Laetitia Mulder

Reward, Punishment, and Cooperation: A Meta-Analysis

How effective are rewards (for cooperation) and punishment (for noncooperation) as tools to promote cooperation in social dilemmas or situations when immediate self-interest and longer term collective interest conflict? What variables can promote the impact of these incentives? Although such questions have been examined, social and behavioral scientists provide different answers. To date, there is no theoretical and/or quantitative review of rewards and punishments as incentives for cooperation in social dilemmas. Using a novel interdependence-theoretic framework, we propose that rewards and punishments should both promote cooperation, and we identify 2 variables—cost of incentives and source of incentives—that are predicted to magnify the effectiveness of these incentives in promoting cooperation.A meta-analysis involving 187 effect sizes revealed that rewards and punishments exhibited a statistically equivalent positive effect on cooperation (d =0.51 and 0.70, respectively). The effectiveness of incentives was stronger when the incentives were costly to administer, compared to free. Centralization of incentives did not moderate the effect size. Punishments were also more effective during iterated dilemmas when participants continued to interact in the same group, compared to both (a) iterated dilemmas with reassignment to a new group after each trial and (b) one-shot dilemmas. We also examine several other potential moderators, such as iterations, partner matching, group size, country, and participant payment. We discuss broad conclusions, consider implications for theory, and suggest directions for future research on rewards and punishment in social dilemmas.

When Sanctions Fail to Increase Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: Considering the Presence of an Alternative Option to Defect

Previous social dilemma research has shown that sanctioning defection may enhance cooperation. The authors argue that this finding may have resulted from restricting participants to two behaviors (cooperation and defection). In this article, the authors introduce the concept of a “social trilemma” (a social dilemma in which an alternative option to defect is present) and tested the effect of a sanction. The authors show that a sanction only increased cooperation and collective interests in the traditional social dilemma. In a social trilemma, the sanction failed because it caused some people to choose the alternative option to defect. Moreover, the results indicate that this was especially the case when people did not expect fellow group members to cooperate. In this case, the sanction even worked counterproductive because it decreased collective interests. It is concluded that allowing individuals to consider alternative options to defect can reveal the potential detrimental effects of sanctioning systems for the collective.

The Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Intragroup Trust

Recent work shows that both reward and punishment systems increase short-term cooperation in social dilemmas. Yet, a growing body of research finds that punishment systems generate a range of negative side effects, including an undermining of trust in fellow group members’ cooperative intentions. The present work asks whether reward systems can generate the same positive effects as punishment systems (increased cooperation) without the negative side effects (decreased interpersonal trust) or whether reward systems also lead to detrimental effects on trust. In two experiments we find that once removed, reward systems, like punishment systems, reduced trust to levels below a control group who never experienced sanctions. This research highlights the detrimental effects of punishment and reward systems on intragroup trust and thus shows that while reward systems can generate the same positive effects as punishment systems, they also generate the same negative side effects.

The Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Intragroup Trust Comparing Punishments and Rewards

Recent work shows that both reward and punishment systems increase short-term cooperation in social dilemmas. Yet, a growing body of research finds that punishment systems generate a range of negative side effects, including an undermining of trust in fellow group members’ cooperative intentions. The present work asks whether reward systems can generate the same positive effects as punishment systems (increased cooperation) without the negative side effects (decreased interpersonal trust) or whether reward systems also lead to detrimental effects on trust. In two experiments we find that once removed, reward systems, like punishment systems, reduced trust to levels below a control group who never experienced sanctions. This research highlights the detrimental effects of punishment and reward systems on intragroup trust and thus shows that while reward systems can generate the same positive effects as punishment systems, they also generate the same negative side effects.

What makes a sanction "stick"? The effects of financial and social sanctions on norm compliance

The present research shows that, like financial sanctions, social punishment (the mere expression of disapproval with another persons conduct) induces compliance with norms for cooperation in a social dilemma. More importantly, after removing the sanctioning opportunity levels of cooperation decrease more under former financial than under former social sanctioning systems. Hence social sanctions are more effective than financial sanctions at inducing “sticky” norms that guide behavior even in the absence of punishment cues. Public policy implications are discussed.

Many analysts, one dataset: Making transparent how variations in analytical choices affect results

Twenty-nine teams involving 61 analysts used the same data set to address the same research question: whether soccer referees are more likely to give red cards to dark-skin-toned players than to light-skin-toned players. Analytic approaches varied widely across the teams, and the estimated effect sizes ranged from 0.89 to 2.93 (Mdn = 1.31) in odds-ratio units. Twenty teams (69%) found a statistically significant positive effect, and 9 teams (31%) did not observe a significant relationship. Overall, the 29 different analyses used 21 unique combinations of covariates. Neither analysts’ prior beliefs about the effect of interest nor their level of expertise readily explained the variation in the outcomes of the analyses. Peer ratings of the quality of the analyses also did not account for the variability. These findings suggest that significant variation in the results of analyses of complex data may be difficult to avoid, even by experts with honest intentions. Crowdsourcing data analysis, a strategy in which numerous research teams are recruited to simultaneously investigate the same research question, makes transparent how defensible, yet subjective, analytic choices influence research results.

Fighting non-cooperative behavior in organizations: The dark side of sanctions.

A common way to promote cooperative and collectively beneficial behavior in organizations is to sanction self-interested and collectively harmful behavior. Social science researchers recently focus more and more on the negative effects of sanctions. In particular, it is argued that sanctioning noncooperative behavior can undermine peoples personal motives to behave cooperatively. In this chapter we argue that, in the decision to behave cooperatively, or in ones own self-interest, perceptions of other peoples motives play an important role. In this chapter we discuss research on sanctioning systems in social dilemmas which shows that sanctioning noncooperative behavior undermines trust in others being motivated to cooperate. In a series of studies we show that the undermining of trust may lead to a general increase of noncooperation. Moreover, the newly developed “social trilemma” paradigm demonstrated that it may induce people to show self-interested behaviors they had not considered before. These negative effects of a sanctioning system are moderated by the trust people initially may have in their fellow group members’ cooperative intentions, in the sanctioning authority and by the way people regard authorities in general. Implications of these results for organizations are discussed.

Moral Rationalization: An Ingredient for Escalation? The Moderating Role of Moral Identity.

Everyone one behaves immorally once in a while, and a way to deal with one’s own previous immoral acts, people often morally rationalize why their acts are morally acceptable. This paper tests whether such post- hoc moral rationalizations contribute to continuation or escalation of immoral behavior and tests how this depends on people’s moral identity. In two scenario experiments moral rationalization was manipulated. Results show that engaging in moral rationalization only convinces low moral identifiers (and not high moral identifiers) that the behavior is morally acceptable, subsequently causing a continuation of one’s immoral acts. These results suggests that post-hoc moral rationalizations may indeed cause escalation of immoral behavior, but only for low moral identifiers and not for high moral identifiers.