Lars Lindblom

Evaluating Workplace Inspections

Abstract This paper introduces a theoretical framework for the evaluation of workplace inspections with respect to their effects on working conditions. The choice of a concept of efficiency is discussed, and its relation to criteria for a good working environment is clarified. It concludes that in order to obtain reliable information on the effects of different inspection methods, it is necessary to perform controlled comparative studies in which different methods are used in different workplaces. Given the ease with which such studies can be performed, it is surprising how few have been made. The studies that are available provide sufficient evidence that inspections can increase compliance with regulations and that they can also increase workplace safety, but not much can be concluded about the relative efficiency of different inspection methods.

Equality of What for Children

This paper revisits the equality of what-debate and asks whether previous conclusions hold if we analyze the arguments from the perspective of children. It makes three claims. First, that even if w ...

Libertarianism, Information, and Unions

Abstract This article presents a normative epistemological argument for unions, developed from libertarian premises. According to Friedman, the state should set up rules for the market, whereas managers should focus on profits. On this view, business ethics can be handled by regulations, but Hayek’s theory of the market indicates that this position is problematic, since it relies on the state being able to collect the relevant ethical information. Hayek argued that a market system is more efficient than planned economies, since it handles information more efficiently. However, there is also reason to doubt that markets can provide the needed information. The price mechanism carries information solely about preferences, but ethics also concerns rights, voluntariness and needs. Moreover, Coase showed that inside firms there are no Hayekian price mechanisms. Firms are characterized by hierarchy, which means that both employers and employees may have incentives to not be forthcoming with information relevant information. The moral epistemology of Anderson, with an important role for civil society, is used to identify solutions to these informational problems. As a part of civil society, unions complement the market as a source of ethical information, and inside the firm they balance power and provide an avenue for voice.

Toward a Responsibility-catering Prioritarian Ethical Theory of Risk

Standard tools used in societal risk management such as probabilistic risk analysis or cost–benefit analysis typically define risks in terms of only probabilities and consequences and assume a utilitarian approach to ethics that aims to maximize expected utility. The philosopher Carl F. Cranor has argued against this view by devising a list of plausible aspects of the acceptability of risks that points towards a non-consequentialist ethical theory of societal risk management. This paper revisits Cranor’s list to argue that the alternative ethical theory responsibility-catering prioritarianism can accommodate the aspects identified by Cranor and that the elements in the list can be used to inform the details of how to view risks within this theory. An approach towards operationalizing the theory is proposed based on a prioritarian social welfare function that operates on responsibility-adjusted utilities. A responsibility-catering prioritarian ethical approach towards managing risks is a promising alternative to standard tools such as cost–benefit analysis.

In Defense of Rawlsian Fair Equality of Opportunity

Abstract Richard Arneson argues that Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) should be rejected, since it is not only too weak and too strong, but also problematically meritocratic. The paper aims to defend FEO, and argues that it is not too weak, since, pace Arneson, it does apply to the problem of stunted ambition. The argument from meritocracy is shown to be based on a conflation of different senses of meritocracy. Finally, it is shown that FEO, correctly interpreted, gives intuitive answers to the examples put forward to bolster the too strong charge. It is concluded that Arneson’s refutation of FEO fails.