Krister Andersson

Understanding decentralized forest governance: an application of the institutional analysis and development framework

Abstract This paper analyzes how local institutional arrangements shape outcomes in the increasingly decentralized policy regimes of the non-industrialized world. The goal is to evaluate local institutional strategies associated with effective forest governance. I use the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to study the institutional conditions conducive to effective decentralized forest governance and how these relate to sustainability. The IAD-guided analysis allows me to formulate a series of testable hypotheses about which institutional factors influence the likelihood for successful governance outcomes in a decentralized context. I then test the hypotheses using recent empirical data from forestry-sector activities in 32 randomly selected municipal governments in Bolivia. Preliminary results suggest that local governance systems are more successful when the system’s governance actors enjoy favorable conditions for information exchange and learning.

The contribution of institutional theories to explaining decentralization of natural resource governance

Governments are increasingly devolving governance of natural resources from central administrations to subnational levels. Researchers routinely document the complexity and contradictions of this process, but policy prescriptions and their underlying theoretical models remain overly simplified. Going beyond classical statements in the policy literature that emphasize interjurisdictional competition, we draw on recent developments in the multidisciplinary literature on institutional theory and the growing stock of research on natural resource governance. We develop an “institutional mediation” approach, which emphasizes the multilevel nestedness of rules and highlights the role of institutional incentives, contradictions, and complementarities in shaping how actors navigate decentralization reforms. Brief case studies of decentralization of forest governance in Bolivia and Uganda lend initial credence to the claims of this approach, and preliminary hypotheses for further research are proposed.

The Politics of Decentralized Natural Resource Governance

more intensely for effective solutions to environmental problems. Various factors conspire to make natural resources difficult to govern well. First, since many larger scale natural resources can be common pool resources, they pose different-and arguably more difficult-challenges to governance than private or public goods. Second, the use of natural resources can produce significant externalities. Third, the complex spatial and temporal boundaries of natural resources along with their potential externalities rarely conform to existing political institutions. Environmental problems often take decades or even centuries to emerge; their solutions may take equally long. Ideas about how to govern natural resources have evolved significantly over the last 30 years. Many perceive centralized, top down approaches as having failed and advocate for more decentralized policies. Two major forms have emerged. The first seeks to devolve property rights over natural resources to local individuals and communities. The second advocates the decentralization of

More Trees, More Poverty? The Socioeconomic Effects of Tree Plantations in Chile, 2001-2011

Tree plantations play a controversial role in many nations’ efforts to balance goals for economic development, ecological conservation, and social justice. This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by analyzing the socioeconomic impact of such plantations. We focus our study on Chile, a country that has experienced extraordinary growth of industrial tree plantations. Our analysis draws on a unique dataset with longitudinal observations collected in 180 municipal territories during 2001–2011. Employing panel data regression techniques, we find that growth in plantation area is associated with higher than average rates of poverty during this period.

Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by forest protection: The transaction costs of implementing REDD

Understanding and minimizing the transaction costs of policy implementation are critical for reducing tropical forest losses. As the international community launches REDD, a global initiative to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from tropical deforestation, policymakers need to pay attention to the transactions costs associated with negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts between forest users, governments, and donors. The existing institutional design forREDDrelies heavily on central government interventions in program countries. Analysing new data on forest conservation outcomes, we identify several problems with this centralized approach to forest protection. We describe options for a more diversified policy approach that could reduce the full set of transaction costs and thereby improve the efficiency of the market-based approach to conservation.

Decentralization can help reduce deforestation when user groups engage with local government

Significance Decentralization is one of the most important innovations in environmental policy during the past 30 years. Despite the pervasiveness and large amounts of resources invested to implement these reforms, little is known about their environmental effects. Given worldwide interest in forest conservation, this lack of knowledge hampers efforts to improve the effectiveness of current policy initiatives. Using quasi-experimental methods, we find that the environmental effects of decentralization reforms depend on how the reforms affect the conditions for user groups to govern their forests. Our findings show that decentralization to general-purpose governments may be most effective in places where forest users take advantage of opportunities to engage with local politicians about forestry issues. Policy makers around the world tout decentralization as an effective tool in the governance of natural resources. Despite the popularity of these reforms, there is limited scientific evidence on the environmental effects of decentralization, especially in tropical biomes. This study presents evidence on the institutional conditions under which decentralization is likely to be successful in sustaining forests. We draw on common-pool resource theory to argue that the environmental impact of decentralization hinges on the ability of reforms to engage local forest users in the governance of forests. Using matching techniques, we analyze longitudinal field observations on both social and biophysical characteristics in a large number of local government territories in Bolivia (a country with a decentralized forestry policy) and Peru (a country with a much more centralized forestry policy). We find that territories with a decentralized forest governance structure have more stable forest cover, but only when local forest user groups actively engage with the local government officials. We provide evidence in support of a possible causal process behind these results: When user groups engage with the decentralized units, it creates a more enabling environment for effective local governance of forests, including more local government-led forest governance activities, fora for the resolution of forest-related conflicts, intermunicipal cooperation in the forestry sector, and stronger technical capabilities of the local government staff.

Non-Governmental Organizations, Rural Communities and Forests: A Comparative Analysis of Community-NGO Interactions

Scholars, policy-makers and advocates have, in the last decade, recommended greater involvement by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in community forest management in developing countries. Behind these recommendations lies a notion that NGOs are a sound complement to formal governments and that NGOs can improve communities’ abilities to manage their own forests. There is limited empirical work, however, testing how NGO activity affects local forest governance and deforestation. This paper reports the results of quantitative statistical tests on the effects of local NGO importance—as measured by local forest users’ reports of NGO importance—on deforestation in a sample of 200 rural Bolivian communities. In addition, it examines the effect of NGO importance on community forestry institutions—specifically, the presence of institutions for rule-making, forest monitoring, sanctioning, and enforcement of rules. Contrary to earlier research, these results suggest that NGOs have no discernible effect on community forestry institutions, though other external actors—most notably, municipal governments—seem to have a positive effect. The paper also reports a negative correlation of NGO importance on deforestation. Although these quantitative results are in part supported by qualitative field observations in selected Bolivian communities, care is needed in drawing generalized causal inferences from this evidence.

Responding to a Groundwater Crisis: The Effects of Self-Imposed Economic Incentives

Many globally important groundwater aquifers are under considerable stress as withdrawals, predominantly for irrigation, outpace recharge. Meanwhile, groundwater policy to address the common-pool resource losses remains in its nascent stage. This study analyzes a recent and unique bottom-up effort to self-impose a groundwater pumping fee in San Luis Valley, Colorado. Utilizing a difference-in-difference econometric framework, our results bring new and direct empirical evidence to the debate on the use of economic incentives in groundwater policy. We find that the price intervention has been effective, leading to a 33% reduction in groundwater use, predominantly through reduced irrigation intensity. We also find, to a more limited extent, movement away from water-thirsty crops and reduced overall irrigated acreage. Given that financial incentives can produce substantial conservation within a groundwater commons in duress, price-based policies warrant further consideration as irrigators address diminishing and variable water supplies.

An Approach to Assess Relative Degradation in Dissimilar Forests: Toward a Comparative Assessment of Institutional Outcomes

A significant challenge in the assessment of forest management outcomes is the limited ability to compare forest conditions quantitatively across ecological zones. We propose an approach for comparing different forest types through the use of reference forests. We tested our idea by drawing a sample of 42 forests from the Midwest USA, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Brazil, Bolivia, Uganda, and Nepal. We grouped these forests by shared characteristics and selected a reference forest to serve as a baseline for each forest type. We developed an index of disturbances using ratios of several forest measurements to assess differences between each study forest and its reference forest. None of the study forests was known to have been impacted by major natural disturbances during the past 50 years. Therefore, the disturbances in these forests appear to be largely related to human activities. The forests most similar to their reference forests have had limited human interventions. Our results indicate the potential of this approach to compare different forest conditions across biomes. We argue that development of this approach could facilitate analyses of forest management institutions, promote reliable indicators to compare management outcomes, and contribute to improved policies for conservation.

Emergence of Collective Action in a Groundwater Commons: Irrigators in the San Luis Valley of Colorado

Under what conditions are irrigators able to develop adaptive governance arrangements? This article addresses this question by developing an empirically grounded theory of self-governance of a snowmelt commons in southern Colorado. Drawing on previous work in collective action and institutional theory, we argue that self-regulation of the hydro-commons is driven by changes in shared user perceptions with regard to the salience and scarcity of the resource, as well as the perceived probability of salvaging the resource system. We further posit that several conditioning factors affect the likelihood of effective local responses, including the existing institutional arrangements for self-governance, techno-institutional complementarities, and vested interests. We test and refine our theoretical argument by conducting a historical analysis of regional responses to hydrologic, social, and institutional disturbances in Colorados San Luis Valley.