Krista E. Wiegand

Past Experience, Quest for the Best Forum, and Peaceful Attempts to Resolve Territorial Disputes

Does a state’s past win/loss record affect its subsequent choices of peaceful dispute resolution methods in territorial disputes? We present a theory that portrays attempts at peaceful resolution as a strategic process, by which states search for the most favorable forum. During the process of decision making, a state strategically chooses between several methods of peaceful resolution; its final choice is based on the state’s past experience with this particular method. Empirical analysis of all attempts at peaceful resolution of territorial disputes from 1945 to 2003 shows that challenger states use their own record of victories and failures, as well as the win/ loss record of the target as indicators of the probability of winning in a subsequent dispute. This pattern is especially strong for the binding third-party methods, arbitration, and adjudication.

Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party

Despite the classification of Hezbollah as a terrorist group by several states, Hezbollah is recognized as a legitimate political party within Lebanon. The purpose of this article is to probe at the reasons why Hezbollah was able to achieve its current status in the Lebanese government while it still maintains a powerful, well armed military branch that has used force recently to influence Lebanese politics. An examination of Hezbollahs life cycle suggests that two major factors were decisive: 1) Hezbollahs political leverage over the majority government, and 2) choices by Hezbollahs leaders to moderate their objectives to achieve domestic political goals.

China's Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Issue Linkage and Coercive Diplomacy

Abstract For almost four decades, China has disputed Japans sovereignty of several small rocky islands in the East China Sea. Despite a June 2008 joint gas development agreement, China continues to claim sovereignty and the dispute is nowhere close to being resolved. This study proposes that China benefits from the endurance of the dispute because it can use territorial dispute threats to compel Japan to change its behavior or policy on other disputed issues. The results show that China gained concessions on other issues by using the territorial dispute as bargaining leverage in most of the 26 threats made between 1978 and 2008.

Legal Systems and Peaceful Attempts to Resolve Territorial Disputes

This paper focuses on how domestic legal systems influence states’ choices of peaceful dispute resolution methods. In order to increase familiarity with rules of peaceful resolution of disputes, states use their domestic legal systems to provide them with clues about the most trustworthy ways to settle disputes. States tend to choose methods of dispute resolution that are similar to those embedded in their domestic legal systems. Empirical analyses support the conjecture of a linkage between domestic law and interstate conflict management methods, showing that civil law dyads prefer more legalized dispute resolution methods compared to common law dyads. Islamic law dyads are most likely to use nonbinding third party methods, while common law dyads tend to resolve their territorial disputes through bilateral negotiations.

Militarized territorial disputes States’ attempts to transfer reputation for resolve

States involved in territorial disputes are more likely initiate militarized interstate disputes to threaten or use force (MIDs) compared to states involved in other types of interstate disputes, when the disputed territory has strategic or ethnic value, and when the opposing states are contiguous, rivals, or have relative power parity. Though useful, these factors are static or rarely change over time, so they cannot explain the timing of an MID in a territorial dispute. It is not clear why a challenger state would threaten or use force at one point in the dispute, but not at another point. This study proposes that challenger states sometimes use MIDs not only to signal resolve to the opposing state in the territorial dispute, but to credibly demonstrate resolve to other adversaries in other disputes – an attempt to transfer reputation for resolve. To tackle the debate about transferability of reputation for resolve, the study empirically analyzes all territorial disputes from 1919 to 1995 and finds support that challenger states are more likely to initiate territorial MIDs as costly signals of resolve and credibility around the same time as another MID with a different adversary. Further analysis indicates that in terms of intensity level, challenger states are more likely to use threats, displays of force, or low intensity uses of force when initiating an MID to signal resolve to other states.

Bahrain, Qatar, and the Hawar Islands: Resolution of a Gulf Territorial Dispute

The Hawar Islands dispute, resolved in 2001, is the only territorial dispute between two Arab states that has been resolved by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Several factors played a role in influencing Qatar and Bahrain to resolve their dispute at the ICJ: 1) the inability of Arab states and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to mediate the dispute, 2) incentives for significant oil and natural gas reserves, and 3) incentives for bilateral and regional cooperation on salient issues between the two states. Both states have benefited significantly since the resolution of the dispute.

Strategic Selection: Political and Legal Mechanisms of Territorial Dispute Resolution

States involved in territorial disputes have several options with regard to resolving their disputes. What types of states are more likely to resort to legal methods of peaceful resolution in attempting to resolve their territorial disputes? We posit that two separate mechanisms affect states’ decisions to choose legal methods of peaceful resolution: the legal mechanism – domestic rule-of-law, and the political mechanism – win/loss record. Rule-of-law based arguments cannot fully explain states’ behavior towards arbitration and adjudication. It is the interplay of both of these mechanisms that explains the strategic choices made by states with regards to arbitration and adjudication. We explain why some high rule-of-law states return to binding methods, while others turn to different forums, and why low rule-of-law states consider binding methods. Empirical analyses of all attempts at peaceful resolution of territorial disputes from 1985 to 2006 show that high rule-of-law states are more likely to return to international binding venues only if they have a positive experience with these methods. On the other hand, we find that low rule-of-law states are not concerned with their record of successes/failures when resorting to international binding venues. Overall, the effect of regime type/rule-of-law is conditioned by past successes and failures in international resolution venues.

Unexpected Companions Bilateral Cooperation Between States Involved in Territorial Disputes

Empirical research suggests that the existence of territorial disputes makes armed conflict more likely to occur. Yet, there are many states that have engaged in militarized interstate disputes that not only maintain normalized bilateral relations, but cooperate with one another on an increasing number of bilateral issues. How can disputing states like Argentina and the UK so frequently cooperate with each other on bilateral issues when there remains a significant amount of tension regarding their territorial dispute over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands? Our theory suggests that challengers involved in territorial disputes are willing to engage in bilateral cooperation with their adversaries in order to influence upcoming territorial settlement attempts. Bilateral cooperation is purposively and strategically used by the challengers as a form of confidence building measure (CBM) with the goal of reducing the negative impact of the territorial dispute. Empirical analyses of monthly data (1978—2003) on Argentina—UK relations, as well as qualitative evidence from the case, support our theoretical expectations by showing that challengers deliberately link cooperation on bilateral issues to territorial dispute settlement attempts as a form of bargaining incentive to increase the likelihood of peaceful resolution.

Islamic Terrorism: The Red Menace of the Twenty-First Century

For nearly half a century, Americans were united against a common enemy of the Soviet Union, and more generally against the ideology of communism, also known as the red menace. With the close of the cold war, the shifts in the world required a rewriting and new understanding of the threats toward American national security. Even before September 11, 2001, government rhetoric increasingly focused on Islamic terrorism as the new enemy. Today, the ideology of Islamic terrorism is undoubtedly the enemy of the United States, more so than any sovereign state. It is much easier to declare war on terrorism sponsored by self-proclaimed, mysterious, and dangerous radicals than it is on another sovereign state. For this reason, and the fact that terrorism is perceived as an absolutely deplorable act, it is easy to assert Islamic terrorism as the enemy. It has also been easier to justify foreign policy actions based on the ever present threat of Islamic terrorism, much like the threat of the spread of communism during the cold war. This chapter examines the process of how Islamic terrorism replaced the Red Menace of communism as “the” American enemy in political rhetoric, justifying major shifts in U.S. foreign policy.

Oil Wealth, Winning Coalitions, and Duration of Civil Wars

New research has begun to underscore the complicated relationship between democratic institutions and the duration of civil wars. Specifically, greater constraints placed on executives often lead to considerably longer civil wars as leaders are limited in how they bargain with dissidents. This presents a puzzle as democracies are often seen as credible negotiators in international disputes. This article suggests that the size of the government’s winning coalition represents a double-edged sword. Larger winning coalitions allow governments to bargain more credibly but also place constraints on what governments can offer since peace agreements may alienate coalition members. Fortunately, future access to postwar oil wealth provides the feasibility for the governments to compensate hard-liners who may lose out on any settlement, making them more likely to allow concessions to rebels. This combined credibility of large winning coalitions and the feasibility provided by oil wealth allows for peace agreements, therefore shortening the duration of civil wars. We test these propositions by examining the conditional relationship between oil wealth and coalition size on the duration of all civil wars between 1950 and 2009.