Leonardo R. Arriola

Patronage and Political Stability in Africa

Political conflict across Africa is often linked to the pervasive use of patronage in retaining control of the state. However, few sources of data have been available to systematically examine the relationship between a leader’s patronage strategies and the likelihood of an extraconstitutional change in power. This article employs ministerial appointments to the cabinet as a proxy for changes in the size of a leader’s patronage coalition. With time-series cross-section data on 40 African countries, this study shows that the size of cabinets varies systematically according to regime type, resource constraints, ethnic fractionalization, and total population. It then shows that African leaders extend their tenure in office by expanding their patronage coalition through cabinet appointments. A proportional hazards model of regime duration indicates that cabinet expansion lowers the probability of a leader’s being deposed through a coup. The appointment of one additional minister to the cabinet lowers a leader’s coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage-point increase in economic growth.

Ethnicity, Economic Conditions, and Opposition Support: Evidence from Ethiopia's 2005 Elections

What do the 2005 parliamentary elections reveal about the nature of opposition support in Ethiopia? Although the final election results have been disputed by the major parties, these results do suggest that the race between ruling party and opposition party candidates was highly competitive in most electoral districts. However, there is no clear consensus among students of Ethiopian politics to explain the evident variation in opposition support across the country and especially across its largest regions. Some stress the role of ethnicity in determining support for the various opposition coalitions, while others point to such factors as nationalism and neopatrimonialism. The puzzle of opposition support in Ethiopia can be generalized to the rest of Africa, where ruling parties manage to win reelection by relying on a set of familiar strategies—distributing patronage, exploiting ethnic cleavages, and employing violence (van de Walle 2003; Adejumobi 2000; Diamond and Plattner 1999). While ruling parties’ deliberate manipulation of the electoral arena is well established in the Africanist literature (Takougang 2003; Makumbe 2002; Crook 1997), we still lack a clear conception of the factors that enable opposition parties to build popular support in countries where democracy has yet to be consolidated. We have no adequate explanation for why voters in some electoral districts are more willing to take a risk in opting for an opposition

Capital and Opposition in Africa: Coalition Building in Multiethnic Societies

Under what conditions can opposition politicians with ethnic constituencies form electoral coalitions? In Africa’s patronage-based political systems, incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure the endorsement of politicians from other ethnic groups. Opposition politicians, however, must rely on private resources to do the same. This article presents a political economy theory to explain how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital influences the formation of multiethnic opposition coalitions. It shows that the opposition is unlikely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages where incumbents use their influence over banking and credit to command the political allegiance of business—the largest potential funder of opposition in poor countries. Liberalizing financial reforms, in freeing business to diversify political contributions without fear of reprisal, enable opposition politicians to access the resources needed to mimic the incumbent’s pecuniary coalition-building strategy. A binomial logistic regression analysis of executive elections held across Africa between 1990 and 2005 corroborates the theoretical claim: greater financial autonomy for business—as proxied by the number of commercial banks and the provision of credit to the private sector—significantly increases the likelihood of multiethnic opposition coalitions being formed.

Protesting and Policing in a Multiethnic Authoritarian State: Evidence from Ethiopia

When do ethnic groups engage in antigovernment protests in authoritarian states? What impact do the repressive strategies of such governments have on the violence associated with protests? Widely accepted theories of ethnic conflict suggest that the introduction of electoral competition in multiethnic states almost inevitably degenerates into violence. 1 Yet, while it seems straightforward that groups experiencing an uncertain political liberalization might resort to protest or other forms of violence to pursue their collective interests, the empirical findings on the relationship between regime type and ethnic mobilization remain ambiguous. Some scholars find that political violence is more likely to occur with the initial democratization of multi-ethnic states, 2 while others show that ethnic protest is no more likely to emerge in newly democratized states. 3 Beyond the uncertain association between regime type and ethnic mobilization, only a limited understanding exists of how dissent unfolds in multiethnic states governed by authoritarian regimes. This gap in knowledge is troubling considering that the countries classified as autocracies and partial democracies have levels of ethnic diversity that are 40–50 percent higher, on average, than countries considered full democracies. 4 Establishing whether or how authoritarian regimes liberalize thus entails identifying the conditions influencing the mobilization of the aggrieved groups they govern. It also requires understanding how the repressive strategies of those regimes influence the dynamics of mobilization. Although studies of ethnic conflict and state repression have produced important contributions in this respect, the cross-national and aggregated nature of much of this scholarship may obscure what occurs within these countries. 5 If this is the case, the impact of ethnic mobilizations most commonly cited causes—grievances and resources—may be misspecified.