Laurent Weill

Banking efficiency in transition economies

An increasing share of the banking sector is controlled by foreign capital in the majority of transition countries. To analyse the effects of this trend on the performance of the banking sector in these countries, this study conducts a comparative analysis of the performance of foreign-owned and domestic-owned banks operating in the Czech Republic and Poland. We use the stochastic frontier approach to compute cost efficiency scores. Following Mester (1996), financial capital is included in the cost frontier model to control for risk preferences. Our finding is that on average foreign-owned banks are more efficient than domestic-owned banks. We conclude, however, that this advantage does not result from differences in the scale of operations or the structure of activities.

Convergence in Banking Efficiency across European Countries

Since the preparation of the Single Market program in the 80s, financial integration in Europe has been expected to provide gains in growth by favoring competition and efficiency on financial markets. Our paper aims to check whether financial integration has taken place on the banking markets, by investigating the convergence in banking efficiency for European Union countries. We measure cost efficiency of banks from 10 EU countries between 1994 and 2005 with the stochastic frontier approach. Our work then constitutes the first one to apply tests of β and σ convergence specified for panel data on banking efficiency measures. We provide evidence of cross-country differences in cost efficiency and of an improvement in cost efficiency for all EU countries. Tests of convergence support the view of a process in convergence in cost efficiency between EU countries. Robustness checks with alternative specifications confirm these findings. These results support the view that financial integration has taken place on the EU banking markets in the recent years.

Are Private Banks More Efficient than Public Banks? Evidence from Russia

We study whether bank efficiency is related to bank ownership in Russia. We find that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks and - surprisingly - that domes-tic private banks are not more efficient than domestic public banks. These results are not driven by the choice of production process, the banks environment, managements risk preferences. the banks activity mix or size, or the econometric approach. The evidence in fnicl suggests that domestic public banks arc more efficient than domestic private banks and that the efficiency gap between these two ownership types did not narrow after the introduction of deposit insurance in 2004. This may be due to increased switching costs or to the moral hazard effects of deposit insurance. The policy conclusion is that the efficiency of the Russian banking system may benefit more from increased levels of competition and greater access of foreign banks than from bank privatization. JEL classification: G21; P30; P34; P52 Keywords: Bank efficiency; state ownership; foreign ownership; Russia

Are private banks more efficient than public banks

We study whether bank efficiency is related to bank ownership in Russia. We find that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks and, surprisingly, that domestic private banks are not more efficient than domestic public banks. These results are not driven by the choice of production process, the bank’s environment, management’s risk preferences, the bank’s activity mix or size, the econometric approach, or the introduction of deposit insurance. The policy conclusion is that the efficiency of the Russian banking system may benefit more from increased levels of competition and greater access of foreign banks than from bank privatization.

The Influence of Bank Ownership on Credit Supply: Evidence from the Recent Financial Crisis

This study examines how bank ownership influenced the credit supply during the recent financial crisis in Russia, where the banking sector consists of a mix of state-controlled banks, foreign-owned banks, and domestic private banks. To estimate credit supply changes, we apply an original approach based on stochastic frontier analysis. We use quarterly data for Russian banks covering the period from the beginning of 2007 to the end of 2009. Our findings suggest that bank ownership affected credit supply during the financial crisis and that the crisis led to an overall decrease in the credit supply. Relative to domestic private banks foreign-owned banks reduced their credit supply more and state-controlled banks less. This supports the hypothesis that foreign banks have a “lack of loyalty” to domestic actors during a crisis, as well as the view that an objective function of state-controlled banks leads them to support the economy during economic downturns.

Market power in the russian banking industry

The aim of this paper is to analyze bank competition in Russia by measuring the market power of Russian banks and its determinants over the period 2001-2006 with the Lerner index. We find that bank competition has only slightly improved during the period studied. The mean Lerner index for Russian banks is of the same magnitude as those observed in developed countries, which suggests that the Russian banking industry is not plagued by weak competition. Furthermore, we find no greater market power for state-controlled banks nor less market power for foreign-owned banks. Finally, our analysis of the determinants of market power enables the identification of several factors that influence competition, including market concentration and risk as well as the nonlinear influence of size.

How Market Power Influences Bank Failures: Evidence from Russia

There has been a notable debate in the banking literature on the impact of bank competition on financial stability. While the dominant view sees a detrimental impact of competition on the stability of banks, this view has recently been challenged by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) who see the reverse effect. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this literature by providing the first empirical investigation of the role of bank competition on the occurrence of bank failures. We analyze this issue based on a large sample of Russian banks over the period 2001-2007 and employ the Lerner index as the metric of bank competition. The Russian banking industry is a unique example of an emerging market which has undergone a large number of bank failures during the last decade. Our findings clearly support the view that tighter bank competition is detrimental for financial stability. This result is robust to tests controlling for the measurement of market power, the definition of bank failure, the set of control variables, and the particular linear specification of the relationship. The normative implication of our findings is therefore that measures that increase bank competition could undermine financial stability.

Is Corruption an Efficient Grease

This paper tests whether corruption may be an efficient grease in the wheels of an otherwise deficient institutional framework. It analyzes the interaction between aggregate efficiency, corruption, and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 69 countries, both developed and developing. Using two measures of corruption and two other aspects of governance, we observe that corruption is less detrimental to efficiency in countries where institutions are less effective. It may even be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are extremely ineffective. We thus find evidence for the “grease the wheels” hypothesis in its weak and strong forms.

Does Competition Influence Bank Failures

There has been a notable debate in the banking literature on the impact of bank competition on financial stability. The aim of this article is to provide the first investigation of the role of bank competition on the occurrence of bank failures. We analyse this issue on a large sample of Russian banks for the period 2001–2007, as the Russian banking industry is a unique example of an emerging market which has undergone a large number of bank failures during the last decade. Our findings support the view that tighter bank competition enhances the occurrence of bank failures. Thus, measures that increase bank competition could undermine financial stability.

Does Corruption Hamper Bank Lending? Macro and Micro Evidence

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of corruption in bank lending. Corruption is expected to hamper bank lending, as it is closely related to legal enforcement, which has been shown to promote banks’ willingness to lend. Nevertheless the similarities between the consequences for bank lending of law enforcement and corruption are misleading, as they consider only judiciary corruption. Corruption can also occur in lending and may then be beneficial for bank lending via bribes given by borrowers to enhance their chances of receiving loans. This assumption may be validated particularly in the presence of pronounced risk aversion by banks, resulting in greater reluctance on the part of banks to grant loans. We perform country-level and bank-level estimations to investigate these assumptions. Corruption reduces bank lending in both sets of estimations. However, bank-level estimations show that the detrimental effect of corruption is reduced when bank risk aversion increases, even leading at times to situations wherein corruption fosters bank lending. Additional controls show that corruption does not increase bank credit by favoring only bad loans. Therefore, our findings show that while the overall effect of corruption is to hamper bank lending, it can alleviate firm’s financing obstacles.