Kristan Stoddart

A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems

This paper reviews the state of the art in cyber security risk assessment of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. We select and in-detail examine twenty-four risk assessment methods developed for or applied in the context of a SCADA system. We describe the essence of the methods and then analyse them in terms of aim; application domain; the stages of risk management addressed; key risk management concepts covered; impact measurement; sources of probabilistic data; evaluation and tool support. Based on the analysis, we suggest an intuitive scheme for the categorisation of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems. We also outline five research challenges facing the domain and point out the approaches that might be taken.

A Cyber Forensic Taxonomy for SCADA Systems in Critical Infrastructure

SCADA systems are essential for the safe running of critical infrastructure but in recent years have increasingly become the target of advanced cyber-attacks through their convergence with public and corporate networks for easier monitoring and control. Cyber-events within critical infrastructure can have devastating consequences affecting human life, the environment and the economy. Therefore, it is vital that a forensic investigation takes place to provide remediation, understanding and to help in the design of more secure systems. This paper provides an overview of the SCADA forensic process, within critical infrastructure, and discusses the existing challenges of carrying out a SCADA forensic investigation. It also discusses ways in which the process may be improved together with a suggested SCADA incident response model. This paper is part of an ongoing research project that is working towards the creation of best practice guidelines for the forensic handling and incident response of SCADA systems.

The British Labour Government and the Development of Chevaline, 1976–1979

Between 1974 and 1979 the British Labour Government, led first by Harold Wilson and then by James Callaghan, developed a programme of improvements to the British Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system initiated during Wilsons first government between 1964 and 1970. This Polaris improvement programme was known from 1974 onwards as Chevaline. Chevaline offered Britain an indigenous solution to meet the ‘Moscow Criterion’ – the requirement that British strategic missiles had to be capable of penetrating Moscows ‘Galosh’ Anti-Ballistic missile defence system (ABM) even in the absence of US support. This came during a time of economic austerity in a changing strategic environment which led Labour to explore nuclear cooperation with the French. It also led to calls from within the party to renounce nuclear weapons through unilateral disarmament. This article will shed fresh light on the bitter internal debates that ensued and how a select band of senior ministers responded to this dilemma.

The Labour Government: The Inheritance of Polaris and Anglo-US Nuclear Relations, 1964–1966

Fiery the Angels rose, and as they rose deep thunder roll’d, Around their shores: indignant burning with the fires of Orc, And Boston’s Angel cried aloud as they flew thro’ the dark night.

Hope and Fear: Intelligence and the Future of Global Security a Decade after 9/11

Abstract This article explores a number of debates that have dominated intelligence studies since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. It examines a number of inherent tensions, involving individuals and institutions, which threaten the long-term compatibility of the national security state with liberal democracy. The notion as to whether or not the use of extreme coercive measures (such as torture) can ever be justified is examined, as is the question as to whether such measures are self-defeating. The piece examines how liberal democracies seek to protect themselves in the light of rapid changes via a globalised media, the Information Revolution, and the proliferation of advanced technology and weapons of mass destruction amongst state and non-state actors. These issues are discussed with particular reference to the use of intelligence in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea and other global trouble spots. Finally, the article speculates on the future of the increasingly enmeshed relationship between policy-makers, intelligence agencies and the media. It is concluded that, without a clear agenda for the modification of the mechanisms for accountability and oversight, this triangular relationship will, despite its interdependence, be fraught with increasing difficulties.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Operational Employment, and Conventional Defence, 1974–1976

While UK policy on non-strategic nuclear use during the last two Wilson premierships became increasingly focused on developing and sustaining a NATO policy in this area of deterrence, rather than war fighting, the equipment policy to buttress it largely revolved around procurement decisions taken during his first two administrations. Since many of these decisions concerned new delivery systems which were, in theory at least, dual use, they generated much less UK domestic debate than the UK’s strategic systems. They also revolved around how to deploy the new UK multi-purpose lay-down bomb, the WE-177, and the blast yields it should be designed to produce. The new aircraft and helicopters purchased or developed to carry this weapon had started to replace existing types at the start of the 1970s. This final chapter will question to what extent the strategic debates at the ‘high policy’ level detailed in the last chapter were being implemented at the ‘operational level’ and how, or whether, strategies which enabled creating a more flexible policy on how to respond to an act of Warsaw Pact aggression were being arrived at. This would not be accomplished overnight, and, indeed, some of the issues this generated, such as the utility of tactical nuclear weapons against the Warsaw Pact or attempts at technology-based solutions to the security dilemma, would be felt in NATO throughout the 1980s. As one commentator writing in the late 1980s put it, ‘war between East and West, even if conducted solely with non-nuclear weapons, could result in a scale of casualties not seen since the Black Death or the Thirty Years War’.1

Britain, America, and NATO Modernisation, 1974–1976

When the new Wilson Labour government regained power at the start of 1974, it did so in a situation where, to quote one of the civil servants representing the UK on NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), ‘NATO had no real policy for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons.’1 As a consequence, the NPG had been given the task of continuing to study ways of changing this situation, and also the impact upon it of ‘cleaner’ nuclear weapons with reduced yields. Although NATO had moved from the 1954 doctrine of ‘Massive Retaliation’ (MC 48) to ‘Flexible Response’ in 1967 (MC 14/3), its thinking continued to be based on the belief that the Warsaw Pact had superior conventional forces. The core politico-military question confronting its policy makers, therefore, remained how in this situation the Alliance should respond to any aggression.

National Strategy and Multilateral Priorities: British ‘Tactical’ Nuclear Operations, 1970–1974

When Heath’s Conservative government entered office in mid-1970, it did so three years after the decision of the preceding Wilson government to withdraw from all British military bases east of Suez by the mid-1970s. Denis Healey, Wilson’s Defence Secretary, had been engaged during this period in restructuring the nuclear roles of all three services. The strategic deterrent role had passed from the RAF to the Royal Navy’s (RN) submarine branch, while the tactical roles of the UK’s 10kt nuclear bombs deployed by both services was undergoing a major evolution. At a technical level, the first-generation Red Beard bombs were being replaced by new, lighter, multi-purpose second-generation WE-177A weapons, whose production had started in 1969. Geographically, the Red Beards were no longer to be permanently stored in Tengeh in Singapore, and they were not replaced or carried by aircraft carriers operating east of Suez; for the first time, they were to be stored in West Germany. In short, British military strategy was henceforth to focus its nuclear forces on being a European state, rather than a global imperial state, a decision which the incoming government largely accepted and moved forward.

The Heath Government, France, and the Not So Special Relationship, 1970–1974

When Edward Heath came to power in June 1970 he was looking for a fresh start for Britain’s nuclear policy.1 As long ago as 1966 he had publicly advocated a pooling of effort between France and Britain in the nuclear field. He has been described as ‘an autocratic Prime Minister, intolerant of dissenting advice and rigid in his ways’.2 In a series of lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1967 (the Godkin Lectures), Heath had called for ‘a nuclear force based on the existing British and French forces which could be held in trusteeship for Europe as a whole’.3 In his considered view, this pooling of effort would form the basis of ‘an eventual European defence system’.4 Two years later, in an issue of the international journal Foreign Affairs, he expanded on this proposal by calling on the: non-nuclear countries of Europe … [to join] with Britain and France in a Consultative Committee which would have exactly the same relationship to the Joint Anglo-French Deterrent as the so-called McNamara Committee [this became the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)] has to the U.S. deterrent…A scheme of this kind would not in any sense be anti-American; indeed because of the provisions of the various British agreements with the U.S. in this field it could not be implemented without American support.5

Mrs Thatcher and the Trident C-4 Decision

Unlike their Labour predecessors, Margaret Thatcher and her new Conservative government appeared fully committed to the continuation of a British nuclear deterrent. In opposition Thatcher had been critical of Labour’s policies over the maintenance of the UK deterrent. In office she was to be a strident advocate of both the deterrent and strengthening the bonds between Britain and the United States in foreign and defence policy.1 When Thatcher won the May 1979 General Election, the Chevaline modification to Polaris was nearing completion and a decision would soon be made to announce the programme. Alongside Chevaline, a decision had to be made regarding the replacement of Polaris. These historic deliberations will be the subject of this chapter.