Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik

The Life Cycle of Party Manifestos: The Austrian Case

Election manifestos are one of the most prominent sources of data for the study of party politics and government. Yet the processes of manifesto production, enactment, and public reception are not very well understood. This article attempts to narrow this knowledge gap by conducting a first investigation into the ‘life cycle’ of election manifestos from the drafting stage to their use in the campaign and post-election periods. Specifically, it investigates the Austrian case between 1945 and 2008 (with special emphasis on the 1990s and 2000s), employing a wealth of qualitative and quantitative data. While the research is thus mostly exploratory, it develops systematic expectations about variation between parties according to their ideology, organisation, government status, and characteristics of their electorates across the stages of the manifesto life cycle. Of those factors, organisational characteristics and status as government or opposition parties were found to be relevant.

Coalition Policy-Making under Constraints: Examining the Role of Preferences and Institutions

While much has been written about the formation and termination of coalitions, comparatively little attention has been paid to the policy output of multiparty governments. The present study attempts to narrow this research gap by analysing policy-making in three Austrian coalition governments between 1999 and 2008. Drawing on the party mandate literature, a manually coded textual analysis of election manifestos is conducted that yields a dataset containing over 1,100 pledges. The fulfilment of these pledges is taken as the dependent variable in a multivariate analysis. The results indicate that institutional determinants (adoption in the coalition agreement, ministerial control, and policy status quo) significantly influence the chances of pledge fulfilment and thus present a powerful predictor of coalition policy output. By contrast, factors related to parties’ preferences (consensus between parties, policy distance, pledge saliency, and majority support in parliament) do not have an impact.

The Politics of Patronage and Coalition: How Parties Allocate Managerial Positions in State-Owned Enterprises

While commonly regarded as a democratic pathology, party patronage can also be understood as an inherent feature of party government and thus as a linkage mechanism between political parties and the government executive. Therefore, theories of government formation, portfolio allocation and coalition governance can potentially add analytical leverage to the study of party patronage. Starting from this presumption, this article derives a number of hypotheses from the field of coalition theory and tests them on an original data set of over 2,000 appointments made to managerial boards in 92 Austrian state-owned enterprises between 1995 and 2010. The empirical analysis strongly supports the hypotheses, showing that patronage appointments vary with the partisan composition of government, the allocation of portfolios and junior ministers, as well as the importance of corporations.

Intra-party democracy, political performance and the survival of party leaders Austria, 1945–2011

Political parties are central to modern democracy and the selection of their leaders is one of the most crucial decisions for any political party to make. Yet, the analysis of party leadership survival is still in its infancy. The pioneering research has been confined to few countries and decades and has focused exclusively on performance-related explanations. While performance is an obvious determinant of party leader survival, generations of research on party organizations suggest that intra-party factors should matter, too. We argue that, while the political performance of a party leader (winning elections, securing government participation) is important, intra-party support and the rules of leadership selection add substantively to our understanding of why party leaders survive or fall. We test these expectations on a new dataset covering all leaders of Austrian parties between 1945 and 2011. The results of our statistical analysis support our claim and show that intra-party factors have a considerable impact on party leader survival.

Credibility Versus Control Agency Independence and Partisan Influence in the Regulatory State

There is a natural tension between theories of party government and theories of regulatory politics. Whereas effective party government requires that politicians have firm control over public policy, the need for credible commitment in regulation stipulates that policy-making capacities are delegated to independent agencies. While the theoretical dimension of this tension is well established, there is little research that examines its empirical implications. To narrow this gap, the analysis assesses whether legal agency independence limits the influence of parties on agency executives. To that end, it investigates the careers of 300 CEOs in 100 West European regulatory agencies. The analysis shows that high levels of agency independence protect appointees with opposition ties from early removal. This presents some of the first evidence to suggest that the institutional response to credibility pressures limits the political use of the appointment channel and, thus, has the potential to constrain party control in regulatory politics.

Explaining coalition-bargaining outcomes: Evidence from Austria, 2002–2008

Most analyses of policy outcomes from coalition-bargaining have hitherto been conducted within a spatial framework that requires the aggregation of coalition policy into a small number of point estimates. Such an approach, however, is limited in terms of the level of specificity at which it can operate. This article therefore draws on the methodology from the pledge fulfilment literature in order to provide a more in-depth examination of coalition-bargaining outcomes. We are thus able to take advantage of the fact that contemporary coalition agreements provide a wealth of detailed information on the government’s prospective course of policy action. Based on a quantitative text analysis of election manifestos, a dataset of over 1,000 election pledges is used to test a number of hypotheses on the adoption of policies in Austrian coalition agreements between 2002 and 2008. The multivariate models yield strong support for the hypotheses and suggest that the methodological approach has the potential to enhance our understanding of coalition-bargaining.

Beyond salience and position taking: How political parties communicate through their manifestos

This article examines aspects of election manifestos that are largely ignored by extant manifesto-based studies focusing on issue saliencies and policy positions. Drawing on the literatures on negative campaigning, retrospective voting, party mandates and personalization, we develop a scheme of categories that allows for the analysis of attacks on competitors, references to a party’s track record, subjective and objective policy pledges and the prominence of party leaders in manifestos. We also show that these elements are present in manifestos of major European parties. The relevance of these categories, we argue, should be influenced by a party’s status in government or opposition, its ideology, its size, the relative popularity of party leaders and the occurrence of early elections. Our systematic examination of 46 Austrian election manifestos produced between 1986 and 2013 demonstrates that many of these expectations are supported by the evidence. Most notably, it emerges that government and opposition parties write manifestos that differ with respect to all of the five characteristics analysed. This suggests that there are systematic differences between government and opposition party manifestos that should be taken into consideration by scholars engaged in manifesto-based research.

The Contingent Nature of Local Party System Nationalisation: The Case of Austria 1985–2009

Abstract Previous studies have found that Austria has one of the most nationalized party systems in Western Europe. Using local election data from over 2300 municipalities between 1985 and 2009, we show that nationalisation of the party system varies considerably across regions. We demonstrate that variation in the organisational strength of regional party branches accounts for this finding, even when controlling for municipality size and the time dimension.

How Women's Political Representation affects Spending on Family Benefits

Recent research finds that womens political representation correlates with higher social expenditures. This paper makes two more specific predictions regarding family benefits. First, women voters and politicians are likely to prefer in-kind benefits to cash transfers. This is because the provision of childcare does more than money can do to ameliorate the double burden of work and family duties, thus strengthening womens autonomy. As a consequence female political representation should correlate with spending on in-kind family benefits, but not with expenditures on cash transfers. Second, the pressure on politicians to provide childcare services should be greater when there are higher levels of female participation in the labour force. Assuming that women politicians are more responsive to such demands, we should see a positive interaction effect between female labour force participation and womens political representation on in-kind spending. An analysis of public expenditures for family benefits in 27 OECD nations between 1980 and 2011 bears out both propositions.

Negative Campaigning and the Logic of Retaliation in Multiparty Competition

The extant literature has demonstrated that the logic of retaliation is a core feature of negative campaigning. Attacks by one side induce counterattacks by the other. Yet most research on the interactive nature of negative campaigning is limited to two-party competition and provides little theoretical justification for why political actors should respond to attacks with counterattacks. The present paper addresses these research gaps. We argue that the negativity bias in human information processing and the zero-sum nature of elections make retaliation a rational strategy. Importantly, these arguments also imply that retaliation may not be the only plausible response to attacks in multiparty systems. Rather, parties may prefer to react to attacks from one competitor by attacking another. To grasp empirically how being attacked and attacking are related, we conduct a highly disaggregated time series analysis of such instances while controlling for other factors that may influence actor behavior. Our analyses draw on several thousand party press releases issued during three national election campaigns in Austria, a typical European multiparty system. They show that retaliation is an important strategy also in multiparty politics. Yet in such context, parties do not exclusively follow a tit-for-tat approach but rather display more complex patterns of attack behavior.