Kinga Morsanyi

Analogical reasoning ability in autistic and typically developing children

Recent studies (e.g. Dawson et al., 2007) have reported that autistic people perform in the normal range on the Raven Progressive Matrices test, a formal reasoning test that requires integration of relations as well as the ability to infer rules and form high-level abstractions. Here we compared autistic and typically developing children, matched on age, IQ, and verbal and non-verbal working memory, using both the Raven test and pictorial tests of analogical reasoning. Whereas the Raven test requires only formal analogical reasoning, the other analogy tests require use of real-world knowledge, as well as inhibition of salient distractors. We found that autistic children performed as well as controls on all these tests of reasoning with relations. Our findings indicate that the basic ability to reason systematically with relations, for both abstract and thematic materials, is intact in autism.

Are systemizing and autistic traits related to talent and interest in mathematics and engineering? Testing some of the central claims of the empathizing-systemizing theory.

In two experiments, we tested some of the central claims of the empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory. Experiment 1 showed that the systemizing quotient (SQ) was unrelated to performance on a mathematics test, although it was correlated with statistics-related attitudes, self-efficacy, and anxiety. In Experiment 2, systemizing skills, and gender differences in these skills, were more strongly related to spatial thinking styles than to SQ. In fact, when we partialled the effect of spatial thinking styles, SQ was no longer related to systemizing skills. Additionally, there was no relationship between the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) and the SQ, or skills and interest in mathematics and mechanical reasoning. We discuss the implications of our findings for the E-S theory, and for understanding the autistic cognitive profile.

Mathematical anxiety is linked to reduced cognitive reflection: a potential road from discomfort in the mathematics classroom to susceptibility to biases

BackgroundWhen asked to solve mathematical problems, some people experience anxiety and threat, which can lead to impaired mathematical performance (Curr Dir Psychol Sci 11:181–185, 2002). The present studies investigated the link between mathematical anxiety and performance on the cognitive reflection test (CRT; J Econ Perspect 19:25–42, 2005). The CRT is a measure of a person’s ability to resist intuitive response tendencies, and it correlates strongly with important real-life outcomes, such as time preferences, risk-taking, and rational thinking.MethodsIn Experiments 1 and 2 the relationships between maths anxiety, mathematical knowledge/mathematical achievement, test anxiety and cognitive reflection were analysed using mediation analyses. Experiment 3 included a manipulation of working memory load. The effects of anxiety and working memory load were analysed using ANOVAs.ResultsOur experiments with university students (Experiments 1 and 3) and secondary school students (Experiment 2) demonstrated that mathematical anxiety was a significant predictor of cognitive reflection, even after controlling for the effects of general mathematical knowledge (in Experiment 1), school mathematical achievement (in Experiment 2) and test anxiety (in Experiments 1–3). Furthermore, Experiment 3 showed that mathematical anxiety and burdening working memory resources with a secondary task had similar effects on cognitive reflection.ConclusionsGiven earlier findings that showed a close link between cognitive reflection, unbiased decisions and rationality, our results suggest that mathematical anxiety might be negatively related to individuals’ ability to make advantageous choices and good decisions.

Developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning: The role of cognitive capacity, instructions, thinking styles, and relevant knowledge

In three experiments we explored developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning, taking into account the effects of cognitive capacity, thinking styles, and instructions. Normative responding increased with grade levels and cognitive capacity in all experiments, and it showed a negative relationship with superstitious thinking. The effect of instructions (in Experiments 2 and 3) was moderated by level of education and cognitive capacity. Specifically, only higher-grade students with higher cognitive capacity benefited from instructions to reason on the basis of logic. The implications of these findings for research on the development of probabilistic reasoning are also discussed.

Decontextualised Minds: Adolescents with Autism are Less Susceptible to the Conjunction Fallacy than Typically Developing Adolescents

The conjunction fallacy has been cited as a classic example of the automatic contextualisation of problems. In two experiments we compared the performance of autistic and typically developing adolescents on a set of conjunction fallacy tasks. Participants with autism were less susceptible to the conjunction fallacy. Experiment 2 also demonstrated that the difference between the groups did not result from increased sensitivity to the conjunction rule, or from impaired processing of social materials amongst the autistic participants. Although adolescents with autism showed less bias in their reasoning they were not more logical than the control group in a normative sense. The findings are discussed in the light of accounts which emphasise differences in contextual processing between typical and autistic populations.

The link between logic, mathematics and imagination: evidence from children with developmental dyscalculia and mathematically gifted children.

This study examined performance on transitive inference problems in children with developmental dyscalculia (DD), typically developing controls matched on IQ, working memory and reading skills, and in children with outstanding mathematical abilities. Whereas mainstream approaches currently consider DD as a domain-specific deficit, we hypothesized that the development of mathematical skills is closely related to the development of logical abilities, a domain-general skill. In particular, we expected a close link between mathematical skills and the ability to reason independently of ones beliefs. Our results showed that this was indeed the case, with children with DD performing more poorly than controls, and high maths ability children showing outstanding skills in logical reasoning about belief-laden problems. Nevertheless, all groups performed poorly on structurally equivalent problems with belief-neutral content. This is in line with suggestions that abstract reasoning skills (i.e. the ability to reason about content without real-life referents) develops later than the ability to reason about belief-inconsistent fantasy content.A video abstract of this article can be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=90DWY3O4xx8.

Logic brightens my day: evidence for implicit sensitivity to logical validity

A key assumption of dual process theory is that reasoning is an explicit, effortful, deliberative process. The present study offers evidence for an implicit, possibly intuitive component of reasoning. Participants were shown sentences embedded in logically valid or invalid arguments. Participants were not asked to reason but instead rated the sentences for liking (Experiment 1) and physical brightness (Experiments 2-3). Sentences that followed logically from preceding sentences were judged to be more likable and brighter. Two other factors thought to be linked to implicit processing-sentence believability and facial expression-had similar effects on liking and brightness ratings. The authors conclude that sensitivity to logical structure was implicit, occurring potentially automatically and outside of awareness. They discuss the results within a fluency misattribution framework and make reference to the literature on discourse comprehension. (PsycINFO Database Record

The equiprobability bias from a mathematical and psychological perspective.

The equiprobability bias (EB) is a tendency to believe that every process in which randomness is involved corresponds to a fair distribution, with equal probabilities for any possible outcome. The EB is known to affect both children and adults, and to increase with probability education. Because it results in probability errors resistant to pedagogical interventions, it has been described as a deep misconception about randomness: the erroneous belief that randomness implies uniformity. In the present paper, we show that the EB is actually not the result of a conceptual error about the definition of randomness. On the contrary, the mathematical theory of randomness does imply uniformity. However, the EB is still a bias, because people tend to assume uniformity even in the case of events that are not random. The pervasiveness of the EB reveals a paradox: The combination of random processes is not necessarily random. The link between the EB and this paradox is discussed, and suggestions are made regarding educational design to overcome difficulties encountered by students as a consequence of the EB.

Reasoning on the basis of fantasy content: two studies with high-functioning autistic adolescents

Reasoning about problems with empirically false content can be hard, as the inferences that people draw are heavily influenced by their background knowledge. However, presenting empirically false premises in a fantasy context helps children and adolescents to disregard their beliefs, and to reason on the basis of the premises. The aim of the present experiments was to see if high-functioning adolescents with autism are able to utilize fantasy context to the same extent as typically developing adolescents when they reason about empirically false premises. The results indicate that problems with engaging in pretence in autism persist into adolescence, and this hinders the ability of autistic individuals to disregard their beliefs when empirical knowledge is irrelevant.

Can I Count on Getting Better? Association between Math Anxiety and Poorer Understanding of Medical Risk Reductions

Background. Lower numerical ability is associated with poorer understanding of health statistics, such as risk reductions of medical treatment. For many people, despite good numeracy skills, math provokes anxiety that impedes an ability to evaluate numerical information. Math-anxious individuals also report less confidence in their ability to perform math tasks. We hypothesized that, independent of objective numeracy, math anxiety would be associated with poorer responding and lower confidence when calculating risk reductions of medical treatments. Methods. Objective numeracy was assessed using an 11-item objective numeracy scale. A 13-item self-report scale was used to assess math anxiety. In experiment 1, participants were asked to interpret the baseline risk of disease and risk reductions associated with treatment options. Participants in experiment 2 were additionally provided a graphical display designed to facilitate the processing of math information and alleviate effects of math anxiety. Confidence ratings were provided on a 7-point scale. Results. Individuals of higher objective numeracy were more likely to respond correctly to baseline risks and risk reductions associated with treatment options and were more confident in their interpretations. Individuals who scored high in math anxiety were instead less likely to correctly interpret the baseline risks and risk reductions and were less confident in their risk calculations as well as in their assessments of the effectiveness of treatment options. Math anxiety predicted confidence levels but not correct responding when controlling for objective numeracy. The graphical display was most effective in increasing confidence among math-anxious individuals. Conclusions. The findings suggest that math anxiety is associated with poorer medical risk interpretation but is more strongly related to confidence in interpretations.