Leon D. Epstein

Voters begin to choose : from closed-class to open elections in Britain

Introduction Facing The Future Opening up Electoral Competition The Multiplicity of Parties in Britain Testing the Closed-Class Model of Voting Expanding the Analysis of Social Structure Restructuring the Electorate Discontinuity in Political Socialization Learning Through a Lifetime Are we all Alliance Nowadays?

Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and Their Political Consequences.

Contributors Preface Glossary 1. Introduction Vernon Bogdanor 2. Elections and electoral systems: choices and alternatives Richard Rose 3. Variants of the Westminster model David Butler 4. France David Goldey and Philip Williams 5. Germany Peter Pulzer 6. Italy Christopher Seton-Watson 7. Scandinavia Bo Sarlvik 8. Benelux Dick Leonard 9. The Republic of Ireland Paul McKee 10. Greece Richard Clogg 11. Japan J. A. A. Stockwin 12. The European Parliament Michael Steed 13. Conclusion: electoral systems and party systems Vernon Bogdanor Index.

What Happened to the British Party Model

Admired during much of this century, the British party model became especially attractive to American political scientists seeking responsible-party government in the early postwar years. After the mid-1960s, the models appeal declined as did Britains national status and the hopes for the democratic socialism often associated with the model. In the 1970s, the model itself seems to have worked in a way unlike that of prior decades. From this intellectual case history, a few broad inferences are drawn about the changing perspectives of political scientists.

Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties.

In the perspective of those political scientists who would reform American parties so as to make them more “responsible,” British parties are familiar prototypes. Prominent among the admired qualities is the cohesion displayed in parliamentary voting by the members of each major British party. That this cohesion is greater than that of American legislative parties has been generally observed at least since the work of A. Lawrence Lowell. And it is common enough, though not universal, to regard British parliamentary solidarity as a virtue particularly because it permits a victorious party, after an election, to enact the program behind which a majority of voters have presumably been rallied. Correspondingly, the relatively low cohesion among Republican and among Democratic congressmen is taken as a defect of American politics. The purpose of this article, however, is not primarily to discuss value judgments concerning parliamentary cohesion. Rather it is to examine the nature of that cohesion and the ways in which it is maintained. But regardless of the disputed merits of British practice, it is still reasonable to ask after such an examination whether the cohesion of party members in the House of Commons is the product of devices which the United States could adopt, or whether it is the result of underlying factors alien to the American environment.

Partisan Foreign Policy: Britain in the Suez Crisis *

Often as foreign policy may be the subject of partisan discussion in modern democracies, important international commitments are usually made only with support, or the expectation of support, from the great bulk of the political community. This has surely been the ordinary American and British pattern, labeled bi-partisan, non-partisan, or extra-partisan. We assume that political support extending well beyond the ranks of the party in office is essential for a successful foreign policy, and especially for a substantial military venture. Even the American decision to defend South Korea, while it was necessarily made by the Democratic administration before any apparent political consensus and while it eventually involved the United States in an unpopular war, was never in itself a partisan policy which Republicans as a group refused to support. The one outstanding recent instance of a truly partisan foreign policy is Britains Suez action of 1956. As the significant deviant case, it provides useful insights into the process by which an alternative to the usual bi-partisan arrangement is developed and conducted. Specific questions concern the making of the Suez intervention decision, the nature of parliamentary support for this decision, the role of party loyalty in maintaining such support, and the significance of partisan opposition.

British M.P.S and their Local Parties: The Suez Cases *

Most students of British parties have accepted the view that the mass organizations are decidedly subordinate to parliamentary leadership. Mainly this has meant rejection of the idea that policy is imposed by a party conference, or its delegated executive, in the Labour party as in the Conservative party. But it may also lead one to ignore or depreciate the role of the constituency units which compose the national organizations. That it is a mistake to do so is now suggested by the activities of local party associations during the Suez crisis of 1956–57. Research material derived from this experience provides the bases for altering the common model of the constituency party as a unit in the mass service organizations sustaining the parliamentary leadership. True enough, the association of dues-paying partisans is primarily service rather than policymaking. However, the Suez experience indicates that this service includes a partly selfgenerating function in relation to the maintenance of parliamentary party cohesion, going beyond the well-known earlier instances of local Labour units simply following national orders to drop candidates who were suspected Communists.

ELECTORAL DECISION AND POLICY MANDATE: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE

From survey data concerning a gubernatorial election and tax policy preferences, the author shows that policy preferences, while probably providing a crucial electoral increment, do not thus provide a majority mandate for the policy proposed by the winning candidate. Leon D. Epstein is Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, and the author of Politics in Wisconsin, 1958, and other books and articles.

Changing Perceptions of the British System

Since the development of their academic discipline over a century ago, American political scientists have treated British parliamentary democracy as a benchmark in evaluating the American system.1 For almost half of that century, it is distressing for me to realize, I have tried to contribute to that comparative enterprise. Now I hope only to refurbish previously stated views by taking into account recent political experience and selected scholarly interpretations of that experience. My perspective combines respect for the British political system with a disbelief in the suitability of its parliamentary institutions for the United States. As a corollary, I treat the separation of executive and legislative powers as workable, if not ideal. It is so central in the American system that its drastic transformation, as distinct from marginal changes in its practice, is inconceivable in circumstances short of a catastrophic breakdown of the system itself. These views are hardly unusual. They are at odds only with a scholarly minority that

William H. Young

At age 93, William H. Young died at his home in Madison, Wisconsin, on March 3, 2006. His long career was distinguished for contributions not only to political science and to the University of Wisconsin-Madison, on whose faculty he served for 36 years, but also to Wisconsin state government, international educational development, particularly in Asia, and several Madison organizations on whose boards he remained an active member for more than two decades after his academic retirement in 1983. Bill was wise and prudent, and, as I well knew from our 35 years as faculty colleagues, his advice was judicious and generously provided.

Westminster's World: Understanding Political Roles.

Introduction - roles, rules, and rationality. Part 1 Backbench roles: policy advocates - checking the executive ministerial aspirants - anticipatory socialization constituency members - redress of grievances parliament men - a window to the past. Part 2 Leadership roles: parliamentary private secretaries - fagging at 40 whips - managing members ministers - leadership in Westminster and Whitehall ministerial role strains and role choices conclusion - institutional structure and individual choice in perspective. Appendices: interviewing members of parliament coding preference roles.