Laura Cabeza-García

Family Ownership and Control, the Presence of Other Large Shareholders, and Firm Performance: Further Evidence:

This article analyzes, using various econometric techniques, how family ownership, family control, and the presence of a second significant shareholder affect firm performance. The authors studied a panel of 118 nonfinancial Spanish companies (711 observations) from 2002 to 2008. Once endogeneity issues were considered, it was found that family ownership did not influence profitability. What seems to matter is family control. This study also reveals the importance of taking into account unobservable heterogeneity and endogeneity issues when analyzing firm performance and provides an interesting future avenue of research: the role played by other large shareholders in family firms.

Operations in banking: the service quality and effects on satisfaction and loyalty

This paper studies the service quality provided by the banks. The objectives are (i) to identify which aspects of the transactions carried out by the banks are important for the service quality perceived by the customers, taking into account some aspects that are sometimes ignored (online channels) and (ii) to observe how service quality influences customer satisfaction and how customer satisfaction affects the loyalty towards the bank. Using a factor analysis, the research identifies the operative, physical, new technologies and human factors. Next, using structural equations models with AMOS, the results show an influence of the operative aspects and the new technologies on service quality, as well as the confirmation of quality as a precedent to customer satisfaction, and how such satisfaction influences on customers loyalty towards the bank.

The Company You Keep: The Effect of Other Large Shareholders in Family Firms

Manuscript Type. Empirical. Research Question/Issue. Using a panel of non‐financial listed firms over a seven‐year period, the authors analyse how the value of family firms is potentially affected by the existence of multiple shareholders, by other large shareholders’ voting rights in relation to the familys, by the final power distribution (that is, whether the familys voting rights exceed those of other shareholders), by the identity of the blockholders, and the existence of shareholder agreements. Research Findings/Insights. After controlling for possible self‐selection bias and for endogeneity issues, the results of a Heckman two‐stage method suggest that other large shareholders’ voting rights in relation to the familys do not affect family firm value. The results indicate that what seems to matter is who controls the company in terms of voting power, i.e., whether there is just one large shareholder or other major blockholders as well, and whether they have more or fewer voting rights than the largest owner. The market favors a firm that has multiple large shareholders provided that the family retains control by holding most of the voting rights. However, when there is just one family owner or when other blockholders have more voting power than the family, industry‐adjusted family firm value is negatively affected. The existence of shareholder agreements and families and non‐financial firms as other blockholders has no impact on company performance, while foreign shareholders tend to increase family firm value. Theoretical/Academic Implications. Academics should take the presence of multiple large shareholders into account as this can affect family power. It is not a question of collusion or contestability per se. The market seems to value other large investors’ ability to balance family power only if families retain control by holding the majority of the votes. The preferred model therefore resembles that of a king amid nobility, a “primus inter pares”, with other large blockholders (nobility) providing a credible and strong but not overwhelming opposition that benefits minority owners. Practitioner/Policy Implications. When multiple large owners exist, firm value is increased if the family retains power. Ownership structure matters and the effect of other large shareholders’ voting rights on minority investors’ wealth has to be considered. New variables to describe particular situations in family firms are needed.

Determinants of CSR practices: analysis of the influence of ownership and the management profile mediating effect

The purpose of this article is to study the relevance of ownership and top management characteristics in the implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Specifically, it is proposed that ownership structure characterised by the presence of large shareholders is related to CSR activities and that this relationship may be mediated by the CEO management profile in accordance with the Agency–Stewardship approach. The results of mediation analysis on a sample of 101 non-listed companies in Spain show that those with a higher ownership concentration tend to be run by managers whose profile is closer to the steward than the agent model and to be more involved in CSR activities. Our findings also support the existence of the suggested mediating effect. This article goes further than existing research on owners and top managers as determinants of CSR and unveils new ways to address this topic empirically.

Recent corporate governance developments in Spain

This major Handbook provides a comprehensive analysis of the development of corporate governance across a range of countries including Australia, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Turkey and the UK. Whilst the stage in the corporate governance life cycle may vary from country to country, there are certain core features which emerge such as the importance of transparency, disclosure, accountability of directors and protection of minority shareholders’ rights.

Legal and cultural factors as catalysts for promoting women in the boardroom

This study focuses on whether regulation as well as national cultures play significant roles in defining womens role in society. We are contributing to the existing debate by providing the first empirical analysis to calibrate which legal mechanisms and cultural dimensions are more efficient in achieving boardroom gender equality. We have highlighted the impact of regulation by distinguishing between those countries that have passed positive laws imposing gender quotas in the boardroom and those applying the ‘comply or explain’ recommendation in their good governance codes. We have monitored enforcement levels among countries and tested the validity of Hofstedes cultural factors in impacting on gender quotas. The emerging picture is that of gender diversity being triggered by the adoption of positive laws rather than by soft recommendations. Moreover, gender diversity policies are more commonly promoted in countries where governments, corporations and institutions are characterized by less masculinity and lower power distance.