Kirk A. Collins

Effective Tax and Subsidy Rates on Human Capital in Canada

Effective tax and subsidy rates (ETRs and ESRs) on human capital investment via post‐secondary education are estimated for Canada in the years 2000 and 2006. The flattening of the federal personal income tax structure in 2001 substantially reduced the tax disincentive for investment in human capital. Effective subsidy rates also declined as public spending did not keep pace with rising tuition fees. The change on the tax side was strong enough to dominate the subsidy reduction according to our main results, but disaggregation shows that this result did not hold in all cases. Results are shown for College, Masters, and PhD programs, in addition to Bachelors degrees. They are also broken down by gender, and are shown for the 25th and 75th percentiles as well as the median. Provincial detail and 1997 results are provided in the case of Bachelors graduates. (Les taux effectifs de taxation et de subvention sur l’investissement en capital humain via l’education post‐secondaire sont evalues pour les annees 2000 et 2006. L’aplatissement de la structure d’imposition federale sur le revenu en 2001 a reduit substantiellement la desincitation fiscale a investir dans le capital humain. Les taux effectifs de subventions ont aussi declinea proportion que les depenses publiques n’ont pas cru au rythme des frais de scolarite. Les changements cote impots ont ete assez importants pour dominer les impacts des reductions de subventions selon les resultats generaux, mais les resultats desagreges montrent que cela ne tient pas dans tous les cas. On presente les resultats pour les colleges, les maitrises et les doctorats en plus des baccalaureats. On ventile aussi les resultats selon le sexe, et on presente les resultats pour les 25e et 75e percentiles de gains ainsi que pour la mediane. On donne les resultats au niveau provincial en 1997 pour le cas des grades de premier cycle.)

Effective Tax and Subsidy Rates on Human Capital in Canada (Taux Effectifs De Taxation Et De Subvention Sur Le Capital Humain AU Canada)

Effective tax and subsidy rates (ETRs and ESRs) on human capital investment via post‐secondary education are estimated for Canada in the years 2000 and 2006. The flattening of the federal personal income tax structure in 2001 substantially reduced the tax disincentive for investment in human capital. Effective subsidy rates also declined as public spending did not keep pace with rising tuition fees. The change on the tax side was strong enough to dominate the subsidy reduction according to our main results, but disaggregation shows that this result did not hold in all cases. Results are shown for College, Masters, and PhD programs, in addition to Bachelors degrees. They are also broken down by gender, and are shown for the 25th and 75th percentiles as well as the median. Provincial detail and 1997 results are provided in the case of Bachelors graduates. (Les taux effectifs de taxation et de subvention sur l’investissement en capital humain via l’education post‐secondaire sont evalues pour les annees 2000 et 2006. L’aplatissement de la structure d’imposition federale sur le revenu en 2001 a reduit substantiellement la desincitation fiscale a investir dans le capital humain. Les taux effectifs de subventions ont aussi declinea proportion que les depenses publiques n’ont pas cru au rythme des frais de scolarite. Les changements cote impots ont ete assez importants pour dominer les impacts des reductions de subventions selon les resultats generaux, mais les resultats desagreges montrent que cela ne tient pas dans tous les cas. On presente les resultats pour les colleges, les maitrises et les doctorats en plus des baccalaureats. On ventile aussi les resultats selon le sexe, et on presente les resultats pour les 25e et 75e percentiles de gains ainsi que pour la mediane. On donne les resultats au niveau provincial en 1997 pour le cas des grades de premier cycle.)

Sheep and their herders: testing the myth of rational voters – a Latvian case study

Through the use of a simple behavioural political economy model, we cast doubt on the assumption that voters behave in predictable ways dependent on their expected support for government policies. We show that under certain conditions an unfavourable (i.e. welfare reducing) policy may result, even with well-informed, welfare maximising voters. While true that voter behaviour may align with government policies, this alignment has more to do with a perceived lack of influence, rather than policy support. The case of Latvias accession to the European Union is used as a case study to evaluate the governments policy in terms of voting behaviour. Both qualitative research by way of focus group sessions and a quantitative research survey are used to develop and test a simple political economy model. Findings indicate that voters evaluate the expected benefits from a policy, and the governments stated position, as separate factors.