Kristine Watson Hankins

How Do Financial Firms Manage Risk? Unraveling the Interaction of Financial and Operational Hedging

This paper investigates how firms manage risk by examining the relationship between financial and operational hedging using a sample of bank holding companies. Risk management theory holds that capital market imperfections make cash flow volatility costly. I investigate whether financial firms consider this cost or focus exclusively on managing tradable exposures. After documenting that acquisitions provide operational hedging by reducing potentially costly volatility, I find that postacquisition financial hedging declines even after controlling for the specific underlying risks. In addition, the decrease in financial hedging is related to the acquisitions level of operational hedging. Larger increases in operational hedging are followed by larger declines in financial hedging. These results indicate that firms in this sample manage aggregate risk, not just tradable exposures, and that operational hedging can substitute for financial hedging. This paper was accepted by John Birge, focused issue editor.

Financial Flexibility, Risk Management, and Payout Choice

Both risk management and payout decisions affect a firms financial flexibility—the ability to avoid costly financial distress as well as underinvestment. We provide evidence of substitution between hedging and payout decisions using samples of both financial and nonfinancial firms. We find that a more flexible distribution, favoring repurchases over dividends, is negatively related to financial hedging within a firm, consistent with financial flexibility in payout decisions and hedging being substitutes. Our findings, which are robust to controlling for the endogeneity of hedging and payout choices, suggest that payout flexibility offers operational hedging benefits.

The Effect of Fiduciary Standards on Institutions' Preference for Dividend‐Paying Stocks

Many researchers apparently believe that some institutional investors prefer dividend-paying stocks because they are subject to the “prudent man” (PM) standard of fiduciary responsibility, under which dividend payments provide prima facie evidence that an investment is prudent. Although this was once accurate for many institutions, during the 1990s most states replaced the PM standard with the less-stringent “prudent investor” (PI) rule, which evaluates the appropriateness of each investment in a portfolio context. Controlling for the general decline in dividend-paying stocks, we find that institutions reduced their holdings of dividend-paying stocks by 2% to 3% as the PI standard spread during the 1990s. Studies of asset pricing and corporate governance should no longer consider dividend payments when evaluating the actions of institutional investors.

Understanding the Rise in Corporate Cash: Precautionary Savings or Foreign Taxes

Has the need for precautionary savings driven the dramatic increase in U.S. corporate cash? We show that the run-up in cash is concentrated in foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations. Precautionary motives explain variation in the level of cash held domestically, but not the level or growth of foreign cash. Multinational firms’ foreign cash balances are instead explained by low foreign tax rates and the ability to transfer profits within the firm through among related subsidiaries. The firms with the greatest incentive and ability to transfer income to low tax jurisdictions do, causing cash to accumulate in their foreign subsidiaries.