Kristin Shrader-Frechette

Verification, Validation, and Confirmation of Numerical Models in the Earth Sciences

Verification and validation of numerical models of natural systems is impossible. This is because natural systems are never closed and because model results are always nonunique. Models can be confirmed by the demonstration of agreement between observation and prediction, but confirmation is inherently partial. Complete confirmation is logically precluded by the fallacy of affirming the consequent and by incomplete access to natural phenomena. Models can only be evaluated in relative terms, and their predictive value is always open to question. The primary value of models is heuristic.

Duties to future generations, proxy consent, intra- and intergenerational equity: the case of nuclear waste.

How does one deal with problems of risk transfer if it is the case that increasing risks to future generations decreases the risks to present generations, and increasing the risks to present generations decreases the risks to future generations? In the case of high-level nuclear waste and spent fuel, for example, should billions of dollars be spent to secure the wastes and protect future generations, or should the same monies be spent on present-day needs, under the assumption that future generations will be better able to deal with the waste than we are at present? Although these questions may appear insoluble, they become less so when one recognizes several common ethical and logical errors that beset many discussions of technological risk and duties to future generations. After briefly explaining the grounds for inter- and intragenerational equity, this analysis argues for three propositions about many treatments of inter- and intragenerational ethics: (1) these discussions often err because they frame policy arguments in terms that ignore rights and focus on maximizing welfare or utility, (2) they err because they frequently frame policy arguments in ways that set inter- and intragenerational welfare at odds, when they are not, because they ignore ameliorating practices and the conditions for proxy consent, and (3) they also err because they engage in risk practices that do not match their risk rhetoric.

Taking action, saving lives : our duties to protect environmental and public health

This is a truly “inconvenient” book; so much so that for many of the corporations, officials, and public figures who it names as targets of blame, it will be a cause for action. One hopes, perhaps idealistically, that action will be ameliorative, not legal. This is also an uncommonly brave book, presenting an argument for protecting human rights to environmental and public health that embraces not only a case for blame distribution to corporations and public officials but also an argument for responsibility that extends to all citizens in a democratic society. So it is a deeply political book as well, presenting a theory of democracy that for once is not about distributing public goods or even liberty equally but about distributing responsibility for environmental harms and health risks. Finally, as one would expect from a prominent philosopher, this is a major philosophical contribution to the literature of human rights. Shrader-Frechette has written many books that present philosophical arguments concerning the advancement of science, technological risk, nuclear power, environmental policy, and environmental justice. Those arguments stand on their merits as attempts to bridge the gap between philosophy and public policy, though most of them reside solidly within the realm of conventional philosophical analysis. Taking Action, Saving Lives presents a different approach both to making environmental policy and to using philosophy for public ends. In the latter approach, Shrader-Frechette comes as close to the ancient Platonic ideal of merging philosophy, politics, and the public good as any philosopher has achieved since John Dewey’s pragmatism early last century. Taking Action, Saving Lives presents an argument for protecting the human rights to public health programs and environmental safety rooted in the lives of ordinary citizens and the responsibility they share with government, industry, and the scientific community. As such, this is an unusual book in human rights as well, since it endeavors to locate, even name, real people who have either had their human rights violated or, even more unusually, are culpable in the violation of those rights. This book names names; in so doing, it goes beyond the usual abstract theoretical arguments about rights and duties to actually give the reader places to start in identifying whose rights have been violated by whom. Shrader-Frechette is also a prominent philosopher of science, so it is perhaps to be expected that a prominent theme of the book is the “misuse and manipulat[ion] of science” in the service of the private self-interest of corporations and the resulting threats to public health.1 The first three chapters of the book largely explore the theme of the privatization of science (the term employed is “private-interest science”)2 to serve interests opposed to the public interest. It is in this part of the book where Shrader-Frechette identifies by name those she considers culpable (including scientists) in the exploitation

What will work : fighting climate change with renewable energy, not nuclear power

Glossary Chapter 1: Why Climate-Change Skeptics Are Wrong Chapter 2: Trimming the Data on Nuclear Greenhouse Emissions Chapter 3: Trimming the Data on Nuclear Costs Chapter 4: Nuclear Safety, Flawed Science, and Accident Cover-Up Chapter 5: Nuclear Energy and Environmental Justice Chapter 6: The Solution: Using Renewable Energy, Efficiency, and Conservation to Address Climate Change Chapter 7: Answering Objections Chapter 8: Conclusions Notes

Nuclear Waste: Knowledge Waste?

A stalled nuclear waste program, and possible increase in wastes, beg for social science input into acceptable solutions. Nuclear power is re-emerging as a major part of the energy portfolios of a wide variety of nations. With over 50 reactors being built around the world today and over 100 more planned to come online in the next decade, many observers are proclaiming a “nuclear renaissance” (1). The success of a nuclear revival is dependent upon addressing a well-known set of challenges, for example, plant safety (even in the light of improved reactor designs), costs and liabilities, terrorism at plants and in transport, weapons proliferation, and the successful siting of the plants themselves (2, 3).

Climate Change, Nuclear Economics, and Conflicts of Interest

Merck suppressed data on harmful effects of its drug Vioxx, and Guidant suppressed data on electrical flaws in one of its heart-defibrillator models. Both cases reveal how financial conflicts of interest can skew biomedical research. Such conflicts also occur in electric-utility-related research. Attempting to show that increased atomic energy can help address climate change, some industry advocates claim nuclear power is an inexpensive way to generate low-carbon electricity. Surveying 30 recent nuclear analyses, this paper shows that industry-funded studies appear to fall into conflicts of interest and to illegitimately trim cost data in several main ways. They exclude costs of full-liability insurance, underestimate interest rates and construction times by using “overnight” costs, and overestimate load factors and reactor lifetimes. If these trimmed costs are included, nuclear-generated electricity can be shown roughly 6 times more expensive than most studies claim. After answering four objections, the paper concludes that, although there may be reasons to use reactors to address climate change, economics does not appear to be one of them.

Technological risk and small probabilities

Many scientists, businessmen, and government regulators believe that the criteria for acceptable societal risk are too stringent. Those who subscribe to this belief often accept the view which I call “the probability-threshold position.” Proponents of this stance maintain that society ought to ignore very small risks, i.e., those causing an average annual probability of fatality of less than 10−6.After examining the three major views in the risk-evaluation debate, viz., the probability-threshold position, the zero-risk position, and the weighted-risk position, I focus on the arguments for the first of these views, since it is the position which currently undergirds most public policy (especially in the U.S.) regarding acceptable risk. After analyzing Arrows argument from decision theory, Comars and Gibsons argument from ontology, and Starrs and Whipples argument from epistemology, I conclude that these defenses of the probability-threshold position err in a variety of ways. Most commonly, they fail because they tacitly accept the assumption that magnitude of probability, alone, provides a sufficient condition for judging the acceptability of a given risk. In the light of these errors, I suggest that it might be more desirable for risk assessors, decision theorists, and policymakers to weight various risk-cost-benefit parameters according to alternative ethical criteria, rather than to evaluate risks solely in terms of mathematical considerations.

Hard Ecology, Soft Ecology, and Ecosystem Integrity

What you take as your starting point depends on where you want to go. If you want to sail due south to the Dry Tortugas, then you start with plenty of fresh water, some food, a good navigational system, and arguably a ship-to-shore radio for the long trip. But if you want to sail due west to nearby John’s Pass, then you might need some fresh water, but no food, no sophisticated navigational system, and no radio. How you begin a journey depends on where you want to go. So it is with environmental ethics.

Ethical issues in radiation protection.

In this note the authors survey existing international radiation-protection recommendations of the ICRP, the IAEA, and the ILO. After outlining previous work on the ethics of radiation protection and risk assessment/management, the authors review ethical thinking on five key issues related to radiation protection and ethics. They formulate each of these five issues in terms of alternative ethical stances: (1) Equity vs. Efficiency, (2) Health vs. Economics, (3) Individual Rights vs. Societal Benefits, (4) Due Process vs. Necessary Sacrifice, and (5) Stakeholder Consent vs. Management Decisions.

Technology Assessment as Applied Philosophy of Science

Historians tell us that some forms of technology assessment may date back more than 4000 years. In ancient Mesopotamia, for example, technical projects were submitted to the scrutiny of priests. Despite such apparently venerable traditions and the growing popularity of the term &dquo;technology assessment,&dquo; however, there is little agreement about the approach to which the term refers. In the U.S. Office of Technology Assess-