Knut H. Mikalsen

From user-groups to stakeholders? The public interest in fisheries management

Fisheries management has long been characterised by strong user-group involvement, created to enhance the legitimacy and proficiency of decisions. Due to perennial problems of overfishing and resource depletion, the privileged position of users are increasingly being challenged, and there have been calls for more inclusive and democratic institutions. Fish, it is argued, is a public resource and should be managed through institutional arrangements that take the public interest into account. Taking the demands for more inclusive and transparent management institutions as our starting point, the article addresses some of the issues emanating from a stakeholder approach to fisheries management. Against the backdrop of stakeholder theory, as it has been developed in the literature on business management, we attempt to identify--and classify--those with a legitimate stake in the fisheries. We also address some of the problems and complexities of stakeholder management, and conclude with a discussion of some of the central issues and challenges pertaining to the creation of more inclusive and transparent institutions in fisheries management.

Limits to participation? On the history, structure and reform of Norwegian fisheries management

Norwegian fisheries management is best characterized as a system of centralized consultation. The ultimate authority to manage lies with central government, albeit with a significant element of power sharing through corporatist arrangements facilitating the participation-in management decision-making--of a select group of stakeholders. This structure has been criticized for fostering a decision-making process that favours user-groups at the expense of other legitimate stakeholders. Transparency and inclusiveness are currently being hailed as core values of the ideal management process, and there are demands for broader representation in management decision-making. In this paper we address some of the questions and dilemmas pertaining to institutional reform in Norwegian fisheries management, tracing the roots as well as the core structures and procedures of the current system. We identify the major challenges being faced by established institutions, and conclude with a discussion of the pros and cons of a more transparent and democratic process.

Representation in Fisheries Co-Management

Co-management builds on the active involvement in regulatory decision-making of those people whose livelihoods depend on the viability of the natural resource. In contrast to government agencies in a top-down, command-and-control role, co-management schemes divide the responsibilities of regulatory functions between government and user-groups based on the principles of collaboration and partnership. The expected outcome is a more equitable, legitimate and effective management system. The promise of co-management should, however, not lead us to underestimate the problems and risks involved that may lead to failure. Given the state of most fisheries and fish stocks, and the questionable legitimacy of current management regimes, this is something co-management systems can hardly afford.

Fisheries Governance, Social Justice and Participatory Decision-Making

Controversies over distribution of access rights are a distinctive feature of fisheries management. Who should be the beneficiaries and what are the relevant criteria for awarding such benefits? We find it rather surprising that principled fisheries management debates on social justice are so rare. We are equally perplexed that so little attention is paid to issues of justice within social science fisheries research. In this article we try to remedy this, first by outlining some of the arguments in the justice literature to demonstrate their relevance for fisheries governance. Second, the establishment of a particular allocative mechanism — the so-called quota ladders - in Norwegian fisheries is used as an example of how different conceptions of justice can be applied in concrete management settings. We argue that much would be gained if a principled debate among involved stakeholders occurred prior to the actual allocation process; that is if stakeholders would agree on some general rules with regard to what constitute socially just distribution of access rights. In fact, we believe that the issue of participatory decision-making through devolvement of authority and responsibility to stakeholder groups, which is now on the agenda in many countries, would be much easier to realise if a social contract for just fisheries were established at the root.

Do national resources have to be centrally managed? Vested interests and institutional reform in Norwegian fisheries governance

Corporatism -with its privileged access, restricted participation and centralized structures - has a long history in Norwegian fisheries governance. Co-management – understood as a decentralized, bottom-up and more inclusive form of fisheries governance - has not been considered a relevant alternative.. Why does corporatism still prevail in a context where stakeholder status in fisheries governance globally – both in principle and practice - has been awarded environmental organizations, municipal authorities and even consumer advocacy groups? Why then have alternatives to the corporatist system of centralized consultation and state governance never been seriously considered in Norway, in spite of the growing emphasis on fish as a public resource and fisheries management as human intervention in geographically confined and complex ecosystems? We suggest that this may have to do with the fundamental assumptions behind Norwegian fisheries governance that since fish is a national resource, it must be centrally managed. We argue that this is an assumption that may be contested.

Regulation and Representation: Institutional Challenges in Fisheries Management

Legitimacy and compliance have gradually become key concepts in fisheries management, sometimes surpassing efficiency and conservation as conspicuous catchwords in debates on management policies (Jentoft, 1993; Felt, 1990). There is a growing recognition — among managers, scientists and politicians — that no management scheme will work unless it enjoys the support of those whose behaviour it is intended to affect. Legitimacy, in this sense, has to do with compliance, with decisions and policies that conform to, or approximate, the values, standards and expectations of those affected (Beetham, 1991: 11). One of the most pressing problems in fisheries management, then, is how to ensure ‘grass-roots’ approval of decisions that may actually harm large segments of the industry.