Leone Leonida

Education and crime: evidence from Italian regions

This study examines the impact of education on criminal activity in Italy. A number of hypotheses are tested regarding the effects of education and past incidence of crime on criminal activity, using annual data for the 20 Italian regions over the period 1980 to 1995. Empirical results show that education is negatively correlated with delinquency and that crime rates display persistence over time. The results are robust to model specifications and endogeneity.

Total factor productivity and the convergence hypothesis in the Italian regions

This article is aimed at testing the catching up hypothesis for the Italian regions. The use of Malmquist productivity indices allows to decompose productivity growth into technological progress and technical efficiency change, interpreted respectively as innovation and catching up measurements. The analysis leads to a conclusion that regional economies diverge at a decreasing rate.

Profits persistence and ownership: evidence from the Italian banking sector

The hypothesis that ownership structure affects persistence of profits in the Italian banking industry is tested. The time-invariant components of ROA and ROE are regressed against ownership concentration and the fraction of shares held by the major shareholders. The results show that abnormal profits increase if ownership is concentrated in foundations and banks, and decrease if market forces are allowed to operate.

Corruption and Referee Bias in Football: The Case of Calciopoli

Based on the Calciopoli scandal, which uncovered widespread corruption in Italian football, this paper quantifies the effect of referee bias on the performance of football teams. The impartiality of referees is often distorted by external factors which exert some emotional pressure in order to influence their decisions. On the other hand, corrupt referees consciously and deliberately try to distort the results of the sport contest, in order to favor the corrupting teams. Building on the implications of a model where performance in a sport contest depends on both effort and bribing, our results highlight the different effects of these two forms of bias, and help to shed light on several aspects of the corruption scandal.

Political and Economic Liberalization: Is this Relationship Non-Linear?

Why high levels of market liberalization can be supported by both repressive and liberal political regimes? Drawing from Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), we use a large dataset of world economies and document the existence of a U-shaped relationship between political and economic liberalization. This functional form explains the ongoing dynamics in the relationship between democratization and economic liberalization in the light of the political calculus that incumbent governments make when are confronted with policy decisions.

Testing the Political Replacement Effect: A Panel Data Analysis

This article tests for the existence of the political replacement effect, as suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson: [American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, pp. 115–131]. They argue that the implementation of market-oriented reform is crucially driven by the political calculus of incumbent governments: they implement economic policy change if such a choice is not expected to reduce their chances to retain power. This implies a non-monotonic relationship between the level of political competition and the extent of economic reform. We test this hypothesis using data for 102 countries over the period 1980 to 2005. Our results strongly support the theory.

Towards an equilibrium level of market reform: how politics affects the dynamics of policy change

In this article we examine the dynamics of economic reforms that are implemented by incumbent policy-makers interested in maintaining their political power. We use a sample of 86 countries over a time period going from 1980 to 2001 and find that the achievement of an equilibrium level of market liberalization is highly costly. Our results are robust to endogenity and model specification.

‘O convergence, where art thou?’ Regional growth and industrialization in Italy

Abstract This paper shows that the Italian economy has two long-run equilibria, which are due to the different level of industrialization between the centre-north and the south of the country. These equilibria converge until 1971 but diverge afterwards; the end of the convergence process coincides with the slowing down of Italys industrialization policy in the South. In this paper we argue that to address this problem effectively, an economic policy completely different from that in place in needed. However, such a policy is unlikely to be implemented given the scarcity of resources and the short run nature of the political cycle.

Executive Ownership and Excess Cash Policy in the UK: Evidence from the Pre-Crisis Period

In this paper, we study the impact of the executive ownership on the probability of adopting an excess cash policy in the UK over the period 1990-2007. We provide a new approach to identify firms which adopt an excess cash policy and we distinguish between executive and non executive ownership. Results suggest that executive ownership is a controversial corporate governance mechanism: at low levels, executive ownership aligns interests of executive managers to those of shareholders and reduces the probability of adopting an excess cash policy; whereas at high levels it entrenches executives and increases the likelihood of adopting such a policy.

Per Capita Income Distribution: Linking Theory to Empirics

The present work analyzes convergence issues on a sample of international countries. By using nonparametric and semiparametric techniques, evidence of club convergence is found. Multimodality and persistence is a result emerging from the study of both real data and steady-state solutions. Thus, divergence and polarization in income distribution are due to the structural characteristics of economies, rather than to transitional dynamics. Besides, simulations show that multimodality is due to fundamentals and the implementation of not efficient policies. Finally, the most important contribution of this work is due to the first utilization of transition matrices in causal terms, so that we can investigate the reasons for cross-country divergence.