Laure Kuhfuss

Préférences individuelles et incitations collectives : quels contrats agroenvironnementaux pour la réduction des herbicides par les viticulteurs ?

[paper in French]The CAP reform is an opportunity to improve the design of existing agri-environmental schemes. Understanding the design attributes affecting farmers’ choices when they adopt an agri-environmental contract can help to identify ways of increasing their participation. The aim of this article is to measure with a choice experiment, the preferences of wine-growers for different types of contracts limiting the use of herbicides in the Languedoc-Roussillon region (France). We test the effect of introducing a collective dimension in the contracts. A monetary “bonus” would be paid to each engaged farmer, provided that the proportion of land collectively enrolled in the scheme reaches a predefined threshold. Despite a high heterogeneity among wine-growers, respondents show a preference for the contracts including this bonus and are more willing to provide environmental efforts when their neighbors also do so. Then, the presence of this bonus in the contracts terms could enhance farmers’ participation.

Nudges, Social Norms, and Permanence in Agri-environmental Schemes

The permanence of land management practices adopted under agri-environmental schemes (AESs) is often questioned. This paper investigates the drivers of farmers’ decisions as to whether to maintain “proenvironment” practices beyond the duration of a contract, and in particular the effect of social norms. Our results, based on the stated intentions of 395 French farmers, show that both pecuniary and nonpecuniary motivations drive farmers’ decisions, which are also significantly influenced by information about a social norm. Therefore “nudging” farmers, by conveying information to them on other farmers’ proenvironmental practices, appears to be a means of maintaining the long-run benefits of AESs. (JEL Q18, Q28)

Le dispositif des MAEt pour l’enjeu eau: une fausse bonne idée ?

[paper in French] Territorialized agri-environmental measures (MAEt) were introduced in France for the 2007-2013 Common Agricultural Policy program, in order to improve the cost-effectiveness of agri-environmental policies. This paper assesses qualitatively the innovations of MAEt with special attention paid to water pollution issues. We analyze the advantages and limits of the partial decentralization of decision-making in the setting-up of agrienvironmental projects; of improved targeting through the identification of eligible priority areas; and of greater flexibility introduced in the design of agri-environmental contracts. This analysis is illustrated by the results of a survey conducted with farmers in a French sub-region, Eure-et-Loir. This survey helps us to identify the reasons why farmers choose to sign agri-environmental contracts or not. The article concludes with a set of recommendations to improve the French agri-environmental system in the perspective of the 2013 CAP reform.