Kirsten E. Schulze

The Struggle for an Independent Aceh: The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy of GAM

On 9 December 2002, the Indonesian government and the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), otherwise known as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), agreed to a Cessation of Hostilities. This agreement was the product of a negotiation process that started in early 2000 with the aim of ending the separatist conflict occurring in Aceh since 1976. The two years leading up to this agreement were riddled with difficulties, including the collapse of the first cease-fire-the May 2000 Humanitarian Pause. The December 2002 cessation of hostilities fared only marginally better. While the monitoring mechanism had been somewhat improved, the fact that there was no agreement on the key substantive issues, such as the question of sovereignty, undermined its implementation. As a result, only six months after its conclusion the cease fire was dead in all but name. Last minute efforts to revive it at a meeting in Tokyo on 17 May failed. Two days later, on 19 May, Indonesia declared martial law in Aceh and gave the green light for a military operation. While the problems in the negotiations are of course the product of policies and dynamics on both sides, this article focuses only on GAM in order to increase the understanding of this national liberation movement and to ascertain to what extent the organization’s history, ideology, structure, and politico-military strategy have made reaching a compromise difficult.

From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table: GAM and the Indonesian Government 1999–2005

Abstract This article looks at the motivations of the Indonesian government and GAM to shift from a purely military strategy in the 1980s and 1990s to a combined strategy in 2000, which for the first time included negotiations. It starts by considering the paradigms through which Jakarta viewed Aceh and GAM viewed Indonesia, and then demonstrates that these paradigms necessitated military action by both protagonists. It then proceeds to explore the changes in the Indonesian governments after the fall of Suharto and their attitudes toward both negotiations and military solution. This is followed by an analysis of GAMs position on negotiations. It will be argued that for both Indonesia and GAM negotiations were part of a broader politico-military strategy rather than an either/or position. It will be further argued that in both cases military weakness, though not a defeat in a conventional sense, played an important role in the decision to embrace the negotiating table.

The Northern Ireland political process: A viable approach to conflict resolution?

Abstract This article explores the possibility of achieving a stable settlement as the result of the current negotiations in Northern Ireland. It looks at the decisions behind the 1994 ceasefires, the perceptions of the parties to the ‘talks’, and the obstacles in the political process. The main focus is on the applicability and limits of conflict resolution ‘theories’ in explaining the shift from conflict to negotiation and the possibility of concluding a lasting negotiated settlement. It suggests that while conflict resolution is unlikely, conflict regulation is within the realms of the current negotiations, if combined with a different approach to nationalism and ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’.

The East Timor Referendum Crisis and Its Impact on Indonesian Politics

The 1997 Asian economic crisis, the emergence of the popular reformasi movement, and the 1998 fall of President Suharto set in motion an uneasy process of political change in Indonesia that has been accompanied by violent challenges to the state’s territorial integrity and to the military’s role in society. The widespread perception in much of the Indonesian and international media is that the reformist camp has won. Suharto’s chosen successor, B. J. Habibie, first lost East Timor in the August 1999 referendum and then his own presidential position in the October 1999 elections. He was replaced by the well-known moderate Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), who within a year installed Indonesia’s first civilian defense minister and ended the military’s guaranteed seats in the House of Representatives, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR). Democracy, it appeared, had finally gained a foothold, not least because of the pressure exerted by the outside world and the United Nations (UN) arising from the East Timor crisis. Yet in Indonesian politics things are rarely what they appear to be. The referendum in East Timor and the patterns of violence surrounding it reveal a number of different agendas that may have been obscured by Gus Dur’s reform policy but that remain far from resolved as evidenced by the striking similarity in the patterns of violence in the on-going conflict in Maluku. Thus, a closer analysis of the agendas pursued by the respective political and military players shows that the “democratic” victory may not necessarily translate into a defeat for the military or a more pluralist political culture. Indeed, it could be argued that the loss of East Timor was necessary to preserve the military’s role in society and that Gus Dur’s government, in that sense, is only the refashioning of a new consensus.

Decommissioning and Paramilitary Strategy in Northern Ireland: A Problem Compared

This study examines the problems of paramilitary decommissioning in Northern Ireland. It analyses why decommissioning has become so contentious in the Northern Ireland peace process. Decommissioning, though, is not a unique or intrinsically insurmountable problem. This is demonstrated by highlighting the issue in international context. Three examples of decommissioning in conflict resolution processes are assessed: the Lebanon, El Salvador and Mozambique. These varied examples do supply some limited lessons for Northern Ireland. This study argues that the explanation for the intractability of decommissioning in Northern Ireland resides, to a greater extent, in the tactical and strategic reasoning of the main paramilitary groupings in Northern Ireland. The factors that condition their thinking, however, can be found in the nature of the peace process itself which provides the paramilitiaries with every incentive to retain possession of their weapons.

The “ethnic” in Indonesia’s communal conflicts: violence in Ambon, Poso, and Sambas

ABSTRACT This article looks at the communal violence in Ambon, Poso, and Sambas in post-Suharto Indonesia from a comparative perspective. It explores why Ambon and Poso were seen as religious while Sambas was seen as ethnic despite the fact that in all three conflicts different religions and ethnicities fought each other. Examining the “ethnic” elements, this article advances three arguments: First, that the Poso and Ambon conflicts were no less ethnic than the Sambas conflict as they had similar “ethnic causes”. Second, that the religious narrative dominated in Ambon and Poso because it reflected the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia since the 1990s while the narrative in Sambas reflected that it was the latest round of a pre-existing anti-Madurese conflict which had already been “defined” as “ethnic”. Third, that the narratives were framed strategically, thus influencing the trajectory of the conflict but also responding to it.

Camp David and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: An Assessment of the State of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, July-December 2000

This article examines the Al-Aqsa Intifada and its impact on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It is argued here that the Intifada was the result of long-term frustrations of the Palestinian people with the lack of change as well as the short-term need of the Palestinian leadership for an exit strategy after the Camp David summit. Palestinian strategy aimed at shifting the blame for the failure of Camp David from Yasser Arafat to Ehud Barak and to create maximum international solidarity to pressure Israel into concessions. Yet, closer analysis reveals that despite early successes, the Intifada strategy is one of diminishing returns. Conversely, Israeli crisis management, while taking some initial blows particularly in terms of public image, has proved relatively successful at preventing the erosion of Israeli positions on the ground. Ultimately, however, neither Palestinians nor Israelis will be able to achieve their respective aims of statehood and security without returning to the negotiating table.

Why They Join: Pathways into Indonesian Jihadist Organizations

ABSTRACT Why do Indonesian Muslims join Islamist extremist groups? This article explores four pathways to entry into Indonesian militant groups: study sessions, local conflict, kinship, and schools. It argues that within all four of these pathways, social bonds and relationships are the common thread in encouraging entry as well as in fostering commitment. Specifically, these relationships contribute to the formation and eventual consolidation of one’s identity as a member of the jihadi group through regular participation in activities, attending meetings, narrowing the circle of friends to those within the group, and participating in increasingly risky and possibly violent activities together. Drawing on original fieldwork including 49 interviews with current and former members of Jemaah Islamiyah, Mujahidin KOMPAK, Darul Islam, Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh, Indonesia’s pro-ISIS network, and other jihadist groups as well as 57 depositions and court documents, this article explores the development and evolution of these pathways and how relational ties play a role in each.

Point of Departure: The 1967 War and the Jews of Lebanon

Jews have been living in what today is Lebanon for the last 3,000 years. They were integrated into their environs and since the Arab conquests in the seventh century they were culturally and linguistically Arabized. They resided mainly in the port cities of Tripoli, Sidon and Beirut, but also in the Chouf mountains and Mount Hermon. They lived amicably among the Maronite, Druze, Sunni and Shi’a communities. The impact of Zionism and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 created sporadic tensions in the first half of the twentieth century, but these were offset by a Lebanese state that was committed to a policy of protecting all of its minorities and that treated its Jews no differently from any other religious or ethnic community. Indeed Lebanon, after 1948, became the only Arab country in which the number of Jews increased as it became the refuge for Syrian and Iraqi Jews fleeing anti-Jewish hostilities and policies. All this changed with the June 1967 war. For the Jews, this war turned Lebanon from a paradise into a paradise lost. Between the end of the war and 1970, half of the Jewish community emigrated. This article looks at the impact of the 1967 June War upon the Jews of Lebanon and analyses why this war precipitated large-scale Jewish emigration. It argues that there were four key reasons for the Jewish exodus. First, this war significantly increased the Palestinian refugee community as well as the fedayeen presence in Lebanon. The latter instilled fear in Lebanon’s Jews as the fedayeen moved about freely in uniforms and carried weapons. Indeed, there were acts of intimidation, extortion and violence by fedayeen against Jews, most notably the murder of Eduard Sasson, which sent shock waves through the Jewish community. Second, business conditions worsened after the war. Third, the Lebanese state placed no restrictions upon either its Jewish citizens or Jewish wealth leaving the country. Fourth, and, most importantly, Lebanon started changing as the sectarian divide deepened and the state and its security forces slowly lost control. The Lebanese Jews saw their security tied firmly

The Idea of an Alliance: Israeli—Maronite Relations, 1920s–1948

‘Collusion’ presupposes a direct and explicit agreement and it carries the connotation ofa shabby and secret deal. ‘Tacit understanding’, on the other hand, can issue from mutual mind-reading, leading to awareness that co-operation can work to their mutual advantage but without any direct contact or explicitly formulated plan of action.1