Kristian Berg Harpviken

Breaking new ground: Afghanistan's response to landmines and unexploded ordnance

Operating since the late 1980s, in an environment of shifting wars, the Humanitarian Mine Action ( HMA ) programme in Afghanistan has nonetheless been highly successful in reducing the impact of landmines. This article discusses three factors that have contributed to its success: the building of national capacity; the systematic application of surveys; and the ability to act flexibly and innovatively. Having operated under the auspices of the UN, but in the absence of a functioning government, the programme faces new challenges with the potential transition to peace in Afghanistan. Ultimately, however, the programme is a world leader in its field, and as one of the best functioning sectors in economic and humanitarian assistance to the country, it represents a key resource for a new internationally recognised Afghan government.

Measures for mines: approaches to impact assessment in humanitarian mine action

The ability to assess the impact of humanitarian interventions is key both for priority-setting and for maximising the quality of projects. Humanitarian mine action (hma) is a young sector, where the application of impact assessment is still in its infancy. In this article we will briefly revisit the history of impact assessment in hma, before reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of three different impact-assessment approaches: 1) the Landmine Impact Survey; 2) economic analysis; and 3) community studies. Each of the approaches has its own merits as well as its own shortcomings and the selection of one approach, or several approaches combined, needs to be informed by the particular conditions in a given setting. We argue that hma should always be based on sound impact-assessment practices, but also that it is important to encourage a general understanding of broader impact issues—as opposed to narrow output definitions—among all relevant stakeholders. In spite of considerable progress over the past few years on this issue, impact in mine action is still largely perceived as an event rather than an integral part of the process and specialised units responsible for impact assessment isolate this activity from day-to-day field management.

Acting as one? co-ordinating responses to the landmine problem

This article looks at co-ordination within humanitarian mine action (hma), and co-ordination between hma and other humanitarian and development initiatives. The discussion focuses specifically on the role of UN-led Mine Action Centres (macs) and the analysis draws on case studies of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan. A contention throughout is that macs often employ a rigid approach to co-ordination. This constricts the flexibility of mine action organisations, limits the development of creative initiatives and poses a barrier to co-ordination between hma and other humanitarian initiatives. A second point pursued is that co-ordination arrangements are embedded in a broader institutional context, and this context has in turn the potential to impact on co-ordination. The analysis presented here suggests a number of implications for hma in general, together with a number of policy considerations. The article concludes by offering some thoughts for the future on the importance of effective co-ordination arrangements both within hma as a sector and between hma and other sectors of humanitarian assistance.

Caught in the middle? Regional perspectives on Afghanistan

For over three decades, Afghanistan has been a battleground in which many of the states of the wider neighbourhood have been involved. The importance of fostering a concerted effort for Afghan peace and stability is widely agreed upon, yet such a process remains difficult to bring about. Some analysts emphasize states and their security relationships, seeing Afghanistan as an ‘insulator’ caught between different regional state systems, each with a strong dynamic of its own. Other analysts emphasize various transnational networks and see Afghanistan as the ‘core’ of a larger conflict formation. This chapter takes as its starting point the former perspective, which has been codified by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2003) as the regional security complex (RSC) approach. The chapter examines the security dynamics of each of the regions surrounding Afghanistan – South Asia, the Persian Gulf and South Asia – adopting a comparative and historical perspective, with an emphasis on the period since the late 1970s. It concludes that each of Afghanistans three surrounding regions is characterized by deep security concerns of its own. These concerns nonetheless inform the engagement of neighbouring countries in Afghanistan, which then comes to reflect conflicts and cleavages specific to the respective regions. One central implication is that a more promising strategy for Afghanistan might be to seek a unilateral non-offensive or neutral status, rather than full security integration with its neighbours. Although such a strategy would necessitate the creation of a forum for Afghanistans neighbours to foster understanding for the Afghan position, it represents a dramatic departure from mainstream policy proposals with their emphasis on an integrated regional approach.

A Rock Between Hard Places: Afghanistan as an Arena of Regional Insecurity

I november 2011 samlet diplomater fra 14 av Afghanistans naboland seg i Istanbul for å skrive under på det som i ettertid ble kjent som ‘Heart of Asia’-erklæringen. Erklæringen markerte starten på den såkalte Istanbulprosessen: En regional diplomatisk prosess som skulle bidra til å skape fred i Afghanistan. I likhet med en stadig mer populær trend i diplomati og forskning, satte Istanbulprosessen Afghanistan i sentrum for regionens stabilitet. Det er denne tankegangen Harpviken og Tadjbakhsh utfordrer i A Rock Between Hard Places: Afghanistan as an Arena of Regional Insecurity. I motsetning til narrativene som plasserer Afghanistan i sentrum, finner forfatterne at Afghanistan er et fjernt tema for sine naboer. Nabolandene er mye mer opptatt av sine regionale konkurrenter enn av Afghanistan. Det er altså i langt større grad India enn Afghanistan som tar fra Pakistans politiske og militære ledere nattesøvnen, mens Afghanistan blir offeret for de bipolare spenningene i de omkringliggende regionene. Mens mange har fokusert på de bilaterale båndene mellom Afghanistan og de omkringliggende statene, representerer Harpviken og Tadjbakhsh’ analyse av de regionale dynamikkene et viktig og mer nyansert bidrag i debatten om Afghanistans stabilisering. I en systematisk gjennomgang av sikkerhetsdynamikkene som dominerer Sør-Asia, Sentral-Asia og Gulfen, viser forfatterne hvordan de respektive dynamikkene spiller inn i Afghanistan. Denne jobben gjør forfatterne med stor grundighet og med et detaljnivå som man ikke finner mange andre steder. Det teoretiske bakteppet for analysen er Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), lansert i Barry Buzan og Ole Wævers verk Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (2003). Teorien tar utgangspunkt i at sikkerhet og stabilitet avhenger av regionale dynamikker, og at en stat alltid vil føle seg mer truet av sine umiddelbare naboer med mer eller mindre lik maktstatus, og opptre mer distansert og likegyldig ovenfor mer perifere stater. Ifølge forfatterne befinner Afghanistan seg i utkanten av tre regionale sikkerhetskomplekser: Gulfen (dominert av spenningen

Troubled regions and failing states: Introduction

There is an emerging consensus within the literature on failed and failing states that state failure is contagious across borders. For its part, the literature on regionalisation claims that states within the same region tend to form clusters of security – or insecurity – so that geographical proximity is closely associated with inert security relationships. This article – along with the individual contributions in the volume it introduces – seeks to bridge these two literatures, which otherwise rarely talk to each other. The approach taken throughout the volume is largely qualitative and case-oriented, yet methodologically diverse, while the articles have a shared comparative ambition. This introductory article examines the debate on failing states and contextualises the volumes contributions within that debate. It then does the same in relation to the debate on regional security, before moving on to examine the role and impact of emerging regional responses to insecurity. When we examine recent state-building initiatives, the effectiveness of external actors seems limited, while existing power holders – and the conflicts between them – are at the centre in processes for building states. This calls for studying the practice of state-building, and for rooting policies in viable practices, even when the driving actors are not inherently benign. To a considerable degree, a states strength and functionality are relational: the state can only be understood in relation to significant other states. Within regions, hegemonic states – and the strategies pursued by other states in their efforts to cooperate with, balance, or counter the hegemon – have major implications for security. Regional cooperation emerges through concrete collaboration to address commonly perceived challenges, at times as an unintended effect of a targeted initiative. Key actors – and the networks of which they form part – are often transnational, spanning the borders of several states. The behaviour of transnational actors, how they interface with the system of states and regions and the potential for their conversion into constructive political forces remain poorly understood. As a whole, these are findings that inspire an agenda for future research at the interface between the state and the region.

Integration at Exile

What kind of coping structures did Afghans develop while in exile? Could they build on prewar migration experiences? How were networks reconfigured among the refugees, between them and their hosts, as well as between the refugees and the people back home? Refugee studies have primarily focused on the ‘refugee condition’ in exile, and have only recently come to show interest in the continuities that bind refugees to other times and other places (Horst 2006b: 45; Koser 2007). Here, I will focus both on the ties people relied upon in exile and on how refugees coped with the challenge of maintaining and developing their ties with their home region in Afghanistan.

Reintegration at ‘Home’

Returning to what used to be home may be just as complicated as arriving in exile. Many of the challenges are identical, the coping mechanisms similar. The fundamental challenge of reintegration is spelt out by Laura Hammond (Hammond 1999: 229): Whether a returnee comes back to his or her birthplace or settles in an entirely new environment, he/she considers return to be more of a new beginning than a return to the past.

Social Networks in Wartime Migration

For most people, the decision to migrate is a dramatic choice. To make such a decision in the midst of war — when your security is threatened, when there is little access to reliable information, and when control over economic resources becomes uncertain — is particularly stressful. Then, having arrived at a new location, the process of becoming integrated — finding a job, a house, and other necessities — forms another tremendous challenge, as stressful as the planning and the flight itself. Furthermore, the level of stress is not necessarily lower when a decision is made to return to one’s place of origin. And integration upon such a return may sometimes be even more difficult than it was in exile. In all of these processes, social networks play an essential role, both as causal factors for the flight itself and as resources people draw upon in tackling the challenges that subsequently arise. As a result, these networks are also transformed, taking on new shapes and new functions.