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international conference on artificial intelligence and law | 1991

More IA needed in AI: interpretation assistance for coping with the problem of multiple structural interpretations

Layman E. Allen; Charles S. Saxon

Legal rules are characteristically suseptiple to multiple structural interpretations, but current legal expert systems embody only one of the many possible interpretations. One approach to coping with this problem of multiple structural interpretations is by interpretation assistance (IA) systems. A prototype IA system called MULTINT is described and illustrated in this article.


international conference on artificial intelligence and law | 1995

Better language, better thought, better communication: the A-Hohfeld language for legal analysis

Layman E. Allen; Charles S. Saxon

A-HOHFELD is a representational language used in MINT (Multiple INTerpretation) Interpretation-Assistance (expert) systems for precisely expressing alternative structural interpretations of sets of legal rules. It draws heavily upon the timlamental legal conceptions formulated by Wesley N. HoMeld at the dawn of the Twentieth Century. In the current version of AHOHFELD the original conceptions have been modified and extended in seeking to define a language sufficiently robust to express all LEGAL RELATIONS and all changes in legal states of affairs. Hohfeld emphasized the use of fundamental legal conceptions in the analysis of judicial reasoning, elsewhere we have shown the use of A-HOHFELD for the analysis of sets of statutory rules, and here we illustrate its use in thinking about legal doctrine. This use of A-HOHFELD is offered as a possible example of where fluency in a more precise and complete language might have facilitated an earlier recognition of remedial alternatives that have apparently only recently been appearing in legal literature and judicial decisions. To the extent that AHOHFELD so strengthens legal analysis, it farther exemplifies how work on problems of artificial intelligence in computer science tiuittidly feeds back to law and illustrates how precision in language contributes to thought as well as communication.


Simulation & Gaming | 1978

What Counts Is How the Game Is Scored: One Way to Increase Achievement in Learning Mathematics

Layman E. Allen; Gloria Jackson; Joan Ross; Stuart White

Pior investigation indicates that instructional gaming can be an effective tool for enhancing both motivation and achievement in the learning of mathematics. This study explores the extent to which the effectiveness of instructional gaming in facilitating the learning of specific mathematical ideas can be increased by incorporating devices that channel learners’ attention upon those ideas. In particular, the effect of channeling attention by changing the method of scoring is explored.


deontic logic in computer science | 1996

From the Fundamental Legal Conceptions of Hohfeld to Legal Relations: Refining the Enrichment of Solely Deontic Legal Relations

Layman E. Allen

The Hohfeldian fundamental legal conceptions that deal with solely deontic LEGAL RELATIONS, the duty/privilege and right/no-right pairs, require not only an adequate definition of agency for the person who is obligated or permitted to act, but also the same of patiency for the person to-or-for whom that action is directed. Person-i’s DUTY to see-to-it-that that state-of-affairs-s is so for the benefit of person-j is defined here in terms of a deontic OBLIGATION operation and DONE-BY (D2) and DONE-FOR (D4) relations between a state of affairs and persons. This paper is a refinement of the author’s earlier efforts to modify, extend, and enrich Hohfeld’s fundamental legal conceptions into a more general notion of LEGAL RELATIONS (defined concepts are expressed in all capital letters.) In particular, the agency concept of DONE-BY is being brought into closer conformity with Belnap’s emerging stit logic, with the modifications of deontic logic accompanying such changes. The S4–D2 action modal logic considered here is intended to be a part of the A-HOHFELD logic in which LEGAL RELATIONS are defined and from which a representation language called the A-HOHFELD language is derived. The A-HOHFELD language is being used as a representation language for constructing MINT (Multiple INTerpretation) interpretation-assistance systems for helping lawyers to detect alternative structural interpretations of sets of legal rules.


international conference on artificial intelligence and law | 1997

Achieving fluency in modernized and formalized Hohfeld: puzzles and games for the LEGAL RELATIONS Language

Layman E. Allen; Charles S. Saxon

A significant refinement has been made in the AHOHFELD representation language, linlciig it realistically to decisions being made in the legal system, and it has been renamed to become the LEGAL RELATIONS Language. Similar changes have been made in the underlying AHOHFELD logic, which has become the Logic of LEGAL RELATIONS. A series of 27 puzzles and games, designed to enable legal problem solvers to become fluent in the LEGAL RELATIONS Language, are described and illustrated briefly in this article. More detailed presentation of the Play-A-Round puzzles and the Clever Plaintiff and the Legal Argument games are available at Internet site: http://thinkers.law.umich.edu.


International Journal of Mathematical Education in Science and Technology | 1975

Instructional gaming as a means to achieve skill in selecting ideas relevant for solving a problem

Layman E. Allen; Joan Ross

Two pilot studies investigated the effects of using IMP (Instructional Mathematics Play) kits, pamphlets with which individuals may play the mathematical game EQUATIONS against a computer programme. The highly‐branched 105‐kit series presents a total of 21 mathematical ideas ‐‐ five versions of each idea. Twenty‐nine junior high school students in a high‐ability mathematics class completed varying numbers of the kits in five 48 min sessions during a 2 week period; 10 junior high school mathematics teachers in a leadership training programme worked through the entire series at their individual paces during a 21/2 month period. Pre‐ and post‐tests focusing on the IMP kit ideas were designed by the investigators to evaluate the subjects’ abilities to detect the relevance of a particular idea for purposes of solving a problem and to evaluate a mathematical expression involving that idea. On the relevance/selecting pre‐test the students achieved solutions to 3.86 (mean) of the 21 problems; teachers achieved so...


international conference on artificial intelligence and law | 1999

Application of enriched deontic legal relations: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7(a), pleadings

Layman E. Allen; Charles S. Saxon

Deontic LEGAL RELATIONS are quantified OBLIGATION or PERMISSION statements in the Logic of LEGAL RELATIONS. Such LEGAL RELATIONS stem from Hohfelds right-duty-privilege-no-right set of fundamental legal conceptions. The four Hohfeldian roots are enriched by more detailed specification in terms of quantifier, deontic, action and temporal logics. The 1600 enriched deontic LEGAL RELATIONS defined in the Logic of LEGAL RELATIONS are both more specific and more discriminating than their Hohfeldian predecessors. A brief summary is presented of the 800 active enriched deontic LEGAL RELATIONS along with other parts of the LEGAL RELATIONS Language involved in the analysis of the important Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Civic Procedure dealing with pleadings.


Logic in the Theory and Practice of Lawmaking | 2015

Modern Logic as a Tool for Remedying Ambiguities in Legal Documents and Analyzing the Structure of Legal Documents’ Contained Definitions

Layman E. Allen; Leon J. Lysaght

There are three forms of indeterminacy in legal documents (statutes, constitutions, regulations, contracts, briefs, forms and other): (1) ambiguity , (2) scope of reference , and (3) vagueness . The first two, ambiguity and scope of reference indeterminacies, can be avoided – and should be. The third, vagueness , is inevitable, but its scope can be managed. For example, “giving notice” can be required in 24 hours, 30 days, one year or in a timely fashion. The solution of the drafters, for example, of the Uniform Commercial Code (of the United States) was “seasonable notice”. So, sometimes deliberate vagueness is the course of wisdom and preferred choice.The First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 9-608 of the Uniform Commercial Code contain various ambiguities and indefiniteness in scope of reference that are analyzed here in detail along with our proposed resolutions.


American Behavioral Scientist | 1963

Automation: Substitute and Supplement in Legal Practice:

Layman E. Allen

T t i o i i of a legal system consists of the processing of information. The liuman beings involved transmit message in oral, written, or some other form. Recipients process the information they acquire from messages received. This processing may result in tlie generation of some further niessages, or it may result in some other kind of act by the recipient. Tlie cycle of generating messages and processing information in a legal contest typically involves many persons and forms a complex communications network wliicli operates more or less coiitinuously tliroughout some specified period of time. In all legal systems today, virtually all of this processing is done “nianually,” in contrast with “automatically” by means of some mechanical or electronic device (altliougli it is somewhat of a mystery \vhy this characterization “by hand” appears so frequently in Itlie literature on information retrieval, rather than, for esample, “by head”). It is evident that some of the kinds of information-processing that humans do can be more effectively and more efficiently done by data processing’ machines. Nobody can reasonably dispute today, for example, that a moden1 computer far outdistances a human in its capacity to perform rapidly and accurately a complex series of mathematical operations with respect to a large collection of data. On tlic other Iiand, it is also evident that (a t least at the present stage of developof computer technology) there are some kinds of information-processing tasks that are better done by humans than by machines. And some of us are prepared to argue that sonic of the most important OF such tasks will probably continue to be better done by Iiumaii beings-for esample, making decisions in disputes that involve important human values and competing community policies. IIonever, it is well for all concerned to be realistic and realize that the class of things that machines can do better than men is ever nden ing -and a t an estraordinary pace. \Ve may still be on the thrcshhold of tlie revolution in information technology that began less than two dccades ago.


international conference on artificial intelligence and law | 2007

NewMINT interpretation assistance system: United States Constitution First Amendment's initial 1344 interpretations

Layman E. Allen; Adam W. Tury

In this paper, we describe and illustrate a new refinement in the MINT (Multiple INTerpretation) Assistance System that has Arrow Diagrams in the left margin of interpretations of legal text that indicates the sentential logical relationships of the constituent sentences of the interpretations. The new version is called NewMINT. An example of the use of NewMINT is presented in detail with respect to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. For the seven ambiguities detected in the text of the one-sentence First Amendment, a total of 1344 different interpretations are constructed by NewMINT. By responding to seven questions about the ambiguities detected, readers can generate short-names for and full text of their own interpretations presented in Normalized Form in the language of LEGAL RELATIONS. An example of NewMINT output is presented by the complete Arrow Diagram and structured interpretation of retired Judge William A. Norris of the Ninth Circuit.

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Charles S. Saxon

Eastern Michigan University

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Joan Ross

University of Michigan

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Robert W. Allen

Nova Southeastern University

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Linda M. Bangert

Mental Health Research Institute

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Mitchell J. Rycus

Mental Health Research Institute

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