Laura Birg

Retailers and Consumers: The Pass‐Through of Import Price Changes

In this paper, we estimate pass-through rates of import price changes to retail prices across retailers and consumers for apparel purchases in Germany for the period of 2000 to 2007. We find that high-price retailers do not pass through changes in the import price. Pass-through rates for low-price retailers are 53% within 3 months. Consequently, pass-through rates for low-income households are 58%, significantly larger than those for high-income households. We then present one possible explanation for these observations in a theoretical model with endogenous vertical product differentiation due to bundling an ex-ante homogeneous import good with services. Following an import price change, retailers who sell a cheaper unbundled product change prices to a greater extent than retailers who sell a higher-priced bundle of product and service.

Christmas Economics - A Sleigh Ride

This article reviews the literature on Christmas economics. First, we present an overall picture of the debate on the potential welfare loss of gift�?giving and we show strategies that reduce the potential welfare loss and might increase the number of presents received. Second, we discuss the effect of Christmas on prices and the business cycle. We provide evidence that at Christmas stock prices and airfares increase, while food prices decrease.

Externalities of National Pharmaceutical Policy when Markets are Integrated through Parallel Trade

This paper studies externalities of nationally determined cost-sharing systems, in particular coinsurance rates (patients pay a percentage of the price), under pharmaceutical parallel trade, i.e. trade outside the manufacturers authorized distribution channel, in a two-country model with a vertical distributor relationship. Parallel trade generates a price-decreasing competition effect in the destination country and a price-increasing double marginalization effect in the source country. An increase of the coinsurance rates in the destination country of the parallel import mitigates the double marginalization effect in the source country. An increase of the coinsurance rate in the source country reinforces the competition effect in the destination country.

Pharmaceutical cost-sharing systems and savings for health care systems from parallel trade

This paper analyzes the consequences of parallel trade on health care systems in a two-country model with a vertical distributor relationship. In particular, two cost-sharing systems - coinsurance and indemnity insurance - are compared with respect to changes in copayments and public health expenditure. Under both cost-sharing systems, parallel trade generates a price-decreasing competition effect in the destination country and a price-increasing double marginalization effect in the source country. In the destination country, copayments for patients decrease to a larger extent under indemnity insurance, whereas reductions of public health expenditure occur only under coinsurance. In the source country, copayments increase less under coinsurance, whereas health expenditure is reduced more under indemnity insurance. This illustrates that a harmonization of health care systems would not make sense.

External reference pricing and the choice of country baskets and pricing rules

This paper models different external reference pricing schemes - a price cap based on the drug price in one or two countries and on the minimum or average drug price - in a three-country framework. It studies the choice of external reference pricing schemes in one country as well as its effect on welfare in the other countries, the manufacturer´s export decision, and the incentives for the other countries to also adopt an external reference pricing scheme. Depending on market size in the country adopting external reference pricing and market size difference of the other two countries, welfare is highest under the minimum price-rule or under the average price-rule. External reference pricing increases the drug price and decreases welfare in the other countries. If the market size in the country adopting an external reference pricing scheme is sufficiently large, the manufacturer does not export to the other countries. There is the incentive for the other countries also adopt external reference pricing.

Minimum Quality Standards and Exports

This paper studies the interaction of a minimum quality standard and exports in a vertical product differentiation model when firms sell global products. If exante quality of foreign firms is lower (higher) than the quality of exporting firms, a mild minimum quality standard in the home market hinders (supports) exports. The minimum quality standard increases quality in both markets. A welfare maximizing minimum quality standard is always lower under trade than under autarky. A Minimum quality standard reduces profits for the exporting firm. It increases domestic welfare, but reduces welfare in the export market.

Minimum Quality Standards and Non-Compliance

This paper studies the effect of non-compliance with a minimum quality standard on prices, quality, and welfare in a vertical differentiation model. Non-compliance with a minimum quality standard by a low-quality firm reduces quality levels of both firms, increases the price for the high-quality product, decreases the price for the low-quality product, and shifts demand from the low-quality to the high-quality firm. Under non-compliance, an increase in the standard increases the quality difference, increases the price difference, and shifts demand from the high-quality to the low-quality firm. Stricter government enforcement decreases the quality level of the low-quality firm, increases the price of the high-quality product and shifts demand from the low-quality firm to the high-quality firm. Non-compliance of the low quality firm increases profits for both firms, reduces consumer surplus and increases or decreases welfare depending on the market size, the effect of quality levels of the externality, the detection probability, and the minimum quality level.

Minimum quality standards and compulsory labeling: More than the sum of its parts

This paper studies the effect of a minimum quality standard, a compulsory labeling scheme, and the combination of both instruments in a vertical differentiation model when not all quality dimensions of products can be observed byconsumers. Both a minimum quality standard on the non-observable quality dimension and a labeling scheme that informs consumers about the non-observable quality dimension have no impact on the observable quality dimension, increase prices, and have no impact on demand. The combination of a minimum standard and a labeling scheme increases prices, reduces or enhances investment in the observable quality dimension, and alters market shares depending on the minimum quality level. Compared to the case of no regulation, social welfare may decrease or increase under the minimum quality standard, the compulsory labeling scheme or the combined scheme, depending on the level of the minimum quality standard and the market size.

Pharmaceutical Regulation at the Wholesale Level and Parallel Trade

This paper studies the effect of pharmaceutical regulation at the wholesale level, if markets are integrated by parallel trade, i.e. trade outside the manufacturer´s authorized distribution channel. In particular, maximum wholesale margins, a restriction of pricing by the intermediary, and mandatory rebates, a restriction of the pricing by the manufacturer, are analyzed with respect to their effect on drug prices, quantities, and public pharmaceutical expenditure. Maximum wholesale margins enhance the manufacturer´s ability to reduce competition from parallel trade in the destination country by increasing wholesale prices. In a symmetric equilibrium, maximum wholesale margins of both countries partly offset each other. Mandatory rebates may be a policy alternative, as they exhibit a reinforcing effect with respect to drug prices.

Pharmaceutical Regulation and Health Policy Objectives

This paper analyzes a maximum price system and a reference price system in a vertical differentiation model with a brand-name drug and a generic. In particular, both instruments are compared with respect to their performance in reducing public expenditure, limiting financial exposure of patients, improving access to pharmaceuticals, and stimulating competition. For identical regulatory prices, free pricing under the reference system tends to result in a higher price for the brand-name drug. For identical price reductions of the brand-name drug, the lower reimbursement amount under the reference price system results in lower health expenditure, but higher financial exposure of patients. Total welfare is higher under the maximum price system.