Laurent de Briey

Démocratie, réligion et pluralisme

This article makes use of the reading of de Tocqueville put forward by Agnes Antoine in order to think through the link that unites modem democracy and Christianity. Antoine turns to Toqueville to show that democracy arose on the basis of Christian resources and that it must be able to lean on a religious consciousness in order to respond to the existential questioning of citizens. The much more recent analyses by Gauchet of the disenchantment of the world make it possible to render this double thesis more precise and more refined. However, the confrontation of Gauchet with the reading of Tocqueville developed by Antoine leads us above all to realise that the link uniting democracy with a specific religion incites us to inquire into the capacity of democracy to integrate authentic religious pluralism within itself (transl. by J. Dudley).

Reconnaissance et justice. De la normativité de l’amour et de l’estime

Cet article etudie les implications normatives des theories de la reconnaissance qui s’inspirent de la tripartition posee par Axel Honneth de l’amour, du respect et de l’estime. Considerant que les morales universalistes, et les theories de la justice qui leur sont associees, peuvent fournir les principes normatifs du respect du a chaque personne, l’article se centre essentiellement sur les figures de l’amour et de l’estime. Il met en evidence qu’une generalisation des exigences d’universalite et d’egalite a ces deux figures meconnaitrait ce qui les distingue du respect.

L'homoparentalité et la fonction du droit

This article analyses the parliamentary debate that recently took place in Belgium and led to the passing of a proposed law enabling homosexual couples to adopt children. It shows that the richness and diversity of the arguments put forward both by the partisans and the opponents of the proposed law exceed the framework of a liberal conception of law and bring into play axiological convictions. Far from interpreting this phenomenon as the sign of a still insufficient liberalisation of the public sphere, the authors see in it the indication that the function of law in pluralist societies cannot be reduced to the mere preservation of subjective rights, but consists equally in the collective affirmation of the values enlightening human existence. However, this makes it necessary to place in perspective the dominant position of the legislator vis-A-vis the social sphere (transl. by J. Dudley).