Kim C. Border
California Institute of Technology
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The Review of Economic Studies | 1987
Kim C. Border; Joel Sobel
A risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know, but may verify through a costly auditing procedure. We characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities, subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent. The main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agents wealth, audit probabilities are decreasing in the agents wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities. In general, such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit.
Journal of Economic Theory | 1983
Kim C. Border
It is shown for the case of private goods economies that every social welfare function satisfying a weak nonimposition condition and the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom is of one of the following forms. It is either null, or the class of decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter, or the class of anti-decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter. In the case of a private goods economy with finitely many traders, the latter conditions imply the existence of either a dictator or anti-dictator. By requiring the Pareto principle as well, it is easily seen that the social welfare function must be dictatorial.
Econometrica | 1997
Kim C. Border; Uzi Segal
There are several solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the literature. Since various authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another, we find it useful to study preferences over solutions in their own right. We identify a set of appealing axioms on such preferences that lead to unanimity in the choice of solution, which turns out to be the solution of Nash.
Archive | 1994
Charalambos D. Aliprantis; Kim C. Border
In this chapter, we introduce the classical L p -spaces and study their basic properties. For a measure space (X, Σ, μ) and 0 < p <∞, the space L p (μ) is the collection of all equivalence classes of measurable functions f for which the p-norm
Journal of Economic Theory | 1992
Kim C. Border
Social Choice and Welfare | 1985
Kim C. Border
{\left\| f \right\|_p} = \left( {\int {{{\left| f \right|}^p}d{\mu ^{\frac{1}{p}}}} } \right) < \infty .
Public Choice | 1984
Kim C. Border
Macroeconomic Dynamics | 1997
Charalambos D. Aliprantis; Kim C. Border; Owen Burkinshaw
Archive | 1991
Kim C. Border
Abstract This paper shows that a choice function is either consistent with the expected utility hypothesis or is ex ante dominated for some prior.
Archive | 1999
Charalambos D. Aliprantis; Kim C. Border
If individuals and society both obey the expected utility hypothesis and social alternatives are uncertain, then the social utility must be a linear combination of the individual utilities, provided the society is indifferent when all its members are. This result was first proven by Harsanyi [4] who made implicit assumptions in the proof not actually needed for the result (see [5]). This note presents a straightforward proof of Harsanyis theorem based on a separating hyperplane argument.