Lars Oxelheim

The impact of foreign board membership on firm value

This study examines the effect of foreign (Anglo-American) board membership on corporate performance measured in terms of firm value (Tobin’s Q). On a basis of firms with headquarters in Norway or Sweden the study indicates a significantly higher value for firms that have outsider Anglo-American board member(s), after a variety of firm-specific and corporate governance related factors have been controlled for. We argue that this superior performance reflects the fact that these companies have successfully broken away from a partly segmented domestic capital market by “importing” an Anglo-American corporate governance system. Such an “import” signals a willingness on the part of the firm to expose itself to improved corporate governance and enhances its reputation in the financial market.

Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment

We argue that mainstream FDI theory underplays financial motivations for interna-tional investment, and suggest several possible channels for a distinct cost-of-capital effect on FDI. Using a sample of European firms’ cross-border acquisitions, and controlling for traditional firm-level determinants of FDI, we find strong evidence in favor of a cost-of-equity effect, whereas the effect of debt costs is indeterminate. We further find that financial determinants are more important for firms originating in relatively less financially developed countries and for firms with high knowledge intensity.

Executive Incentive Compensation and Economic Prosperity

This paper analyzes the existence of a potential link between the prevalence of long term incentive compensation schemes and the economic prosperity of a country. This issue is previously not addressed in the literature. In a panel regression with fixed effects a strongly significant, positive effect is found between growth of GDP/capita in real terms and this prevalence, while controlling for general investment and institutional variables. However, when the 22 countries of the study are divided into European and non-European, the growth effect found for the entire material accrues only to the non-European countries. It is concluded that long term incentive contracts seem to have no effect in the European countries due to labor market and cultural reasons.