Kristen Intemann

Feminism, Underdetermination, and Values in Science

Several feminist philosophers of science have tried to open up the possibility that feminist ethical or political commitments could play a positive role in good science by appealing to the Duhem‐Quine thesis and underdetermination of theories by observation. I examine several different interpretations of the claim that feminist values could play a legitimate role in theory justification and show that none of them follow from a logical gap between theory and observation. Finally, I sketch an alternative approach for defending the possibility that feminist political commitments could play a legitimate role in science.

How do disclosure policies fail? Let us count the ways

The disclosure policies of scientific journals now require that investigators provide information about financial interests relevant to their research. The main goals of these policies are to prevent bias from occurring, to help identify bias when it occurs, and to avoid the appearance of bias. We argue here that such policies do little to help achieve these goals, and we suggest more effective alternatives.—De Melo‐Martin, I., Intemann, K. How do disclosure policies fail? Let us count the ways. FASEB J. 23, 1638–1642 (2009)

Interpreting Evidence: why values can matter as much as science

Despite increasing awareness of the ways in which non-epistemic values play roles in science, many scientists remain reluctant to acknowledge values at stake in their own work. Even when research clearly relates to risk assessment and establishing public policy, contexts in which the presence of values is less likely to be contentious, scientists tend to present such research as merely involving empirical questions about what the evidence is. As a result, debates over policy-related science tend to be framed as purely epistemic debates over the state of the evidence. We argue that this neglects the important ways that ethical and social values play legitimate roles in judgments about what we take to be evidence for a particular policy. Using the case of recent disputes about the relative safety of home birth, we argue that although the debate has been framed as a purely scientific one about the empirical evidence for home birth, it actually involves disagreements about underlying value assumptions. If our claims are correct, then in order to move the debate forward, scientists will need to engage in a critical discussion about the values at stake.

Can ethical reasoning contribute to better epidemiology? A case study in research on racial health disparities

A common belief among epidemiologists and other scientists is that they ought not engage in ethical evaluation or endorse any particular ethical, political, or social values while involved in scientific reasoning. Such values are irrelevant to collecting and interpreting data and can only lead to bias. This view is also reflected in scientists’ education. The authors argue that ethical values are crucial to conducting much epidemiological research. Focusing on epidemiological research on racial health disparities, they show that value judgments are inescapable when performing such research. Values are implicit in the framing of research questions, the identification of the problem, and the choices of design and methodology. By making value judgments explicit, scientists will be more likely to pay attention to them and thus assess them in critical ways. Finally, the implications that this has for scientific training are discussed. Scientific training should prepare scientists to engage in ethical reasoning not only because it will make them more responsible human beings, but also because it will make them better scientists.

Regulating scientific research: should scientists be left alone?

In our current political climate, decisions about whether to fund research on new stem cell lines or do chimera experiments seem to arbitrarily depend on the religious and economic interests of the administration. Not unreasonably, many scientists believe that science should be left to its own devices in determining research priorities and conducting research. When nonscientific considerations constrain research, it is claimed that values are inappropriately dictating scientific decisions. This assumes, however, that all ethical and social values are irrelevant to such decisions. Using the case of embryonic stem cell research to illustrate the debate, we argue here that this position is untenable for several reasons. First, the aims of science, particularly in the case of the biomedical sciences, cannot be completely extricated from ethical and social aims. Hence, value judgments will be necessary to assess research priorities and methodologies. Second, maintaining this position is inconsistent with actual scientific practices. Scientists already recognize that there are some ethical values that appropriately constrain research, such as in human subject experimentation. Therefore, the problem cannot be that ethical values are brought to bear on science per se but that those values are highly questionable or are imposed by those who often lack the scientific expertise necessary to understand how ethical concerns may relate to the research. Finally, we argue that to the extent value judgments must be made, consensus about such values should be reached by a diverse group of stakeholders, including scientists, community members, policymakers, and ethicists.—Intemann, K. K., de Melo‐Martín, I. Regulating scientific research: should scientists be left alone? FASEB J. 22, 654–658 (2008)

Science and Values: Are Value Judgments Always Irrelevant to the Justification of Scientific Claims?

Several feminist theorists have claimed that feminist values ought to influence theory choice. Susan Haack has argued that this is implausible because normative claims about what ought to be the case can never provide justification for descriptive claims. I argue against one of the premises of Haacks argument. Furthermore, I attempt to show that the most promising defense of this premise would cast doubt on a second premise of Haacks argument. My aim is to open up the possibility that value judgments can play a legitimate role in theory choice.

Scientific dissent and public policy: Is targeting dissent a reasonable way to protect sound policy decisions?

The temptation to silence dissenters whose non-mainstream views negatively affect public policies is powerful. However, silencing dissent, no matter how scientifically unsound it might be, can cause the public to mistrust science in general.

Diversity and Dissent in Science: Does Democracy Always Serve Feminist Aims?

Partly in response to feminist concerns about bias in science, there has been a recent trend towards viewing good science as democratic science (e.g., Kitcher 2001; Solomon 2001; Longino 2002). One similarity of these approaches is that democratic science is conceived of as what I will refer to as Millian science. Based on the epistemological views of John Stuart Mill (1859), ideal scientific communities are comprised of participants with diverse values who have equal authority in a ‘free marketplace of ideas’ to advocate for different research directions, theories, and interpretations of data. This model of science has been taken to be attractive from a feminist perspective insofar as it can help eliminate male-bias and explain the importance of feminist perspectives in science. Focusing on the work of Miriam Solomon (1994, 2001), and Helen Longino (1990, 2002), I argue that a Millian conception of democratic science cannot ultimately address several feminist concerns within philosophy of science. An alternative conception of democratic science is then offered.

The Risk of Using Inductive Risk to Challenge the Value-Free Ideal

The argument from inductive risk has been embraced by many as a successful account of the role of values in science that challenges the value-free ideal. We argue that it is not obvious that the argument from inductive risk actually undermines the value-free ideal. This is because the inductive risk argument endorses an assumption held by proponents of the value-free ideal: that contextual values never play an appropriate role in determining evidence. We show that challenging the value-free ideal ultimately requires rejecting this assumption.

Who's Afraid of Dissent?: Addressing Concerns about Undermining Scientific Consensus in Public Policy Developments

Many argue that encouraging critical dissent is necessary for promoting scientific objectivity and progress. Yet despite its importance, some dissent can have negative consequences, including undermining confidence in existing scientific consensus, confusing the public, and preventing sound policy. For example, private industries and think tanks have funded dissenting research to create doubt and stall regulations. To protect scientifically sound policies, some have responded by attempting to minimize or discourage dissent perceived to be problematic. We argue that targeting dissent as an obstacle to public policy is both misguided and dangerous.