Kristina Rolin

Science as collective knowledge

The aim of this paper is to explore to what extent scientific knowledge is properly understood as collective knowledge. By collective knowledge is meant justified true belief or acceptance held or arrived at by groups as plural subjects. I discuss Gilberts [Gilbert, M. (2000) Collective belief and scientific change. In Gilbert, M. (Eds.), Sociality and responsibility: New essays on plural subject theory (pp. 37-49). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers] view that scientific communities have collective knowledge and Wrays [Wray, K. B. (2007) Who has scientific knowledge? Social Epistemology 21 (3) (pp. 335-345)] view that scientific communities are not capable of having collective knowledge but merely research teams. I argue contra Wray that collective knowledge is not limited to research teams. As Gilbert assumes, scientific communities are capable of having collective knowledge. However, I argue that Gilberts account of collective knowledge in science is limited because it does not explain why scientific communities have an interest in collective knowledge. I introduce a contextualist theory of epistemic justification to argue that scientific communities have an interest in collective knowledge because it enables them to establish a context of epistemic justification.

Can Gender Ideologies Influence the Practice of the Physical Sciences

As a response to the critics of feminist science studies I argue that it is possible to formulate empirical hypotheses about gender ideology in the practice of the physical sciences without (1) reinforcing stereotypes about women and mathematical sciences or (2) assuming at the outset that the area of physics under investigation is methodologically suspect. I will then critically evaluate two case studies of gender ideology in the practice of the physical sciences. The case studies fail to show that gender ideologies have influenced the practice of the physical sciences in a profound waynot because it is impossible to conceive how gender ideologies could influence the practice of the physical sciences even in a profound waybut because they do not provide the right kind of evidence. This, however, leaves open the possibility that future studies might provide such evidence.

Why Gender Is a Relevant Factor in the Social Epistemology of Scientific Inquiry

In recent years, feminist philosophy of science has been subjected to criticism. The debate has focused on the implications of the underdetermination thesis for accounts of the role of social values in scientific reasoning. My aim here is to offer a different approach. I suggest that feminist philosophers of science contribute to our understanding of science by (1) producing gender‐sensitive analyses of the social dimensions of scientific inquiry and (2) examining the relevance of these analyses for normative issues in philosophy of science.

Diversity and Dissent in the Social Sciences The Case of Organization Studies

I introduce a case study from organization studies to argue that social epistemologists’ recommendation to cultivate diversity and dissent in science is unlikely to be welcomed in the social sciences unless it is coupled with another epistemic ideal: the norm of epistemic responsibility. The norm of epistemic responsibility enables me to show that organization scholars’ concern with the fragmentation of their discipline is generated by false assumptions: the assumption that a diversity of theoretical approaches will lead to fragmentation and the assumption that an imposed consensus on a theoretical approach is needed to maintain the unity of the discipline.

Group Justification in Science

An analysis of group justification enables us to understand what it means to say that a research group is justified in making a claim on the basis of evidence. I defend Frederick Schmitts (1994) joint account of group justification by arguing against a simple summative account of group justification. Also, I respond to two objections to the joint account, one claiming that social epistemologists should always prefer the epistemic value of making true judgments to the epistemic value of maintaining consistency, and another one claiming that the notion of joint commitment implicit in the joint account is epistemically unacceptable.

Scientific Knowledge: A Stakeholder Theory

A stakeholder theory of scientific knowledge addresses the question of whether outsiders to particular scientific communities are allowed to play a role in epistemic justification, and if they are, what this role might be. By stakeholders of scientific knowledge I mean outsiders to particular scientific communities who have an interest in the knowledge produced in these communities.1 Those who fund scientific research or are in a position to make funding decisions on the behalf of some larger social body, either public or private, are stakeholders for the obvious reasons that it is their or their employer’s money that is used in science. Among stakeholders are also laypersons who have an interest in scientific knowledge because scientists study them or because their lives are influenced by the applications of scientific research. Some laypersons, such as AIDS activists and environmental activists, have tried to interfere in scientific debates (see e.g., Epstein 1996; Jasanoff 2004 and 2005; Leach, Scoones, and Wynne 2005).2 Yet another group of stakeholders consists of scientists who are outsiders to a specialty and nevertheless have an interest in the specialty because of its relevance for their research. Communication and collaboration across the boundaries of specialties have sometimes been a crucial factor in the epistemic success of scientific inquiry (see e.g., Thagard 1999). Professionals such as physicians, therapists, lawyers, engineers, and to some extent corporate managers, are also stakeholders because their status as professionals is dependent on scientific knowledge.

Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration

Much of the literature on values in science is limited in its perspective because it focuses on the role of values in individual scientists’ decision making, thereby ignoring the context of scientific collaboration. I examine the epistemic structure of scientific collaboration and argue that it gives rise to two arguments showing that moral and social values can legitimately play a role in scientists’ decision to accept something as scientific knowledge. In the case of scientific collaboration some moral and social values are properly understood to be extrinsic epistemic values, that is, values that promote the attainment of scientific knowledge.

Contextualism in Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science

I introduce a contextualist theory of epistemic justification in order to defend Helen Longino’s contextual empiricism against three criticisms. The critics claim that contextual empiricism (1) implies dogmatism with respect to standards of argumentation, (2) lacks naturalistic justification, and (3) implies relativism with respect to moral and social values. I argue that the three criticisms fail. If we understand contextual empiricism as a contextualist theory of epistemic justification, standards of argumentation do not need to be adopted dogmatically, Longino’s social account of objectivity is justified in virtue of advancing epistemic responsibility, and her account of objectivity does not imply that any moral and social values are acceptable in scientific debates.

Values, standpoints, and scientific/intellectual movements

Feminist standpoint empiricism contributes to the criticism of the value-free ideal by offering a unique analysis of how non-epistemic values can play not only a legitimate but also an epistemically productive role in science. While the inductive risk argument focuses on the role of non-epistemic values in the acceptance of hypotheses, standpoint empiricism focuses on the role of non-epistemic values in the production of evidence. And while many other analyses of values in science focus on the role of non-epistemic values either in an individual scientists decision making or in the distribution of research efforts in scientific communities, standpoint empiricism focuses on the role of non-epistemic values in the building of scientific/intellectual movements.

A Feminist Approach to Values in Science

While I share the aims and values of Philosophy of Science after Feminism, I argue that the ideal of socially responsible science is in need of further defense. In accordance with this ideal, not only sound epistemic values but also sound social values are to play a role in scientific inquiry. However, the ideal of socially responsible science does not specify what roles sound social values are required to play so that they go together with sound epistemic values without undermining them. Nor does it specify how scientists identify sound social values.