Kim Huynh

The 'Read or Write' Dilemma in Academic Production: A Transatlantic Perspective

This paper investigates the production of research in business and economics. A scholars reward is positively related to the quantity and quality of research. In turn, the quality of a paper depends on the scholars ability to internalize new ideas and the overall quality of external research. The individual scholar is subject to a trade-off between writing more papers or reading in order to take in new ideas. In the Nash symmetric equilibrium, the quantity and quality of published papers are jointly determined. Under reasonable assumptions about the research production process, in equilibrium researchers write too many papers of too low a quality compared to the cooperative outcome. The model sheds some light on the effectiveness of various research policies currently under review by European policymakers.

Congestion of Academic Journals under Papers' Imperfect Selection

Abstract This paper studies how the congestion of its editorial process affects an academic journal. In a publishing game played by researchers and editors, we assume that quality screening by editors depends on their ability to properly process the flow of submissions. When too many papers arrive, this ability declines and editors may reject good papers or accept papers with little contribution to scientific knowledge. In this game, a separating equilibrium always exists in which only good researchers submit their papers to the journal. Each paper is accepted and the quality of the journal reaches its highest level. However, when the researchers’ reward for each publication exceeds a given threshold, two hybrid equilibria are also feasible. In these equilibria, authors of low-quality papers submit their papers to the journal and, as the flow of papers exceeds the editors’ capacity of perfect assessment, the selection process becomes imperfect. This creates an opportunity for authors to submit poor quality papers, a behaviour which contributes to the congestion of the editorial process. The various strategies implemented by the editors to oppose congestion are then discussed.

Growth patterns under imitation in the investment decision

Abstract Experience shows that developing countries or regions that vary little with respect to their fundamentals sometimes follow different growth paths. Such puzzling facts may occur if less informed international investors imitate those who are well informed about profit opportunities instead of acquiring the relevant information themselves. This paper analyses how the type of mimetic behaviour influences the development pattern of an economy where the lack of infrastructure is the main constraint on development. Possible outcomes may be stationary growth, divergent growth or cycles in development.