Laurence D. Smith

Philosophical and psychological epistemologies in behaviorism and behavior therapy

We argue for the following conclusions: (1) that despite what has traditionally been the received view, the epistemology of behaviorism is not similar to, was not historically influenced by, is not consistent with, and therefore does not share a linked fate with, logical positivism; (2) that this tradition of unfortunate exegesis and misattribution is alive and well in that some behavior therapists (e.g., Mahoney, 1989) have tried to construct arguments against radical behaviorism by falsely linking radical behaviorism with certain philosophical positions that they regard as erroneous; (3) that there has been a surprising variety of views on behavior therapys epistemological commitments; (4) that developments within philosophy and philosophy of science, especially by Quine and Popper, are largely in agreement with naturalized psychological epistemologies such as Skinners. Therefore, behavior therapists may not need to rely on philosophy for insights into epistemological questions, but rather may look toward neo-behaviorist theories of knowledge.

Perception of linear and nonlinear trends: using slope and curvature information to make trend discriminations.

This study investigated several factors influencing the perception of nonlinear relationships in time series graphs. To model real-world data, the graphed data represented different underlying trends and included different sample sizes and amounts of variability. Six trends (increasing and decreasing linear, exponential, asymptotic) were presented on four graph types (histogram, line graph, scatterplot, suspended bar graph). The experiment assessed how these factors affect trend discrimination, with the overall goal of judging what types of graphs lead to better discrimination. Six participants (two psychology professors, four psychology graduate students) viewed graphs on a computer screen and identified the underlying trend. All participants were familiar with the types of trends presented and were aware of the purpose of the experiment. Analysis indicated higher accuracy when variability was lower and sample size was higher. Choice accuracy was higher for nonlinear trends and was highest when line graphs were used.

Bringing history to life: simulating landmark experiments in psychology.

The course in history of psychology can be challenging for students, many of whom enter it with little background in history and faced with unfamiliar names and concepts. The sheer volume of material can encourage passive memorization unless efforts are made to increase student involvement. As part of a trend toward experiential history, historians of science have begun to supplement their lectures with demonstrations of classic physics experiments as a way to bring the history of science to life. Here, the authors report on computer simulations of five landmark experiments from early experimental psychology in the areas of reaction time, span of attention, and apparent motion. The simulations are designed not only to permit hands-on replication of historically important results but also to reproduce the experimental procedures closely enough that students can gain a feel for the nature of early research and the psychological processes being studied.

Detection of Sample Differences from Dot Plot Displays

Cleveland and McGill [10] concluded that dot plots are effective when one judges position along a common scale. We assessed the ability of graph readers to detect sample mean differences in multipanel dot plots. In Experiment 1, plots containing vertically arranged panels with different sample sizes and levels of variability were presented. Sensitivity was greater with large samples and low variability. In Experiment 2, sensitivity depended on the location of the comparison sample, with vertical and superimposed arrays yielding greater sensitivity than horizontal or diagonal arrays. Horizontal arrays also produced a bias to judge data in right-most panels as having higher means. Experiment 3 showed that ordering of data had little effect on sensitivity or bias. The results suggest that good graph design requires attention to how the specific features of a graphical format influence perceptual judgments of data

Chapter 1 Historical and philosophical foundations of the problem of meaning

Publisher Summary The chapter discusses the historical and philosophical foundations of the problem of meaning. As a perennially contested topic of deep bearing, the problem of meaning has always called forth and put to the test the most basic, even metaphysical views of human nature and the world, social and physical, in which we operate. And if, in our own time, meaning has proven to be a problem in flux, so too it has been subject all along to shifting interpretations, often radically divergent yet sometimes surprisingly convergent. All of the developments reviewed in this chapter reflect the challenges of the problem of meaning, as well as its perdurance, its continuing immersion in philosophical issues, and perhaps its unusual degree of intractability. But these developments also reveal that every era of attack on the problem has produced valuable new prospects for the pursuit of solutions. There are longstanding and recurrent themata in the human effort to elucidate the semantic triangle of minds, things, and language, and that the effort to do so evinces no foregone conclusions. In renewing and recombining these themata the essays collected in this chapter offer a rich array of promising directions for gaining new insight into one of our cultures most venerable problems.

Making sense of epistemological pluralism: A response to ringen

Behaviorism and Logical Positivism (Smith, 1986) was conceived and written as a work in the history of science. But like many other works of its genre, it tells a story that has implications for the philosophy of science and epistemology. Based on a most perceptive reading of the book, Jon Ringen has spelled out a number of the book’s philosophical implications while raising pointed questions about my own treatment of them in the book’s concluding chapter. In doing so, Ringen has opened more fertile ground than can profitably be cultivated here, but there is still much that can be said to clarify the book’s philosophical import. I begin by commenting on Ringen’s exposCe of Fodor’s critique of behaviorism, and then turn to the larger questions raised by Ringen in regard to the compatibility of pluralistic naturalized epistemologies with genuinely prescriptive epistemic standards. I will conclude by commenting on the implications of this compatibility, specifically on why naturalistic epistemology is likely to remain a pluralistic, relativistic, and unfinished enterprise.

Fodor and the naturalist's problem: A response to Garrett and Graham☆

Garrett and Graham (1986) take up the defense of naturalistic psychology against the peculiar claim of Fodor that naturalistic psychology is a practical impossibility. On the face of it, Fodor’s claim is remarkable to say the least, especially to those who have been under the impression that naturalistic psychology is not only possible but already well under way as a viable enterprise (perhaps even dating back as far as Aristotle). To understand why such a debate should be taking place at all, it will be helpful to get clear on what the naturalist’s problem is, as well as on what Fodor thinks it is. As naturalistic psychology is usually understood, the core problem is to give some systematic account of the interactions between organisms and their environments. This problem can be construed in a number of ways, and attacked accordingly. One can investigate stimuli and responses without explanatory recourse to mental events or constructs, as the behaviorist does. Or if one is disinclined toward strict behaviorism, one can attempt to retain mentalism by somehow identifying mind with the organism-environment interactions themselves (James, Dewey). Or one can even remain a naturalist while going on to posit mental events underlying those interactions. In any case, as long as the focus is on organism+nvironment interactions, the naturalist will aim to provide general statements relating aspects or dimensions of the organism (whether construed as an emitter of responses or as a possessor of mental states) to those of the environment. The whole trick from the naturalist’s perspective is to find those particular aspects or dimensions that yield systematic relationships-in other words, to parse organism and environment in such a way that reliable relationships are revealed. As Skinner has put it, the problem is to find the “natural lines of fracture” along which organism and environment break (1961, p. 347). Generations of naturalistic psychologists have devoted themselves to some version of this task. Being a thoroughly modern mentalist, Fodor poses his own version of the naturalist’s problem. Psychology, for him, is first and foremost a computational psychology of mental states or processes, and any naturalistic psychology will have to shape itself in accordance with this conception. In particular, naturalistic psychology will have to deal with relations between thoughts (construed as propositional attitudes ranging over mental representations) and the objects of