Kimberley A. Wade

A picture is worth a thousand lies: Using false photographs to create false childhood memories

Because image-enhancing technology is readily available, people are frequently exposed to doctored images. However, in prior research on how adults can be led to report false childhood memories, subjects have typically been exposed to personalized and detailed narratives describing false events. Instead, we exposed 20 subjects to a false childhood event via a fake photograph and imagery instructions. Over three interviews, subjects thought about a photograph showing them on a hot air balloon ride and tried to recall the event by using guided-imagery exercises. Fifty percent of the subjects created complete or partial false memories. The results bear on ways in which false memories can be created and also have practical implications for those involved in clinical and legal settings.

Actually, a picture is worth less than 45 words : Narratives produce more false memories than photographs do

Most memory “implantation” studies have elicited false memories by using fake narratives. Recently, Wade, Garry, Read, and Lindsay (2002) showed that doctored photographs can be used to create false childhood memories in adults. Fifty percent of Wade et al.’s sample reported details of taking a childhood hot air balloon ride, although they had never been in a balloon. In this experiment, we investigated whether photos or narratives influence memory more than the other. We exposed subjects to either a fake photograph or a fake narrative of a childhood hot air balloon ride. Subjects tried to remember the false event and three real events over 1 week. Narratives were more likely to produce false memory reports than were photos. We offer a fluency-based account of our results and suggest that narratives promote more familiarity in subjects than do photographs.

Registered Replication Report

Trying to remember something now typically improves your ability to remember it later. However, after watching a video of a simulated bank robbery, participants who verbally described the robber were 25% worse at identifying the robber in a lineup than were participants who instead listed U.S. states and capitals—this has been termed the “verbal overshadowing” effect (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). More recent studies suggested that this effect might be substantially smaller than first reported. Given uncertainty about the effect size, the influence of this finding in the memory literature, and its practical importance for police procedures, we conducted two collections of preregistered direct replications (RRR1 and RRR2) that differed only in the order of the description task and a filler task. In RRR1, when the description task immediately followed the robbery, participants who provided a description were 4% less likely to select the robber than were those in the control condition. In RRR2, when the description was delayed by 20 min, they were 16% less likely to select the robber. These findings reveal a robust verbal overshadowing effect that is strongly influenced by the relative timing of the tasks. The discussion considers further implications of these replications for our understanding of verbal overshadowing.

Digitally Manipulating Memory: Effects of Doctored Videos and Imagination in Distorting Beliefs and Memories

In prior research on false autobiographical beliefs and memories, subjects have been asked to imagine fictional events and have been exposed to false evidence that indicates that the fictional events occurred. But what are the relative contributions of imagination and false evidence toward false belief and memory construction? In the present study, subjects observed and copied various simple actions; then they viewed doctored videos that suggested that they had performed extra actions and they imagined performing some of those and some other actions. Subjects returned 2 weeks later for a memory test. False evidence or imagination alone was often sufficient to cause belief and memory distortions; in combination, they appeared to have additive or even superadditive effects. The results bear on the mechanisms underlying false beliefs and memories, and we propose legal and clinical applications of these findings.

Creating Fair Lineups for Suspects With Distinctive Features

In their descriptions, eyewitnesses often refer to a culprits distinctive facial features. However, in a police lineup, selecting the only member with the described distinctive feature is unfair to the suspect and provides the police with little further information. For fair and informative lineups, the distinctive feature should be either replicated across foils or concealed on the target. In the present experiments, replication produced more correct identifications in target-present lineups—without increasing the incorrect identification of foils in target-absent lineups—than did concealment. This pattern, and only this pattern, is predicted by the hybrid-similarity model of recognition.

Imagination inflation is a fact, not an artifact: A reply to Pezdek and Eddy

Pezdek and Eddy (2001) claim to prove that imagination inflation is a spurious effect caused by regression to the mean (RTM). They make four predictions about what patterns of data would demonstrate a genuine effect for imagination versus those that would be explainable by RTM. We review each of those predictions, and demonstrate significant problems with them. We conclude that imagination inflation is a genuine effect, and that Pezdek and Eddy’s work has contributed to the growing research showing that when people imagine fictitious events from long ago, they become more confident that those false events were genuine experiences.

Adults' memories of childhood: affect, knowing, and remembering.

Adult questionnaire respondents reported, for each of a number of events, if they had experienced that event during childhood and, if so, if they remembered the experience or merely knew it had happened. Respondents also rated the emotion of each event and judged whether they would remember more about each reportedly experienced event if they spent more time trying to do so. Study 1 respondents were 96 undergraduates, whereas Study 2 tested 93 community members ranging widely in age. Respondents often reported no recollections of reportedly experienced events. Reportedly experienced events rated as emotional were more often recollected than those rated as neutral, and those rated as positive were more often recollected than those rated as negative. Predicted ability to remember more was related to current memory. Claims of remembering reportedly experienced events increased with age, but predicted ability to remember more about them declined with age.

Visible markers of brain injury influence attributions for adolescents’ behaviour

Primary objective: Experiments investigated whether attributions for a brain-injured persons behaviours were affected by markers of injury. People misattribute behaviours that result from brain injury to personality or life stages (e.g. adolescence), particularly when there are no visible markers of the injury. Research design: Scenarios presented a photograph of an adolescent boy, who either wore or did not wear a head bandage. The boy was described as suffering a brain injury and showing four changes in his behaviour, relating to sleep, anger, self-confidence and motivation. Methods and procedures: For each behaviour, students (n = 100) rated attributions to the brain injury and adolescence. Outcomes and results: When there was no bandage, participants attributed the behaviours to adolescence more than brain injury, whereas with the head bandage they invoked both causes equally. Conclusions: When actions resulting from brain injury are attributed to causes other than the injury, this misattribution hinders accurate diagnosis and treatment. Data on effects of injury and individual levels of pre-morbid behaviours lead to accurate attributions.

A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false memory implantation studies

ABSTRACT Understanding that suggestive practices can promote false beliefs and false memories for childhood events is important in many settings (e.g., psychotherapeutic, medical, and legal). The generalisability of findings from memory implantation studies has been questioned due to variability in estimates across studies. Such variability is partly due to false memories having been operationalised differently across studies and to differences in memory induction techniques. We explored ways of defining false memory based on memory science and developed a reliable coding system that we applied to reports from eight published implantation studies (N = 423). Independent raters coded transcripts using seven criteria: accepting the suggestion, elaboration beyond the suggestion, imagery, coherence, emotion, memory statements, and not rejecting the suggestion. Using this scheme, 30.4% of cases were classified as false memories and another 23% were classified as having accepted the event to some degree. When the suggestion included self-relevant information, an imagination procedure, and was not accompanied by a photo depicting the event, the memory formation rate was 46.1%. Our research demonstrates a useful procedure for systematically combining data that are not amenable to meta-analysis, and provides the most valid estimate of false memory formation and associated moderating factors within the implantation literature to date.

Attributions for behaviours of persons with brain injury: The role of perceived severity and time since injury

Primary objective: The experiment determined first whether visible markers of brain injury shape judgements of severity of injury and time since injury; and secondly whether these two judgements predict attributions for undesirable actions performed by an adolescent with brain-injury. Research design: Scenarios presented a photograph of an adolescent, in one condition with a head scar and in a second condition with no scar. The adolescent was described as having suffered a brain injury and showing four behaviour changes, concerning sleep, anger, self-confidence and motivation. Methods and procedures: For each behaviour, students (n= 101) rated attributions to the brain injury and adolescence and estimated severity of injury and time since injury. Outcomes and results: With no scar, participants attributed the behaviours to adolescence more than brain injury, whereas with the scar they invoked both causes equally. With the scar they rated severity higher and time since injury shorter; severity predicted participants’ attributions for the behaviours. Conclusions: Visible markers of injury such as scars are spurious indicators of severity but they shape judgements of severity and attributions for actions of persons with brain injury. These results inform more accurate diagnosis and treatment for actions resulting from brain injury.