Lee Pinkowitz

The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings

Abstract We examine the determinants and implications of holdings of cash and marketable securities by publicly traded U.S. firms in the 1971–1994 period. In time-series and cross-section tests, we find evidence supportive of a static tradeoff model of cash holdings. In particular, firms with strong growth opportunities and riskier cash flows hold relatively high ratios of cash to total non-cash assets. Firms that have the greatest access to the capital markets, such as large firms and those with high credit ratings, tend to hold lower ratios of cash to total non-cash assets. At the same time, however, we find evidence that firms that do well tend to accumulate more cash than predicted by the static tradeoff model where managers maximize shareholder wealth. There is little evidence that excess cash has a large short-run impact on capital expenditures, acquisition spending, and payouts to shareholders. The main reason that firms experience large changes in excess cash is the occurrence of operating losses.

Cash Stockpiles and Investment: Do Cash-Rich Firms Use Cash in Acquisitions?

U.S. firms are hoarding a

Do U.S. Firms Hold More Cash

2 trillion cash stockpile which many believe will spur acquisition activity. In light of this fact, we examine whether cash-rich firms actually use their cash when making acquisitions. Surprisingly, we show that firms in the top third of cash holdings are 45% more likely to use stock versus cash in acquisitions, vis-a-vis other firms. Additionally, cash-rich firms both make fewer all-cash bids and use a lower proportion of cash in mixed bids. We investigate this phenomenon further and show that cash-rich firms are more likely to use equity as the method of payment when they are overvalued. Moreover, there is no evidence that cash rich firms waste their cash on acquisitions; cash-rich firms that pay with cash actually acquire undervalued firms. Finally, in the post-acquisition period, cash-rich firms that acquire with stock are at least as likely to maintain high levels of excess cash as non-bidder cash-rich firms. Overall, the evidence implies that the link between cash stockpiles and cash acquisitions is not as obvious as commonly believed.

Why are Cash-Rich Firms More Likely to Pay for Acquisitions with Stock?

Using medians, U.S. firms do not hold more cash than similar foreign firms, irrespective of whether the foreign firms come from countries with good investor protection or not. With means, they do. The means, in contrast to the medians, are affected by U.S. multinationals. U.S. multinationals with high R&D expenditures hold 38.7% more cash than comparable foreign firms, but there is evidence that these high cash holdings may result more from high R&D expenditures than from multinationality. The crisis leaves only small traces in the recent cash holdings of firms. Firms throughout the world decreased their cash holdings during the crisis and replenished their cash holdings afterwards as expected with the precautionary motive for cash holdings. However, U.S. firms hold more cash than firms from countries where the stock market fell less during the crisis. There is no evidence that the determinants of cash holdings changed from before the crisis to after the crisis.

The Staggers Act and Firm Performance: Long-Run Evidence

We examine why cash-rich firms prefer to use stock to make acquisitions. Consistent with prior literature, we find that cash-rich firms are more likely to attempt acquisitions than other firms. However, cash-rich acquirers are more likely to employ stock as the method of payment. We investigate this finding further and show that cash-rich firms use overvalued equity to make acquisitions. Moreover, there is no evidence that firms waste excess cash on acquisitions; cash-rich firms that pay with cash actually acquire undervalued firms. Finally, in the post-acquisition period, cash-rich firms that acquire with stock are at least as likely to maintain high levels of excess cash as non-bidder cash-rich firms.

Does the Contribution of Corporate Cash Holdings and Dividends to Firm Value Depend on Governance? A Cross-country Analysis

Abstract One of the primary purposes of the Staggers Act of 1980 was to increase the profitability of the railroad industry. The paper examines the industry’s financial performance from 1963 to 2013 and provides evidence that railroads outperformed most other industries from pre- to post-deregulation using accounting-based measures. However, using a market-based measure, the railroad industry underperforms two-thirds of industries. Additionally, the post-Staggers accounting performance improvements were not at the expense of firms from commodity groups that are reliant on rail transportation. Importantly, there exists considerable skewness and heterogeneity across measures, which affects the effectiveness of inferences that are based on the mean of the distribution to reflect economic reality.