Kevin Ow Yong

The Effect of Board Independence on Information Asymmetry

Boards have an important role in ensuring that investors’ interests are protected. Our paper first examines whether the independence of a firms board affects information asymmetry among investors. We provide evidence that greater board independence leads to lower information asymmetry. Next, we provide evidence that more voluntary disclosure and greater analyst coverage are two underlying mechanisms via which greater board independence reduces information asymmetry. Of the two mechanisms, we find that analyst coverage is more significant in influencing how board independence affects information asymmetry. Overall, our paper contributes to a better understanding of the effect of board independence on information asymmetry.

An Examination of the Statistical Significance and Economic Implications of Model-Based and Analyst Earnings Forecasts

We address the demand for model-based earnings forecasts by proposing a cross-sectional model which incorporates three salient ideas. First, firm performance converges to expected levels over time; second, amounts from current financial statements are robust predictors of future performance; and third, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is unreliable in samples including extreme values. Accordingly, we estimate a cross-sectional earnings forecasting model based on least absolute deviations analysis (LAD), and include profitability drivers derived from financial statements as predictors. In terms of statistical significance, we find that these forecasts are more accurate than forecasts from three extant prediction models and consensus analysts’ forecasts. In terms of economic implications, we find that forecasts from our model have greater predictive ability for future abnormal returns than consensus analysts’ forecasts. Overall, our results are important because they document the usefulness of a cross-sectional earnings forecasting model for a broad range of diverse firms, including those with little or no analyst coverage.

Lease Characteristics, Agency Costs, and Tax Considerations

We examine the determinants that influence managers’ decision as to whether a lease is structured as a financing lease or an operating lease. Specifically, we find that firms with higher marginal tax rates, lower credit ratings, and more severe agency problems are more likely to use both operating leases and financing leases. However, tax considerations and debt capacity have little effect on which of the two types of lease is chosen. More importantly, we find that differences in kinds of agency problemsare reflected in the choice of the type of lease. Our study provides a better understanding of the extent of risks and benefits associated with the use of leased assetsand contributes to the discussion of impending revisions to lease accounting rules by standard-setting bodies.