Laurence Thomas

Moral Flourishing in an Unjust World.

Abstract While moral ideals are of the utmost importance, the truth of the matter is that we live in a world that falls considerably short of the ideal. Drawing upon a variety of theoretical considerations from both psychology and philosophy, 1 aim to make explicit some of the concrete steps that can be taken to overcome patterns of injustice. To this end, the ideas of textured affirmation and moral deference are developed.

Morality and a Meaningful Life

Abstract I aim to capture the intuition that the moral person is, in virtue of being such, favored over the immoral person to lead a meaningful life. I argue that the reason for this is that the moral person is open to affirmation from others in a way that the immoral person is not. Central to the argument is the idea of psychological health. Being affirmed by others is a fundamental aspect of being psychologically healthy. Thus, I say that being moral and being psychologically healthy dovetail with respect to leading a meaningful life. With this argument regarding psychological health I draw upon, and extend, P.F. Strawsons seminal essay ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Also in this regard, I extend Wittgensteins argument against the possibility of a private language to social behavior generally.

Virtue ethics and the arc of universality: Reflections on Punzo's reading of Kantian and virtue ethics

Abstract While I agree with Punzos central thesis that virtue ethics is superior to Kantian ethics, the aims of my comments are twofold. On the one hand, I draw attention to some ways in which Punzo overstates the case against Kantian ethics, noting that unattainable ideals as such are no mark against a moral theory. On the other, I build upon Punzos insights in order to bring into sharper focus the superiority of virtue ethics. Accordingly, I distinguish between inter‐species (Kantian ethics) and intra‐species (virtue ethics) morality, maintaining that the former, unlike the latter, invariably proves too wide of the mark.

Must we care about morality

Abstract Moral philosophy is at its best when it takes human psychology seriously. Such are the instincts of Thomas Wren. His engaging book Caring About Morality is an attempt to offer an account of human motivation that is true to human psychology, but which captures the spirit of Kantian morality without Kantian metaphysics. I argue that there are some fundamental psychological considerations which Wren does not take into account, and which are an obstacle to the success of his project. Moral motivation, 1 suggest, is much more tied to the psychological histories of persons than Wren allows.

The character of humanity

Since a genuine expression of appreciation is unequivocally a form of affirmation, then Kong’s view clearly entails that human beings never outgrow their need for affirmation. The profound need for affirmation is one of the fundamental reasons why fitting-in is so characteristic of human beings, even when the fitting-behavior has no advantage whatsoever save that of fitting-in. The case of sagging pants worn by young males, as in the image to the left, is a clear illustration of the point just made. There is simply no advantage whatsoever to wearing such tremendously sagging pants other than the advantage of fitting-in. But, of course, the advantage of fitting-in is hardly trivial. Not at all.

The Character of Friendship

For all the ways in which human beings differ with respect to objectives, practices, and preferences, a striking commonality among human beings is the considerable value that is placed upon friendship. There is every indication that what counts as a good friendship is the same across the globe, even when there are differences owing to societal practices. For example, whether they are female or male, it is commonplace for good friends in France to faire la bise (the kiss on each cheek) as a form of greeting; whereas in other parts of the world, for example, North America, women may greet one another with a ‘peck’ on the cheek but not men.

The matrices of malevolent ideologies: Blacks and Jews

This essay aims to shed some light on the perennial tensions between Blacks and Jews in the United States. Beginning with a brief account of both racism and anti-semitism , I argue that both groups have embraced, if only unwittingly, negative stereotypes concerning the other. I then suggest an innocent confusion that came about during the Civil Rights movement. Finally, I stress the fact that each group must recognize that its suffering, however egregious, does not thereby give it such substantial insight regarding the suffering of the other group that each can understand the other without listening to the other.