Kevin Siqueira

Global Terrorism: Deterrence Versus Pre-Emption

This paper analyses two anti-terrorism policies when a targeted nations people and property are in jeopardy at home and abroad. A countrys deterrence decision involves both external benefits and costs as the terrorist threat is deflected, while its preemption decision typically gives external benefits when the threat is reduced for all potential targets. With damages limited to home interests, a country will overdeter, while, for globalized terror, a country will underdeter. Pre-emption is usually undersupplied. Leader-follower behaviour is apt to lessen inefficiency for deterrence, but worsen inefficiency for pre-emption, compared with simultaneous-choice equilibrium allocations. Targeted nations can never achieve the proper counterterrorism policy through leadership.

Games and Terrorism

This article provides an updated survey of recent advances in game-theoretic analyses of terrorism. In particular, it investigates the governments allocation of a fixed budget to counter attacks against potential targets. The choice between proactive and defensive countermeasures is addressed, along with the impact that domestic politics has on this choice. Other topics include the interaction between political and militant factions within terrorist groups, the role of asymmetric information, and game-theoretic analysis of suicide terrorism. Throughout, the article highlights surprising results from the application of game theory. Unanswered questions are also indicated.

Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and Organizations

A model is developed to provide a basis for investigating the nature of faction behavior and the interrelationships between factions and between factions and their supporters under conditions of competition and cooperation. A general finding of the study illustrates the fact that when factions act competitively and independently of one another, the results do not necessarily lead to increased dissident activity and violence when compared to the case when factions act jointly and coordinate their actions. For example, when faction activities generate positive externalities and are strategic complements, competition and the independent behavior of factions lead to decreased levels of dissident activity. The model can also be used to derive implications for various types of counterterrorism policies when a government faces independently acting groups within a dissident movement.

Conflict and third-party intervention

The paper looks at various scenarios of possible concern for intervening third parties when two factions are engaged in a conflict and act strategically against one another. A standard conflict model is used to determine appropriate intervention strategies in order to lower the overall level of conflict. Choosing a suitable strategy in such a setting, the third party must not only take into account the direct impact of its efforts but also the indirect impacts that result from the strategic interaction among the parties involved.

International externalities, strategic interaction, and domestic politics

Abstract Domestic politics can sometimes play an influential role when externalities have strategic and international implications. If voters delegate the choice to policymakers and if individual countries independently determine their environmental policy using a consumption tax on the emissions generating good, the result could be an outcome that is inferior to the one preferred by the median voter in the absence of delegation. On the other hand, if the international externality is unilateral in nature, rather than reciprocal, we find that delegation is largely irrelevant, since voters’ choice of policymaker is no longer strategic in character. Similarly, if voters anticipate policymakers successfully coordinating their policies at a later stage, there also will be no difference between the policymakers’ and the median voters’ aggregate weighting of environmental emissions.

DEFENSIVE COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Unlike most of the literature, this paper includes domestic political considerations in which two countries must decide defensive countermeasures against a common terrorist threat. A delegation problem arises as voters strategically choose a policymaker whose preferences differ from their own. As a consequence, countries limit the presumed oversupply of defensive countermeasures. Thus, the inclusion of domestic politics gives a new perspective on counterterrorism. The timing of elections is also shown to make a difference.

Motivating operatives for suicide missions and conventional terrorist attacks

We investigate the problem of motivating terrorist operatives for suicide missions and conventional terrorist attacks when operatives have either self-interested or social preferences that are not observable by the terrorist organization. We characterize the screening mechanism for selecting operatives according to their social preferences and determine under what conditions a terrorist group will prefer to utilize suicide versus conventional tactics. For example, when operatives are intrinsically motivated and likely to be represented in the pool of potential recruits, a terrorist organization will be more likely to employ suicide attacks as its sole tactic of choice.

Clubs and the Cost of Agency

The paper investigates the impact of agency costs on clubmembership. Using a simple principal-agent model, under standardassumptions, the paper demonstrates that increased agency costsassociated with hidden action can lead to an expansionary bias.

Models of alliances: Internalizing externalities and financing

This paper extends the joint product model of military alliances to apply to the new strategic doctrine adopted by NATO in the 1990s. In particular, a choice must be made between protecting ones own territory and pooling forces for an alliancewide rapid reaction force. This new model accounts for a host of externalities and their implications for burden sharing, full financing, and allocative efficiency. The Pigouvian taxes that adjust for force thinning and attack deflection are shown to finance optimal border‐protecting forces under a variety of circumstances. Second‐best considerations arise owing to the pure publicness of rapid reaction forces. The ideal toll arrangement does not currently characterize NATO financing, nor is it likely to do so.

Participation in organized and unorganized protests and rebellions

Abstract The paper investigates the individual decision of whether to join and participate in a protest or rebellion. When the protest activity is unorganized and individuals join spontaneously without regard to the effect on the probability of success and failure and without regard for potential benefits, multiple equilibria can exist, which may in turn have consequences for government policies. I also consider the case where a protest or rebellion is coordinated by a leader. The broad conclusion is that institutional analysis is required to specify the environment within which a protest or rebellion takes place.