Laurie Nathan

Domestic Instability and Security Communities

The problem of political instability is neglected in the literature on security communities. In this article I argue that domestic stability, defined as the absence of large-scale violence in a country, is a necessary condition of these communities. Domestic violence precludes the existence of security communities because it renders people and states insecure; it creates the risk of cross-border destabilization and violence; and it generates uncertainty and tension among states, inhibiting trust and a sense of collective identity. I conclude that the benchmark of a security community—dependable expectations of peaceful change—should apply as much within states as between them. This is consistent with the work of Karl Deutsch, whose pioneering concept of a security community is widely understood to mean the absence of interstate war. Deutsch, in fact, was equally concerned with large-scale internal violence.

SADC's Uncommon Approach to Common Security, 1992–2003

This article describes and explains the Southern African Development Communitys difficulty in establishing a common security regime and its failure to play a useful peacemaking role. The malaise is attributed to three major problems: the absence of common values among member states, which inhibits the development of trust, common policies, institutional cohesion and unified responses to crises; the reluctance of states to surrender sovereignty to a security regime that encompasses binding rules and decision-making; and the economic and administrative weakness of states. These are all national problems that cannot be solved at the regional level. Paradoxically, the challenge of common security in southern Africa is less a regional than a national challenge.

Community of insecurity : SADC's struggle for peace and security in Southern Africa

Contents: Introduction The formation of SADC and the era of hope The stuggle to establish SADCs security architecture Failed peacemaking in Southern Africa Explaining the failure of the organ The fiction of Southern Africa as an emerging security community Conclusion References Index.

Civil War Settlements and the Prospects for Peace

In “Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?” Monica Duffy Toft questions whether policymakers are correct to have a strong preference for terminating civil wars through negotiated settlements.1 Her main endeavor is to undertake a statistical analysis that compares the effect of negotiated settlements, military victories, and ceaseares/stalemates on war recurrence and on the state’s level of democracy and economic growth. With respect to war recurrence, which is the focus of this letter, she ands that negotiated settlements are largely ineffective, that civil wars ending in military victory by one side are less likely to recur, and that rebel victories produce the most durable settlements (pp. 7–8). Toft’s purpose is not only to understand these phenomena but also to provide policymakers with guidance (p. 22). She recommends that third parties should pay greater attention to security-sector reform (SSR) during negotiations, leading to settlements that can credibly guarantee both beneats from cooperation and harm from defection; failing that, support in pursuit of victory, especially rebel victory, may be a worthy objective for policymakers (p. 36). Given that the stakes and risks of external intervention in a civil war are high, it is worth reoecting on the merits of Toft’s results and recommendations. I suggest below that her andings on war recurrence and the stability of rebel victories are not dependable and helpful for policy purposes. Advice to policymakers on war termination ought to be based on case studies that explore causal relationships and examine the role actually played by policymakers in seeking to end civil wars.

The Failure of the Darfur Mediation

Abstract In late 2005 the African Union convened peace talks aimed at ending the conflict in Darfur. In May 2006 the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed by the Sudanese Government and one rebel faction, but rejected by the other rebel groups. It did not achieve peace and in certain respects it heightened the conflict, partly because it was the product of a deeply flawed process: the Sudanese parties were unwilling to engage in negotiations and failed to forge agreements; the African Union and its international partners, desperate for a quick accord, pursued a counter-productive strategy of deadline diplomacy; and the mediators were consequently unable to undertake effective mediation. The talks demonstrated that the acceptability and legitimacy of a peace agreement depend not only on its content but also on the process by which it is prepared and concluded.

The African Union and regional organisations in Africa: communities of insecurity

Abstract This article refutes the claim by Benedikt Franke, in his book Security cooperation in Africa: a reappraisal, that growing institutionalised security cooperation among African states has given rise to the emergence of security communities on the continent. Most African states and people do not have dependable expectations of peaceful change, which is the benchmark of a security community. Franke concentrates on the formal security agreements and mechanisms of the African Union and the regional organisations in Africa without taking proper account of the conduct of states and the reality of violence and chronic insecurity that afflict millions of people. The agreements and mechanisms are themselves predicated on expectations of violence. The AU and the regional organisations are thus best characterised as communities of insecurity.

AFRICOM: A Threat to Africa's Security

James Forest and Rebecca Crispin seek to explain a significant problem confronting the newly established United States Unified Command for Africa (AFRICOM): the official purpose of the initiative is to assist Africans to address their security needs but the response of Africans has been largely hostile. Forest and Crispin attribute the negative reaction to weak planning, unrealistic timelines, a failure to consult Africans about AFRICOM, and poor communication about the aims and orientation of the command. The lack of proper consultation and communication led to misperceptions and mistrust among Africans. Forest and Crispin conclude that what is required now is a robust strategic communications effort that includes extensive consultation and public diplomacy. This would help to provide a clear vision of AFRICOM, allay the misgivings and enable the command to transcend its inauspicious debut. Forest and Crispin do not capture adequately the African concerns about AFRICOM. If one takes serious account of these concerns, it appears that the authors have misdiagnosed the causes of the problem and that their optimism about AFRICOM’s future prospects is misplaced. The adverse response to the US Department of Defense initiative was not simply due to poor planning, weak communication, and resultant misunderstandings. More fundamentally, it reflects a deep-rooted anti-imperialist posture that is grounded in the historical and contemporary realities of African politics and US foreign policy. It will not be overcome through a communications strategy, no matter how well resourced and sophisticated. The anti-imperialist stance derives from many sources. Chief among them are the liberation struggles against colonialism, Washington’s unsympathetic attitude to the liberation movements, its embrace of dictators in Africa and Latin America during the Cold War, its unwavering support for Israel despite the illegal occupation of Palestine, its exceptionalism in relation to the International Criminal Court, and its long history of unilateralism, aggression, and disdain for international law. Under the Bush administration these trends were reinforced in dramatic fashion by the unlawful invasion of Iraq and the travesty of Guantanamo Bay. The conclusion is that the US has no firm commitment to human rights, pursues its own interests at the expense of others, and is willing to deploy force offensively to advance those interests. The spectre of Empire looms ever large. Forest and Crispin are aware of these dynamics but underestimate their import. The authors note briefly that perceptions of American foreign policy towards Africa are framed by history and actions elsewhere. They point out that from the 1960s through to the 1990s the US provided financial and military aid to corrupt and brutal regimes and that unilateral American interventions in Iraq and other

Power, security and regional conflict management in Southern Africa and South Asia

This article explores the ways in which hegemony and power impact on the emergence, development and conflict management function of regional organizations. It compares the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), both of which include a strong regional power. These powers have contrasting postures: South Africa is a keen regionalist, a reluctant hegemon and a pacific power, whereas India is a keen hegemon, a reluctant regionalist and a militarist power. The presence of the hegemon has stimulated regionalism in Southern Africa but retarded regionalism in South Asia. Despite these differences, SADC and SAARC have similarly failed to manage regional conflict effectively. This has been due in large measure to the conflictual relationship between the hegemon and another powerful state in each region, Zimbabwe in the case of South Africa, and Pakistan in the case of India. Some of these dynamics are well explained by neorealist theory, but other dynamics are best explained by constructivist and liberal positions. This supports the argument by Katzenstein and Okawara (2001–2002) that in the field of international relations an eclectic analytical approach is required to comprehend complex processes that combine material, ideational, international, domestic, contemporary and historical factors.

Africa's early warning system: An emperor with no clothes?

The author provides a critique of Africas efforts to put in place early warning systems to guard against the outbreak of deadly conflicts. The article looks at current efforts by the African Union to establish the Continental Early Warning System and examines some of the critical factors that will determine the systems effectiveness.

Synopsis of Community of Insecurity : SADC’s struggle for peace and security in southern Africa

This article presents a synopsis of Community of insecurity: SADCs struggle for peace and security in southern Africa, published by Ashgate in 2012. It focuses on SADCs efforts to establish a common security regime; conflict and peacemaking in southern Africa between 1992 and 2011; and the prospects of SADC becoming a security community. It summarises the reasons for SADCs difficulties in the sphere of regional security and politics, namely the weakness of member states, their unwillingness to surrender sovereignty to communal mechanisms, and the absence of common values among them. The main conclusion is that these problems lie primarily at the national level and cannot be solved at the regional level. SADC is a forum of states and it cannot do anything that these states will not permit it to do.