Kris Dunn

Preference for radical right-wing populist parties among exclusive-nationalists and authoritarians

The literature on authoritarianism and exclusive forms of nationalism often implies that authoritarian and exclusive-nationalist individuals will prefer radical right-wing populist parties such as Austrias FPÖ. The theoretical case for such implications appears sound as party programmes for radical right-wing populist parties invoke rhetoric that should appeal to individuals with either of these characteristics. To date, these implications have not been examined. This article examines quantitative survey data from five Western European countries with electorally viable radical right-wing populist parties to determine whether radical right-wing populist parties are preferred by authoritarians and/or exclusive-nationalists. Analyses indicate that the radical right-wing populist parties studied here are consistently preferred by exclusive-nationalist individuals, though not necessarily to all other parties, but only inconsistently preferred by authoritarian individuals. While more nuanced investigation is still needed, it is clear that, contrary to the assumptions in the authoritarianism literature, radical right-wing populist parties cannot always rely on authoritarian individuals for support.

The Surprising Non-Impact of Radical Right-Wing Populist Party Representation on Public Tolerance of Minorities

The presence of radical right-wing populist (RRP) parties presents a challenge to liberal democracies, which are inclined to allow the representation of parties that reject their principles of diversity and inclusiveness. Addressing this concern, we use the World Values Survey and other data sources to demonstrate that the representation of RRP parties in parliament, in fact, has no discernible effect on individual levels of intolerance. The anti-outgroup messages of RRP parties are mitigated by the tolerance-boosting effect of the information diversity present in the multiparty systems that allow for their representation. In addition, even those predisposed to be intolerant of outgroups are unaffected by the representation of such parties, as the attitudes of these individuals are least likely to be shaped by new information. Bans on political parties that espouse intolerance, often considered or implemented by modern democracies, are unlikely to achieve their desired effect.

Legislative Diversity and Social Tolerance: How Multiparty Systems Lead to Tolerant Citizens

Abstract This article argues that individuals in countries with a more diverse political discourse express high levels of social tolerance relative to those in low‐discourse countries. Political systems with more parties facilitate the consideration of a broader range of issues, including those relevant to the interests of marginalized groups, and greater exposure to these issues increases individually‐held levels of social tolerance. Using data from the World Values Survey and other sources, we demonstrate that the number of parties in the legislature is positively related to social tolerance. Our results are robust across several model specifications.

Pluralistic conditioning: social tolerance and effective democracy

Modern democracy is based in dissent and diversity. The essential defining aspect of democracy is the existence of competitive and fair elections; an element which emphasizes diversity of opinion and serves to place one party (or group of parties) in power, while relegating the other(s) to dissent. The diversity inherent to democratic systems instills in a countrys inhabitants an awareness of difference, which in turn propagates more tolerant individuals. In autocratic regimes, expression of diversity is restrained, being considered the basis of disorder and thereby detrimental to the state. In liberal democratic societies, freedom of expression and speech and a free media are widely accepted principles. Political parties and social groups in liberal democratic societies are therefore able to express varied and opposing opinions on societal concerns, and such opinions are broadcast to large swaths of the population. Exposure to such variety indicates to even the most inattentive of individuals that they reside in a diverse and heterogeneous society. For many individuals, exposure to diversity promotes tolerance of difference. While diversity tends to breed tolerance, there is a critical exception to this generality. Exposure to diversity only facilitates tolerance of difference when such exposure occurs under positive or neutral conditions. Those who are exposed to diversity under aversive conditions are instead pushed toward intolerance of difference. Our thesis in this article is thus one of pluralistic conditioning. In general, when individuals are exposed to diversity under positive or neutral conditions, they become more tolerant of diversity. However, when individuals are exposed to diversity under aversive conditions, they become less tolerant of difference. This thesis unites findings from multiple disciplines under a single theoretical framework.

Veto Players, the Policy‐Making Environment and the Expression of Authoritarian Attitudes

The number of veto players – actors with the ability to halt a change to the status quo – is consistently linked to the fluidity of the policy-making process across countries. Building upon previous work on authoritarianism, we theorize that the nature of the policy-making process, as influenced by the number of veto players, serves to shape attitudes among the public. Specifically, we argue that fractionalization of powerful political actors leads to a conflictual policy-making process, which in turn exacerbates the expression of authoritarian attitudes among those predisposed to such by portraying an image of a heterogeneous and divided society. To test this, we gather data on thousands of individuals and several countries from the World Values Survey and other sources. Results indicate that those with authoritarian predispositions are much more likely to express authoritarian attitudes where the number of veto players is high, where the preferences of these players are diverse and where the overall capacity for political change is diminished.

Vote Intent and Beliefs about Democracy in the United States

Democracy is an abstract and murky concept. This is particularly apparent in the wide variety of beliefs about democracy held by publics around the globe. Within democracies, political parties often define and name themselves with reference to a particular understanding of democracy. This article focuses on this partisan division in understanding democracy. We suggest that parties will attract those who share similar beliefs about democracy. Specifically, we look at whether differences in beliefs about democracy predict party support in the United States. Examining the responses of US participants to the fifth wave of the World Values Survey, we find that differences on a number of “essential” aspects of democracy among individuals predict vote intent (and party identification). Those more likely to understand democracy as a form of government that promotes civil liberties and the redistribution of wealth to protect the vulnerable are more likely to vote Democrat. Those who report stronger associations between democracy and both religious interpretation of laws and severe punishment of criminals are more likely to vote Republican. This research reinforces the idea that policy differences between the two main parties in the United States may derive from different understandings of the role of government in society.

The Human Empowerment Sequence and the Development of Libertarian Values: A Theoretical and Empirical Adjustment to the Human Empowerment Sequence

Building on the work of Inglehart and colleagues, Welzel sets out a step-by-step theory explaining how democracies arise from processes of modernization. The intermediary stages in the causal chain he sets out explain the connection between action resources and emancipatory values. In short, Welzel provides strong evidence that people must first have the material, intellectual, and connective resources to exercise certain freedoms before they develop values that will motivate them to seek out those freedoms. Although we are convinced by much of Welzel’s argument, we also note a substantial overlap between these intermediary stages of Welzel’s theory and the individual-level authoritarianism literature. Integrating current theory on authoritarianism into Welzel’s thesis at the point of overlap provides for a distinct set of hypotheses and a more nuanced understanding of how individual differences work in Welzel’s theory. Analyses of data from Wave 5 of the World Values Survey and Vanhanen provide some initial evidence in support of our amended view of the intermediary stages of Welzel’s modernization thesis.

Authoritarianism, socioethnic diversity and political participation across countries

It is argued in this article that threatening stimuli affect political participation levels among non-authoritarians more than among authoritarians. Focusing on socioethnic diversity, which is known to be particularly threatening to authoritarians and to relate negatively to political participation in the general public, analyses of individual- and macro-level data from 53 countries is presented which supports this thesis. Participation levels among authoritarians are largely static, regardless of a countrys level of socioethnic heterogeneity, while non-authoritarians participate considerably less in countries with relatively high levels of socioethnic heterogeneity. This suggests that authoritarians participate to a proportionately greater degree in the most diverse countries.