Krishna Savani

Leveraging mindsets to promote academic achievement: Policy recommendations

The United States must improve its students’ educational achievement. Race, gender, and social class gaps persist, and, overall, U.S. students rank poorly among peers globally. Scientific research shows that students’ psychology—their “academic mindsets”—have a critical role in educational achievement. Yet policymakers have not taken full advantage of cost-effective and well-validated mindset interventions. In this article, we present two key academic mindsets. The first, a growth mindset, refers to the belief that intelligence can be developed over time. The second, a belonging mindset, refers to the belief that people like you belong in your school or in a given academic field. Extensive research shows that fostering these mindsets can improve students’ motivation; raise grades; and reduce racial, gender, and social class gaps. Of course, mindsets are not a panacea, but with proper implementation they can be an excellent point of entry. We show how policy at all levels (federal, state, and local) can leverage mindsets to lift the nation’s educational outcomes.

Reverse ego-depletion:: Acts of self-control can improve subsequent performance in Indian cultural contexts.

The strength model of self-control has been predominantly tested with people from Western cultures. The present research asks whether the phenomenon of ego-depletion generalizes to a culture emphasizing the virtues of exerting mental self-control in everyday life. A pilot study found that whereas Americans tended to believe that exerting willpower on mental tasks is depleting, Indians tended to believe that exerting willpower is energizing. Using dual task ego-depletion paradigms, Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c found reverse ego-depletion among Indian participants, such that participants exhibited better mental self-control on a subsequent task after initially working on strenuous rather than nonstrenuous cognitive tasks. Studies 2 and 3 found that Westerners exhibited the ego-depletion effect whereas Indians exhibited the reverse ego-depletion effect on the same set of tasks. Study 4 documented the causal effect of lay beliefs about whether exerting willpower is depleting versus energizing on reverse ego-depletion with both Indian and Western participants. Together, these studies reveal the underlying basis of the ego-depletion phenomenon in culturally shaped lay theories about willpower.

No match for money: Even in intimate relationships and collectivistic cultures, reminders of money weaken sociomoral responses

Abstract The present research tested two competing hypotheses: (1) as money cues activate an exchange orientation to social relations, money cues harm prosocial responses in communal and collectivistic settings; (2) as money can be used to help close others, money cues increase helping in communal or collectivistic settings. In a culture, characterized by strong helping norms, money cues reduced the quality of help given (Experiment 1), and lowered perceived moral obligation to help (Experiment 2). In communal relationships, money reminders decreased willingness to help romantic partners (Experiment 3). This effect was attenuated among people high on communal strength, although money cues made them upset with help requests (Experiment 4). Thus, the harmful effects of money on prosocial responses appear robust.

Meta-lay theories of scientific potential drive underrepresented students’ sense of belonging to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM).

The current research investigates people’s perceptions of others’ lay theories (or mindsets), an understudied construct that we call meta-lay theories. Six studies examine whether underrepresented students’ meta-lay theories influence their sense of belonging to science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM). The studies tested whether underrepresented students who perceive their faculty as believing most students have high scientific aptitude (a universal metatheory) would report a stronger sense of belonging to STEM than those who think their faculty believe that not everyone has high scientific aptitude (a nonuniversal metatheory). Women PhD candidates in STEM fields who held universal rather than nonuniversal metatheories felt greater sense of belonging to their field, both when metatheories were measured (Study 1) and manipulated (Study 2). Undergraduates who held more universal metatheories reported a higher sense of belonging to STEM (Studies 3 and 4) and earned higher final course grades (Study 3). Experimental manipulations depicting a professor communicating the universal lay theory eliminated the difference between African American and European American students’ attraction to a STEM course (Study 5) and between women and men’s sense of belonging to STEM (Study 6). Mini meta-analyses indicated that the universal metatheory increases underrepresented students’ sense of belonging to STEM, reduces the extent of social identity threat they experience, and reduces their perception of faculty as endorsing stereotypes. Across different underrepresented groups, types of institutions, areas of STEM, and points in the STEM pipeline, students’ metaperceptions of faculty’s lay theories about scientific aptitude influence their sense of belonging to STEM.

Choice as an engine of analytic thought

Choice is a behavioral act that has a variety of well-documented motivational consequences—it fosters independence by allowing people to simultaneously express themselves and influence the environment. Given the link between independence and analytic thinking, the current research tested whether choice also leads people to think in a more analytic rather than holistic manner. Four experiments demonstrate that making choices, recalling choices, and viewing others make choices leads people to think more analytically, as indicated by their attitudes, perceptual judgments, categorization, and patterns of attention allocation. People who made choices scored higher on a subjective self-report measure of analytic cognition compared to whose did not make a choice (pilot study). Using an objective task-based measure, people who recalled choices rather than actions were less influenced by changes in the background when making judgments about focal objects (Experiment 1). People who thought of others’ behaviors as choices rather than actions were more likely to group objects based on categories rather than relationships (Experiment 2). People who recalled choices rather than actions subsequently allocated more visual attention to focal objects in a scene (Experiment 3). Together, these experiments demonstrate that choice has important yet previously unexamined consequences for basic psychological processes such as attention and cognition.

Are the Motivational Effects of Autonomy-Supportive Conditions Universal? Contrasting Results Among Indians and Americans:

In Western theories of motivation, autonomy is conceived as a universal motivator of human action; enhancing autonomy is expected to increase motivation panculturally. Using a novel online experimental paradigm that afforded a behavioral measure of motivation, we found that, contrary to this prevailing view, autonomy cues affect motivation differently among American and Indian corporate professionals. Autonomy-supportive instructions increased motivation among Americans but decreased motivation among Indians. The motivational Cue × Culture interaction was extraordinarily large; the populations exhibited little statistical overlap. A second study suggested that this interaction reflects culturally specific norms that are widely understood by members of the given culture. When evaluating messages to motivate workers, Indians, far more than Americans, preferred a message invoking obligations to one invoking autonomous personal choice norms. Results cast doubt on the claim, made regularly in both basic and applied psychology, that enhancing autonomy is a universally preferred method for boosting motivation.

Does deciding among morally relevant options feel like making a choice? How morality constrains people’s sense of choice.

We demonstrate that a difference exists between objectively having and psychologically perceiving multiple-choice options of a given decision, showing that morality serves as a constraint on people’s perceptions of choice. Across 8 studies (N = 2,217), using both experimental and correlational methods, we find that people deciding among options they view as moral in nature experience a lower sense of choice than people deciding among the same options but who do not view them as morally relevant. Moreover, this lower sense of choice is evident in people’s attentional patterns. When deciding among morally relevant options displayed on a computer screen, people devote less visual attention to the option that they ultimately reject, suggesting that when they perceive that there is a morally correct option, they are less likely to even consider immoral options as viable alternatives in their decision-making process. Furthermore, we find that experiencing a lower sense of choice because of moral considerations can have downstream behavioral consequences: after deciding among moral (but not nonmoral) options, people (in Western cultures) tend to choose more variety in an unrelated task, likely because choosing more variety helps them reassert their sense of choice. Taken together, our findings suggest that morality is an important factor that constrains people’s perceptions of choice, creating a disjunction between objectively having a choice and subjectively perceiving that one has a choice.

People in more racially diverse neighborhoods are more prosocial.

Five studies tested the hypothesis that people living in more diverse neighborhoods would have more inclusive identities, and would thus be more prosocial. Study 1 found that people residing in more racially diverse metropolitan areas were more likely to tweet prosocial concepts in their everyday lives. Study 2 found that following the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, people in more racially diverse neighborhoods were more likely to spontaneously offer help to individuals stranded by the bombings. Study 3 found that people living in more ethnically diverse countries were more likely to report having helped a stranger in the past month. Providing evidence of the underlying mechanism, Study 4 found that people living in more racially diverse neighborhoods were more likely to identify with all of humanity, which explained their greater likelihood of having helped a stranger in the past month. Finally, providing causal evidence for the relationship between neighborhood diversity and prosociality, Study 5 found that people asked to imagine that they were living in a more racially diverse neighborhood were more willing to help others in need, and this effect was mediated by a broader identity. The studies identify a novel mechanism through which exposure to diversity can influence people, and document a novel consequence of this mechanism.

Making the leader identity salient can be demotivating.

Extensive research has shown that when a social identity is made salient, people tend to embrace positive identities (e.g., being a voter) and shy away from negative identities (e.g., being a cheater). The present research proposes that this effect of identity salience could be reversed for identities that cannot be attained or rejected by engaging in simple behaviors (e.g., being a leader). People perceived leadership education programs that highlighted the leader identity as more difficult (Studies 1 and 3), and were less interested in signing up for such programs (Study 2). People performed worse when learning educational material framed in terms of the leader identity (Study 4). However, a growth mindset about leadership ability reduced the negative effects of identity frames on performance (Study 4). These findings highlight that the motivational effects of making identities salient might not hold for identities that cannot be attained by executing simple behaviors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Is Education a Fundamental Right? People’s Lay Theories About Intellectual Potential Drive Their Positions on Education

Does every child have a fundamental right to receive a high-quality education? We propose that people’s beliefs about whether “nearly everyone” or “only some people” have high intellectual potential drive their positions on education. Three studies found that the more people believed that nearly everyone has high potential, the more they viewed education as a fundamental human right. Furthermore, people who viewed education as a fundamental right, in turn (a) were more likely to support the institution of free public education, (b) were more concerned upon learning that students in the country were not performing well academically compared with students in peer nations, and (c) were more likely to support redistributing educational funds more equitably across wealthier and poorer school districts. The studies show that people’s beliefs about intellectual potential can influence their positions on education, which can affect the future quality of life for countless students.