Ko Maeda

Two Modes of Democratic Breakdown: A Competing Risks Analysis of Democratic Durability

There are two distinctive modes by which democracies become nondemocracies, which have not yet been differentiated in the literature. One is when a democratic government is toppled by a force outside of the government, such as a military coup, and the other is when a democratically elected leader suspends the democratic process. Employing a competing risks model, this article examines the effects of economic and institutional factors on a state’s risk of experiencing either of these paths to democratic breakdown. An analysis of the duration of 135 democratic periods, between 1950 and 2004, provides evidence that lower levels of economic development and economic growth rates increase the risk of military coups and that incumbent democratic leaders are more likely to end the democratic process themselves in a presidential system than in a parliamentary system.

Duration of Party Control in Parliamentary and Presidential Governments A Study of 65 Democracies, 1950 to 1998

Most of the previous work on political stability uses cabinet duration or leadership duration to measure stability. This study, however, focuses on another area of stability, namely the party control of the executive branch. This approach not only allows us to compare political durability in presidential and parliamentary systems directly, but it also, we believe, better reflects policy changes that stem from government party composition. Our analysis of longitudinal data from 65 democracies reveals that presidential and parliamentary governments create different patterns of government survival. Ruling parties in parliamentary systems encounter a declining hazard rate over time, whereas those in presidentialism face an increasing hazard rate in their survival. We explain this difference by focusing on how parliamentary and presidential systems create different incentive structures for political parties.

Divided We Fall: Opposition Fragmentation and the Electoral Fortunes of Governing Parties

This article introduces the concept of opposition fragmentation into the study of the determinants of election results. Empirical studies have demonstrated that anti-government economic voting is likely to take place where the clarity of responsibility (the degree to which voters can attribute policy responsibility to the government) is high. This argument is extended by focusing on the effects of the degree of opposition fragmentation in influencing the extent to which poor economic performance decreases the government’s vote share. With data from seventeen parliamentary democracies, it is shown that when there are fewer opposition parties, the relationship between economic performance and governing parties’ electoral fortune is stronger. Opposition fragmentation appears to be as strong a factor as the clarity of responsibility.

An Irrational Party of Rational Members: The Collision of Legislators’ Reelection Quest With Party Success in the Japan Socialist Party

This study presents a new explanation to a puzzle regarding the reluctance of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) to moderate its hard-liner Marxist platform. The author does so by focusing on the preferences and strategies of individual JSP members, in contrast to previous studies that treat the party as a unitary actor. The author shows that Japan’s electoral system created a unique environment in which the electoral prospects for some JSP incumbents would be seriously jeopardized if their party increased its popular support. The analysis demonstrates that the degree of security JSP politicians had in retaining their own seats was a significant determinant in their attitudes toward a proposed policy moderation plan that was considered during a critical period in the early 1960s that could have increased support for the party.

Determinants of opposition fragmentation Parliamentary rules and opposition strategies

Whether the opposition in a democratic country is unified or fragmented is an important characteristic that may influence the accountability of government, as a recent study demonstrates that the degree of opposition fragmentation has consequences for the electoral performance of ruling parties. This study explores the determinants of opposition fragmentation using data from 18 advanced democracies. I argue and provide evidence that deliberative parliamentary rules that allow opposition parties to have greater influence in the policymaking process lead to higher levels of opposition fragmentation. Opposition parties deprived of political influence tend to reduce their levels of fragmentation in order to become more competitive. This finding suggests that there may be a trade-off between deliberativeness and competitiveness in democratic politics.

Voter turnout and district-level competitiveness in mixed-member electoral systems

ABSTRACT It has been suggested that one of the reasons why majoritarian electoral systems are associated with lower voter turnout in comparison to proportional electoral systems is that citizens in uncompetitive districts (“safe seats”) are not motivated to vote. This study brings this thesis into a new context and tests it with unique data. Mixed-member electoral systems have both majoritarian and proportional components. The relative importance of these components differs between mixed-member proportional (MMP) and mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems. I argue that, due to this difference, the impact of district-level competitiveness on turnout is stronger in MMM than in MMP. An analysis of district-level electoral data from four countries confirms this hypothesis. Findings from this study advance our theoretical understanding of voter participation and also of the functioning of mixed-member electoral systems.

Honeymoon or consolidation, or both?: Time dependence of democratic durability

Much research has been done to identify factors that facilitate or prevent democratic breakdown. Little attention, however, has been paid to the question of whether and how the baseline risk level (after controlling for the impacts of relevant factors) changes over time. Using a flexible parametric survival model, I analyse the duration of 149 democratic periods (1946–2008) and demonstrate that the baseline risk has an inverted-U shape, which provides evidence for the honeymoon effect and democratic consolidation. This finding has an important policy implication for democratic assistance programmes.

The JCP: A Perpetual Spoiler?

This chapter examines the electoral performance of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) in the 2017 general election. The JCP lost about 30% of proportional representation (PR) votes relative to the previous election, and the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) appears to be the main recipient of the voters who left the JCP. The JCP reduced its number of single-seat district (SSD) candidates in this election, but still ran candidates in 71% of SSDs. The presence or absence of a JCP candidate in SSDs, however, does not seem to have substantially influenced the overall results.

What Motivates Moderation? Policy Shifts of Ruling Parties, Opposition Parties and Niche Parties

What makes political parties moderate their policy platforms? Previous research has emphasised such factors as electoral systems, past election results and changes in voters’ preferences as influencing the policy positions that parties take. This study considers a variable that has been ignored in the literature: whether a party is in power or in opposition. I argue that the behaviour of opposition parties stems from their powerless status and their desire to change this status (unless they are niche parties that tend to stick to their positions). It is expected that non-niche opposition parties are more likely to moderate their policy positions than ruling parties or niche opposition parties. A statistical analysis provides strong supportive evidence for the hypothesis.