the results of such research might be. The goal of the chapter is not to offer precise predictions of how things will turn out, but rather, to encourage further research and helpfully gesture to good starting places for such research.

The Traditional Account of Knowledge

This chapter introduces the traditional account of knowledge. First, three main kinds of knowledge are distinguished: acquaintance knowledge, knowledge-how, and propositional knowledge. The nature of each of these kinds of knowledge and their differences from one another are illuminated. It is also made clear that scientific knowledge is best understood as a particular variety of propositional knowledge. After clarifying the differences between these kinds of knowledge the chapter turns to a brief examination of the traditional account of propositional knowledge. This traditional account holds that in order for one to have knowledge of a particular proposition three conditions must be satisfied: the proposition must be true, one must believe the proposition, and one must have justification for believing the proposition. The discussion of the traditional account of knowledge in this chapter sets the stage for the more in-depth examination of the general features of knowledge that is the focus of the remaining chapters in this section of the book.

Gaining Scientific Knowledge from Others

This chapter explores how we gain knowledge from other people. In particular two of the primary ways that we come to have social evidence are explored. The first is the most prevalent form of social evidence: testimony. This chapter examines some of the best explanations of how it is that we come to have knowledge via the testimony of others. The second way that we come to have social evidence is by learning of disagreements. This chapter explores the epistemic significance of disagreement as it occurs in science. In particular it discusses how we should respond when we discover that someone disagrees with us about a scientific claim. When we discover that equally informed experts in an area of science disagree we should refrain from believing one side or the other is correct until we have further deciding evidence. When novices discover that experts disagree with them concerning a scientific claim, the novices should defer to the experts.