Kjell G. Nyborg

Discriminatory versus uniform treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions

Abstract We use when-issued transactions data to assess the Treasurys current experiment with uniform auctions. When-issued volume is higher under uniform as compared to discriminatory auctions, suggesting a higher information release, which should reduce pre-auction uncertainty and the winners curse. Under uniform auctions, when-issued volatility falls after the auction and again after the outcome announcement. The pattern is the opposite for discriminatory auctions. This is further evidence that uniform auctions increase pre-auction information and lower the short squeeze. A direct comparison of markups in uniform and discriminatory auctions yields mixed results.

A Comparison of UK, US and German Insolvency Codes

The bankruptcy codes of the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany differ concerning who is permitted to control the debtor in bankruptcy and as to the ability of the debtor to arrange new financing while in bankruptcy. This study compares the efficiency of these three bankruptcy codes against a set of benchmarks.

Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from Swedish Treasury Auctions

We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction awards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second, we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner’s curse–driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies. Third, we explore the extent to which the received theories of multiunit auctions are able to offer insights into the bidder behavior we observe. Our empirical evidence is consistent with some of the predictions of the models of auctions that emphasize private information, the winner’s curse and the champion’s plague. While the models of multiunit auctions serve as useful guideposts, our empirical findings also point to several new areas of research in multiunit auctions that are of policy and theoretical interest.

Divisible-Good Auctions: The Role of Allocation Rules

We examine the role of allocation rules in determining the set of equilibrium prices in uniform-price auctions. Beginning with Wilson (1979), the theoretical literature has argued that these auctions are subject to possible low equilibrium prices. We show that this is due to the way the asset is being divided. We focus on allocation rules that specify the way the asset is divided in cases of excess demand. This may have a dramatic effect on the set of equilibrium prices. In particular, we show that a simple allocation rule (pro rata) eliminates underpricing, while the allocation rule used in practice has a negative effect on equilibrium prices.

The use and pricing of convertible bonds

This paper provides an overview of the main results of the literature on pricing convertible bonds. It covers simple convertible bonds which are non-callable and can be converted only at maturity as well as more complicated callable and puttable convertible bonds under stochastic interest rates. The paper also reviews the main results in the literature on why firms issue convertible bonds. The two most often cited rationales for issuing convertible bonds - as delayed equity, and to sweeten debt - are discussed in the context of both asymmetric information and agency models of capital structure. Finally, the paper provides some thoughts on incorporating strategic issues into the pricing of convertible bonds.

Bank Bailout Menus

We study bailouts of banks that suffer from debt overhang problems and have private information about the quality of their assets-in-place and new investment opportunities. Menus of bailout plans are used as a screening device. Constrained-optimality involves over capitalization and nonlinear pricing, with worse types choosing larger bailouts. When investment opportunities follow the assets, we derive an equivalence result between equity injections and asset buyouts. The larger capital outlay under asset buyouts can be offset by borrowing against the assets. If investment opportunities follow the bank, equity injections offer more upside to the bailout agency. This may reduce as well as enhance efficiency, depending on whether screening intensity is needed mostly on assets-in-place or new investments.

The Price of Liquidity: Bank Characteristics and Market Conditions

We identify frictions in the market for liquidity as well as bank-specific and market-wide factors that affect the prices that banks pay for liquidity, captured here by borrowing rates in repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap. We have price data at the individual bank level and, unique to this paper, data on individual banks’ reserve requirements and actual reserve holdings, thus allowing us to gauge the extent to which a bank is short or long liquidity. We find that the price a bank pays for liquidity depends on the liquidity positions of other banks, as well as its own. There is evidence that liquidity squeezes occasionally occur and short banks pay more the larger is the potential for a squeeze. The price paid for liquidity is decreasing in bank size and small banks are more adversely affected by an increased potential for a squeeze. Healthier banks pay less, but contrary to what one might expect, banks in formal liquidity networks do not.

Consistent Methods of Valuing Companies By Dcf: Methods and Assumptions

In this note we discuss four common methods of valuing firms: 1.Discounting operating free cash flow at the weighted average cost of capital. 2.Discounting equity free cash flow at the cost of equity. 3.Valuing the firm using adjusted present value. 4.Discounting the capital cash flow at the unlevered cost of capital. We examine four alternative assumptions about leverage policy and how they affect three things: discount rates, the present value of tax savings, and how to use the above methods. We describe alternative ways of implementing the valuation methods consistently, and how to choose between them. Finally, we show how inconsistent application can lead to errors that are subtle but large. The use of incorrect formulas can result in an estimate of the present value of the tax saving that is double its correct value.

Monetary Policy Implementation: A European Perspective

Monetary policy implementation is one of the most significant areas of interaction between central banking and financial markets. Historically, how this interaction takes place has been viewed as having an important impact on the ultimate objective of monetary policy, for example price stability or stimulating economic growth. In this article, we survey different approaches to monetary policy implementation. We cover briefly some of the historical trends, but give particular attention to the practice that is now (again) very common world-wide; namely, targeting short term interest rates. We discuss various ways this can be done and the implications for financial markets. We emphasize different European approaches, while also providing comparisons with the Fed.

Stock Liquidity and Corporate Cash Holdings: Feedback and the Cash as Ammunition Hypothesis

We advance the feedback/cash as ammunition hypothesis, namely that firms hold cash to address feedback from stock prices to cash ows and growth opportunities. Firms with more liquid stocks are expected to hold more cash, the opposite of the prediction from a standard information asymmetry perspective on stock liquidity. The effect should be amplifed by growth opportunities. These and other predictions are supported in the data. We use the introduction of tick-size decimalization as a natural experiment where liquidity is exogenously shocked. The evidence also suggests that cash holdings and stock liquidity are mutually reinforcing. As predicted by theory, stock liquidity is affected by factors relating to information asymmetry, inventory risks, and transaction costs.