Laird Addis

Natural Signs: A Theory of Intentionality.

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Behaviorism and the Philosophy of the Act

An adequate philosophy of mind must satisfy a number of criteria. The two most important among them are, first, that it take account of and be entirely consistent with the phenomenological data; and, second, that it accord with both the presuppositions and the findings of scientific psychology. Many philosophers as well as many philosophically-minded psychologists have believed that it is impossible at once to satisfy both of these criteria-at least as their requirements are widely interpreted. Consider two notable examples. The psychologistJohn Watson believed that the requirements of a scientific psychology imply the denial of the efficacy and possibly the very existence of private mental states. Denying the existence or the efficacy of private mental states is inconsistent with the phenomenological data. The philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre believed that an adequate phenomenology of the mind implies the impossibility of the causal explanation of human behavior. Asserting the impossibility of the causal explanation of human behavior is not in accord with the presuppositions of scientific psychology. Among the relatively few philosophers and psychologists who were moved by the impulse to account fully for the phenomenological data were a yet smaller number who defended the act. The most elaborate analysis and defense of the act among twentieth-century analytic philosophers is to be found in the writings of Gustav Bergmann.2 Yet Bergmann is also known as one who, as a logical positivist, helped to develop and defend the philosophy of psychology known as behaviorism.3 Behaviorism and the philosophy of the act: the dearth of those who would defend both is almost intimidating to one who, like myself, agrees with Bergmann that both must be defended. Indeed, I believe that behaviorism and the philosophy of the act alone jointly satisfy the requirements of a scientific psychology and of respect for the phenomenological data, respectively. The historical tension that has existed between scientific psychology in general and behaviorism, in particular, on the one hand, and dualistic philosophy of mind in general and the philosophy of the act,

Ontology and analysis : essays and recollections about Gustav Bergmann

The Development of Bergmanns Metaphysics The First Station of Gustav Bergmanns Odyssey Bergmann as Historian Bergmann on the Synthetic A Priori Truth: Nothing Can Have Two Colours All Over at Once Gustav Bergmanns Quest for the Ontology of Knowing: From Phenomenalism Towards Realism Time for Bergmanns Bare Particulars Breadleys Regress: Meinong versus Bergmann Bergmanns Thinkable Inexpressibles Placing Bergmann Reminiscence of Gustav Bergmann Reminiscence of Gustav Bergmann (1987) Reminiscences of Bergmanns Last Student.

Freedom and the Marxist Philosophy of History

Many believe that the Marxist philosophy of history entails that man is not free in a sense in which it seems obvious that he is. In particular it is held to be (1) materialistic, (2) holistic, (3) economistic, and (4) fatalistic. It is claimed, in short, that since the Marxist philosophy of history has these features, man is not capable of shaping his own (social) destiny if it is true. I show for each of these features either that it does not entail what it is believed to entail or that it is not correctly attributed to the Marxist philosophy of history.

Consciousness and Intentionality

Abstract The thesis is that conscious states and intentional states are the same things, although the property that makes a state a conscious state is different from the property that makes it an intentional state. Against those who say that sensations such as pains are conscious but not intentional states, it is argued that they are in fact intentional states. Against those who say dispositional mental states such as beliefs are intentional states but not conscious states, it is argued that they are in fact not intentional states. It is further argued that those unconscious mental states that are not merely dispositional mental states are, in the relevant sense, conscious states and therefore also intentional states. The argument is conducted within the framework of a briefly summarized ontology of mind.

Mind: ontology and explanation : collected papers 1981-2005

Introduction Mind, Structure & Time Natural Signs Pains and Other Secondary Mental Entities Intrinsic Reference & the New Theory The Ontology of Emotion The Simplicity of Content The Necessity and Nature of Mental Content Dispositions, Explanation Behaviorism &the Philosophy of the Act Parallelism, Interactionism & Causation Dispositional Mental States: Chomsky & Freud Review of Laurence D. Smiths Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance Human Action and the Human Universe.

Music and Knowledge

There are, needless to say, multiple ways in which music might be related to knowledge; and no doubt, too, the actual ways are but a very small subset of the still probably finite number of imaginable ways. In the last few decades, cognitive science has often been invoked in discussion of putative musical knowledge—for example, by the philosopher Diana Raffman in her Language, Music, and Mind and, probably most notably, by the composer Fred Lehrdahl and the linguist Ray Jackendoff in their A Generative Theory of Tonal Music. One cannot doubt, even at this comparatively early date, the contribution that scientific psychology, done from a broadly “cognitivist” frame of reference, can make and has made to the understanding of the human mind in relation to music. If empirical science cannot tell us, as it surely cannot, what music is worth listening to, there remains the strong possibility that music psychology, including neurology and evolutionary biology, can tell us ever more why humans are so drawn to music and what they perceive in it and from it, and thus why, at least in some measure, they do evaluate music in the ways they do.

Dispositional mental states: Chomsky and Freud

ZusammenfassungChomsky behauptet, daß das Bewußtsein die Struktur eines grammatischen Übersetzungsapparates hat, Freud dagegen betrachtet es als einen unbewußten Geisteszustand. Es wird gezeigt, wie sich diese Theorien innerhalb einer Metaphysik des Bewußtseins vereinbaren lassen, die nur bewußte Geisteszustände als grundlegend, Sinneswahrnehmungen, Bilder, Emotionen und dergleichen als sekundär, und veranlagungsbedingte (natürliche) Geisteszustände als tertiär bezeichnet. Hervorzuheben wäre, daß grammatische Übersetzungsapparate und unbewußte Geisteszustände, wie alle menschlichen Veranlagungen, als Eigenheiten des Körpers, welcher gewissen Gesetzen und Prinzipien unterliegt, zu analysieren sind.

On Defending The Covering-Law “Model”

Hempel in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays tells us that “all scientific explanation involves, explicitly or by implication, a sub-sumption of its subject matter under general regularities; that it seeks to provide a systematic understanding of empirical phenomena by showing that they fit into a nomic nexus.”1 This I take to be an informal statement of his covering-law “model” of scientific explanation. In defense of his “model” against apparent examples of scientific explanations which do not fit it, Hempel’s almost instinctive reaction has been to patch them up in some way so that they do conform. This, I believe, is the wrong way to defend the covering-law “model”. In the three parts of this brief essay I shall do the following: (1) show that Hempel’s attempt to patch up a certain version of so-called “rational” explanation does not succeed of its purpose, (2) generalize that result with respect to all dispositional explanations, and (3) reflect momentarily on philosophic method and another way to defend the covering-law “model”.