Leon J. Goldstein

Theory in History

It is obvious enough to those who read what philosophers writing in English have to say about problems of history that the main focus of interest and point of contention is the nature of historical explanation. And even within that general theme, interest is confined more narrowly to the question of whether or not explanations in history rest upon general laws or theories, “covering laws” in the increasingly used term of William Dray. On the one hand, we have the view, often associated with the names of Hempel and Popper, yet including among its supporters such writers as Brodbeck and Gardiner, and actually rooted in writings earlier than those of any of these, according to which explanation must always presuppose general laws for only these can warrant an inference from one particular state of affairs to another particular state of affairs. And on the other, we have writers such as Donagan, Dray, Gallie, and Scriven offering a variety of arguments to the opposite effect, and in particular, making much of the claim that historians do indeed explain or offer explanations which are complete and reasonable, yet make no use of general laws. Some may think that the debate has grown stale and tedious, and that essentially the same arguments—though occasionally with greater subtlety—are repeated time after time. And some may deem it a matter of regret that neither side seems able to reach the other, or if you like, that neither side seems amenable to persuasion.

Evidence and Events in History

The first part of the paper distinguishes between a real past which has nothing to do with historical events and an historical past made up of hypothetical events introduced for the purpose of explaining historical evidence. Attention is next paid to those so-called ancillary historical disciplines which study historical evidence, and it is noted that the historical event is brought in to explain the particular constellation of different kinds of historical evidence which are judged to belong together. The problem of explaining events is then taken up, and an attempt is made to defend the view that such explanation must presuppose general laws. And this is followed by a discussion, partly speculative, of social-historical laws. The final section of the paper tries to argue that the subjective intentions of individuals are irrelevant to historical explanation.

Toward a Logic of Historical Constitution

The question which it is my intention to explore in the pages which follow is, What makes an historical reconstruction acceptable? But before I begin, it seems appropriate to say something about the term ‘historical constitution,’ particularly since so far as I know I am the only one who uses it. Such perverse idiosyncracy ought not to be indulged, yet in the present case some justification can be offered. I am not wedded to the term for its own sake, but it does seem to suit my purpose admirably. What I am trying to do when I use it, is to avoid using the established alternatives, because those alternatives carry along with them suggestions about history and historical knowing which I should want to reject.