Laura Chappell

Poland in Transition: Implications for a European Security and Defence Policy

Despite its accomplishments, development of ESDP requires more than the leadership of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. This is especially significant for overcoming divergence between ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states. As a vocal, medium-sized country, the largest of the new EU members, Poland, has special potential to influence ESDP. This article analyses continuity and change in Polands security and defence views. It highlights beliefs, attitudes and norms shaping policy-makers’ conceptions towards defence issues, stressing role theory. Poland initially reacted sceptically to the creation of ESDP, but its policies changed after 1) transformation of the international situation following 11 September, 2) international expectations of Poland to enhance its military role, and 3) Polands desire to be a reliable European and transatlantic ally. This is despite the fact that Polish threat perceptions and immediate defence concerns are focused on its own neighbourhood, not the larger region or out of region. Polish acceptance of ESDP highlights the beginnings of a European strategic culture can be seen, despite divergences with other members, particularly over Russia. Polands original scepticism has not just been replaced by pragmatism but also activism and potential leadership. Polands positive approach offers a model for other member states to increase their contributions, turning ESDP into more than a German, French, and British exercise.

Germany, Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy

Introducing Germany, Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Constructing an Analytical Framework The Impact of Strategic Culture on Germanys and Polands Security and Defence Policy German and Polish Roles and CSDP Germany, Poland and the European Security Strategy: Analysing Continuity and Change Developing the EU Battlegroup Concept: The Perceptions and Contributions of Germany and Poland Conclusion References

The European Union's Crisis Management Operations: Strategic Culture in Action?

How useful is the concept of strategic culture for understanding when, where and how the European Union uses force? This paper will assess the extent to which agreement among the European Union Member States to conduct Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations is founded on a top-down approach based on a common strategic culture or alternatively on a bottom-up approach. In the latter case, a decision to deploy troops is based on specific Member States’ interests and capabilities. Four military operations will be analysed: Operation EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR TChad/RCA and Operation Atalanta. Emphasis is placed on whether there has been any form of decision-making based on shared beliefs, attitudes and norms regarding the use of force. The aim is to highlight whether there has been increasing convergence behind the reasoning for the deployment of European Union operations which indicates the extent to which the organisation possesses a European strategic culture.

The European Defence Agency and Permanent Structured Cooperation: Are We Heading Towards Another Missed Opportunity?

The member states’ military capability deficits are well known. These can be attributed to nationally focused investment which leads to duplication and non-interoperability, the lack of a fully-fledged European strategic culture which would provide top-down guidance as to which capabilities need to be developed and finally member states’ static and declining defence budgets. Attempts to close the European Union’s numerous military deficits have been haphazard and have often been no more than a documenting exercise where capability gaps are identified but little is done to actually close them (the European Capability Action Plan process being a case in point). Nonetheless, there are significant financial imperatives for moving towards a greater use of pooling due to the current economic crisis. This article therefore analyses the work of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in military capability development and in particular focuses on the role that Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PSCD) can play to encourage the member states to move from defence sovereignty to pooled defence resources. Two interconnected research questions provide the core focus for the research. First, what does PSCD add to what currently exists and to what extent is this likely to re-invigorate capability development? Second, to what extent can the EDA play a role in developing PSCD thus enabling the concept to succeed? Indeed, the introduction of PSCD in the Treaty of Lisbon can be

Transforming CSDP? Feminist Triangles and Gender Regimes: CSDP and Gender Regimes

Despite equality being considered one of the key normative foundations of the EU, gender has not yet been mainstreamed within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This article investigates the impact of institutional structures on the inclusion of a gender dimension in this policy area. The article adopts Woodward’s (2003) model of feminist triangles to unpack the role of actors and processes; specifically, highlighting key innovations and missed opportunities to integrate gender into CSDP. Focusing in particular on femocrats, the article argues that for gender mainstreaming to take place, the office of the Gender Advisor needs to bridge the division between the military and civilian dimension of CSDP. It concludes that CSDP remains largely gender blind in spite of the EU’s adoption of an action plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

Germany, Poland and the European Security Strategy: Analysing Continuity and Change

This chapter will look in more detail at Germany’s and Poland’s security and defence elites’ conceptions of CSDP by using the European Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS and the report on its implementation provide a good basis on which to assess Germany’s and Poland’s security and defence elites’ views and changes towards CSDP. Security strategies generally outline a country’s, or in this case, an organisation’s, aims, objectives and interests in the security and defence realm. It acts as a starting point for considering a state’s or organisation’s role in the world. In this way it is possible to compare the ESS and the 2008 report on its implementation with German and Polish security and defence elites’ perceptions of not only their own security and defence policies but also how they want CSDP to progress. Therefore this chapter seeks to outline continuity and change in both countries’ security and defence policy and to ascertain whether the political rhetoric, outlined in various speeches as highlighted in the previous chapter, match the reality.

German and Polish Roles and the CSDP

The aim of this chapter is to analyse German and Polish roles towards CSDP, taking into account each country’s unique strategic culture. First, this chapter seeks to highlight any changes that have occurred in Polish and German policy-makers’ roles in relation to security and defence issues in general and CSDP in particular from 1999 to July 2011. Second, it will analyse the reasons behind these changes as well as distinguishing the reasons for continuity in other areas. Third, it will ascertain if there have been any expectation gaps between the role German and Polish policy-makers want to play and the role they have actually played.

Developing the EU Battlegroup Concept: The Perceptions and Contributions of Germany and Poland

The Battlegroup Concept was initiated at a time when the EU was trying to find a role in the global security environment.1 Building upon the Artemis mission, the ESS and the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) process, it sought to provide a value-added mechanism for military action, within the limited capabilities of the Member States, while at the same time avoiding duplication with NATO’s Reaction Force (NRF). In this respect both the military and political aspects are emphasised. The aim is to assess German and Polish contributions to the EU Battlegroup Concept and to discover how far these reflect the conceptions that each country’s decision-makers have of CSDP and the role it should play. Above all it will analyse how both countries’ policymakers perceive the Battlegroups and the issues which are central to it, such as when, where and how the Battlegroups will be used, capability requirements and how the Battlegroups should work with other relevant multilateral institutions.

Introducing Germany, Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

In June 1991, in the context of the European Community’s (EC’s) diplomatic efforts regarding the former Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Poos, declared, ‘this is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans’ (The Independent 1991). At the beginning of the 1990s the EC’s Member States were trying to carve out and define a role for Western Europe on the international stage. This was reflected in the changes within the EC, coming at the time of discussions over the Maastricht Treaty, which included the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Considering the EC’s growing influence on the international stage and the US reluctance to continue its role as the guarantor of European security, the EC Member States wished to take control of the Yugoslav situation without US interference. The Yugoslav crisis was supposed to act as a springboard for the organisation’s international role. However the lack of cohesion between the Member States’ views concerning what had to be done regarding the Yugoslav situation, in addition to the lack of capabilities to deal with the break-up, underlined the EC’s limits. Indeed Hill’s (1993: 1) ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ came to symbolise the general problem with the European Union’s ‘actorness’,1 highlighting that its capabilities did not correspond to what was expected of it.

Constructing an Analytical Framework

History plays a vital role in the understanding of current German and Polish security and defence policies and the roles they play in the international environment. As highlighted in the previous chapter, strategic culture and role theory form the theoretical framework of the book. It is argued that these middle-ranging theories combined allow for the dynamics of interaction that takes place both within a nation state and between nation states and regional organisations, in this case the EU. Additionally they enable an analysis of German and Polish perceptions of CSDP and how these have evolved. The following section of this chapter will undertake an investigation of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) in order to formulate the underpinning methodology of this book. Then the key explanatory variable, strategic culture, will be assessed to evaluate its utility before examining role theory and how it relates to strategic culture. The final section will outline how the research will be undertaken, including the role categories that will be used to activate the research, the hypotheses and methods.