Kim Kaivanto

An alternative model of pro-cyclical absenteeism

Abstract Current economic models of absenteeism derive pro-cyclical properties from cyclical variations in the costs and consequences of absence. Through an extension of the household production model, this paper proposes a complementary approach based on variations in forgone earnings associated with work-commodity itself.

Risk Shifting, Technology Policy and Sales Contingent Claims: When is Launch Aid to the Aerospace Industry a Subsidy?

This Paper studies the criteria with which the presence or absence of ‘subsidy’ in sales contingent Launch Aid R&D support may be determined when payoff-relevant market incompleteness limits the precision of market-based pricing to non-trivial intervals. The criteria currently employed in WTO and EU proceedings are consistent with correct accounting for the opportunity cost of capital when markets are complete and frictionless, but fail in the presence of payoff-relevant market incompleteness where the interval between bid and ask prices may not be finessed away. An economic definition of subsidy must necessarily capture opportunity cost, and we develop a definition that fully incorporates government’s opportunity cost in both complete and incomplete market settings. With this in hand we then revisit some commonly posed questions concerning the subsidy status of Launch Aid, giving indication of how they may be best resolved by those in possession of the relevant details.

Alternation Bias and Reduction in St. Petersburg Gambles: An Experimental Investigation

Reduction of compound lotteries is implicit both in the statement of the St. Petersburg Paradox and in its resolution by Expected Utility (EU).We report three real-money choice experiments between truncated compound-form St. Petersburg gambles and their reduced-form equivalents. The first tests for differences in elicited Certainty Equivalents. The second develops the distinction between ‘weak-form’ and ‘strong-form’ rejection of Reduction, as well as a novel experimental task that verifiably implements Vernon Smith’s dominance precept. The third experiment checks for robustness against range and increment manipulation. In all three experiments the null hypothesis of Reduction is rejected, with systematic deprecation of the compound form in favor of the reduced form. This is consistent with the predictions of alternation bias. Together these experiments offer evidence that the Reduction assumption may have limited descriptive validity in modelling St. Petersburg gambles, whether by EU or non-EU theories.

Community-level natural resource management institutions: A noncooperative equilibrium example

The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) literature finds that Nash equilibrium predictions are empirically falsified in the social dilemmas that arise in community-level natural resource management problems. However, Nash equilibrium is not the only solution concept within noncooperative game theory. Here we demonstrate the power of Correlated Equilibrium (CE) to explain lotteries for the allocation of fishing sites as enduring community-level natural resource management institutions. Such CE-implementing lotteries are procedurally fair, equitable, and increase total expected fishery value.This modeling approach clarifies two further sets of relationships. It reveals the nature of the interdependence between the size and spacing of fishing sites and (a) the in-use characteristics of fishing gear, as well as (b) the degree of formalization of property rights and the structural features of the natural resource-management institution. When appropriately applied, noncooperative game theory offers a powerful explanatory complement to the IAD literature on community-level natural resource management.

Visceral Emotions, Within-Community Communication, and (Ill-Judged) Endorsement of Financial Propositions

The 2007-08 financial crisis exposed poignant examples of ill-judged risk accretion in both tails of the Lorenz curve: concentrations of inappropriate mortgages within low-income neighborhoods, and concentrations of Bernard Madoff’s victims within wealthy, predominantly Jewish country-club communities. These examples share three key elements. First, individual behavioral decision makers take decisions privately but contribute to the build-up of risk within the community. Second, sales agents employ psychological persuasion techniques (bypassing logical processes), and trigger visceral emotions (overriding rational deliberation). Third, community membership immerses individuals within information flows that trigger invidious visceral emotions, and leads to biased inferences due to sample-size illusion and persuasion bias. We develop a closed-form model based on Signal-Detection Theory (SDT) that incorporates all three abovementioned elements: it is behavioral in employing a Prospect Theory (PT) objective function; peripheral-route persuasion and visceral emotions are incorporated through their impacts on discriminability d ′ ; and sample-size illusion and persuasion bias are incorporated through their effects on the score θ. This PT-SDT model predicts that visceral-emotion-charged hot states can short-circuit the capacity to practice caveat emptor, carrying implications for regulation and for our understanding of US household-borrowing growth 2001–2006.

Local Representativeness and the St. Petersburg Paradox

In the context of coin tossing, the local representativeness effect gives rise to alternation bias, whereby negatively autocorrelated sequences are perceived as maximally random and the runs characteristic of unbiased memoryless Bernoulli processes are perceived as being excessively regular to be random. Thus as a consequence of the local representativeness effect, a negative subjective autocorrelation is associated with tosses of fair, memoryless coins. Given this negative subjective autocorrelation, the expected value of the St. Petersburg prospect is finite. Moreover, this expected value falls within the empirically-determined range of what people are typically willing to pay for the St. Petersburg gamble.