Krzysztof Majcher

Attacks on CKK Family of RFID Authentication Protocols

At Pervasive 2008, Cichon, Klonowski, Kutylowski proposed a family of shared-key authentication protocols (

Efficient Probabilistic Methods for Proof of Possession in Clouds

\mathcal CKK

Hidden bits approach for authentication in RFID systems

). Small computational and communication cost, together with possibility of efficient hardware implementation makes

Kinematically excited parametric vibration of a tall building model with a TMD - Part 2: Experimental analyses

\mathcal CKK

Practical attacks on HB and HB+ protocols

attractive for low-cost devices such as RFID tags. In this paper we present a couple of attacks on

Experimental (OMA) and Numerical (FEM) Modal Analysis of Ball Mill Foundations

\mathcal CKK

Experimental research of cable tension tuning of a scaled model of cable stayed bridge

protocols, both passive and active.

Blocker-Type Methods for Protecting Customers' Privacy in RFID Systems

Cloud computing is a new paradigm that has received the considerable attention in theory and practice quite recently. One of the applications of cloud computing is the storage of client’s data on remote servers. While maintaining huge volumes of data, the cloud vendors may be tempted to cheat its clients by removing their data. Thus, to avoid such a situation, many proof of possession methods have been proposed. Usually they utilize complex cryptographic calculation which makes them not applicable to devices with limited resources. This paper proposes two novel methods of light-weight proof of possession. Instead of using the resource consuming cryptographic functions, these methods use only straightforward hash functions. In the first method, the client stores his data on one server in the cloud. The second approach addresses the scenario of data duplication between many independent servers.

Shaking table tests of a model-scale building with 2DOF pendulum mass damper

We present an authentication scheme designed for tiny and strictly constrained devices like RFID-tags. Authentication is based on the symmetric key shared between a tag and a reader. While a tag needs to perform only simple operations in order to authenticate: to pick n/2+b random values and then to compute XORs of some values, a reader needs to try 2b possible values to check if a tag replied correctly (b is small). At the same time eavesdropping adversary after r executions of the protocol needs to solve a system of rk-multivariate quadratic equations over GF(2) with nk+rb variables. We present a security discussion of proposed solutions.